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Affinity, Worth, and Fecundity  
On Susan Wolf’s Advice for Living a Meaningful Life 
John Partridge* 
Abstract 
I examine Wolf’s hybrid theory of meaning in life and her recommendation of an important 
additional consideration for persons wishing to live meaningfully. Her advice is that we consider 
whether and to what extent our caring for something would create additional unique and 
transformative value. I call this fecundity. Wolf is correct to think that the prospect of fecundity 
matters to agents who wish to life meaningfully, though it is not a requirement on meaning like 
affinity and worth. Still the advice raises questions about her analysis. I pose the objectivists’ query 
about the necessity of the subjective “affinity” condition, but also argue that key elements of the 
affinity condition are better captured by an emotional state theory of happiness. 
 
1. An Important Third Consideration for Those Wishing to Live 
Meaningfully 
 
Susan Wolf’s hybrid theory holds that meaning in life arises “when 
subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.” Thus, we should consider 
both affinity and worth in determining the reasonableness of our projects, cares, 
and activities. She seems to hold that activities or projects that meet the affinity 
and worth requirements may have another feature as well. One way she puts it is 
as follows: 
 
In other words, meaning in life arises when subjective attraction meets 
objective attractiveness, when one finds oneself able to love what is 
worth loving, and able, further, to do something with or about it—to 
contribute to or promote or preserve or give honor and appreciation to 
what one loves. (Wolf 2002, 237, emphasis added). 
 
Just being at the intersection of affinity and worth is not enough. As the passage 
indicates, a certain kind of activity and some measure of success must happen as 
well. This is clear and consistent throughout Wolf’s work as I’ll show in part 3. 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Wheaton College, 26 E Main Street, Norton MA 02766, USA. 
Email: partridge_john[a]wheatoncollege.edu  
 2
But the sense that there could be something else besides affinity and worth 
comes earlier. She says that there are “at least three sorts of consideration” we 
should undertake when determining what would be most suitable to care about 
or love. The third is “whether (and how much) the relation between the person 
and the object has the potential to create or bring forth experiences, acts, or 
objects of further value” (235). Here is the fullest elaboration of her point: 
 
Perhaps even more important that the considerations mentioned so far 
is a further point—namely, that affinity for an object, activity or person 
encourages or makes possible kinds of worth or value that would not 
exist without it, value that lies not in the object considered in itself, but 
in the lover of that object or the relationship between them. Some 
people bring out the best in each other; they allow or encourage each 
other to fulfill their potentials. Similarly, a person’s affinity for a genre 
or for a more particular type of entity can inspire and stimulate him in 
ways no other thing can. One thinks of Glenn Gould’s relation to Bach, 
of Merchant and Ivory’s relation to post-Victorian fiction. (Wolf 2002, 
235) 
 
Wolf states that the third consideration is possibly “more important” than the 
other considerations. Why? 
This moment in Wolf’s argument invites us to look very carefully at the 
intersection of affinity and worth to better understand her advice to persons 
looking to live meaningfully. My paper aims to examine this intersection and her 
advice of a third consideration. I conclude that Wolf is right to offer this advice, 
but for reasons that differ somewhat from those implied by her analysis. I 
believe that the third consideration, which I’ll call “fecundity,” becomes visible 
in some instances of the affinity-worth intersection, though fecundity is not a 
distinct requirement on meaning. So far, Wolf might agree. But she will disagree 
with my reevaluation of affinity, the key features of which are better accounted 
for by the right conception of happiness. And she’ll disagree with one potential 
implication of my view, namely that worth is not only necessary for meaning, 
but may be sufficient for it. My aim here, however, is to argue that fecundity 
describes the condition of an agent who is more likely to successfully and 
durably produce transformative objective worth. On the view I favor, happiness 
characterizes the emotional state of such a person. Thus, Wolf is right to put 
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forward this evocative characterization of fecundity when advising those who 
wish to live meaningfully; and she is right to see meaning’s motivation to be 
distinct from the motivations of hedonic conceptions of happiness as a final 
good. But on my view, it is because happiness, rightly understood, is playing an 
important role in making meaning more likely.   
 
2. Fecundity in Wolf and Frankfurt 
 
Let me now come back to Wolf’s evocative picture of a life in which affinity 
and worth come together in the special way that creates unique value. Why, we 
can ask afresh, is this such an important element in life?  
There might be many different answers. First, the “experiences, acts, or 
objects of further value” denote a value that obtains uniquely. Second, it is a 
value that is grounded not in the object, but in the subject or in the relationship 
between subject and object (cf. Nozick’s notion of relational meaning). There 
are also gestures toward the idea that we are engaged in the fulfillment of our 
nature, or in developing and exercising our capabilities, or in plumbing deep or 
core features of our identity.  
Whatever precisely she means in that passage, Wolf certainly affirms that 
our caring can be generative of other values and productive of special outcomes 
that arise in no other way. I believe that this generative dimension of meaning 
obtains our caring results in deep, intense, or comprehensive engagement of a 
productive sort. Specifically, the caring should engage us deeply in ways that 
leave distinctive marks on us and on the world. It leaves a mark on us by 
fulfilling our potential, or realizing our nature, or exercising our capabilities. 
And it leaves a mark on the world by inspiring the creation of independent value 
that would not otherwise exist.  
Call this “fecundity.” At its heart is a generative and transformative 
dimension of living. It recalls Plato’s Symposium when Diotima instructs 
Socrates that we all seek to “give birth in beauty.” Socrates, now convinced of 
Diotima’s account of what it is like to be in contact with Beauty itself and by 
itself, seeks every day to honor Eros (212b). He does this by giving birth to true 
virtue and rearing it (212a). That is to say, he creates or brings forth experiences, 
acts, or objects of further value. In this way, Socrates is engaged in an activity 
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that transforms himself and the world.1 I’ll come back to Diotima very briefly at 
the end, but first I want to say a few more words about fecundity as it appears in 
more contemporary discussions.  
A brief look at Frankfurt may help us understand the generative dimension 
of fecundity and its contribution to enhancing the goodness of one’s life. To 
begin, Frankfurt speaks of the way that loving and care produce value. “[E]very 
possibility of loving is a possibility of bringing about a state of affairs that 
possesses some value” (Frankfurt 2002, 246). What is more, he writes that when 
people love things for which they have an affinity, they are provided with “rich 
opportunities for fulfilling their most satisfying capacities, and that enable them 
to flourish” (2002, 245).2 This captures the idea that affinity can leave a mark 
on us. In addition, he shows how caring shapes our identity and directs our 
actions (1988/1982, p. 83), which are conditions that make it possible for us to 
impact the world. A summary of his position on these matters is no better stated 
than in The Reasons of Love: “It is by caring about things that we infuse the 
world with importance. This provides us with stable ambitions and concerns; it 
marks our interests and our goals” (2004, 23).  
Frankfurt can accept my characterization of fecundity to the extent that he 
understands how care and loving both create value and are personally 
transformative or structuring. On these points, he and Wolf agree. 
But—famously or infamously—his view is that love and care not only create 
value and make one’s life meaningful, but they may do so regardless of the 
objective worth of the object of care.3 This is a big difference since for Wolf, 
meaningful activity must involve the agent in something of independent worth, 
whereas Frankfurt’s meaningful activity is significant because it connects the 
agent intrapersonally. Specifically, the loving agent connects him- or herself via 
distinctive volitional states that give rise to oneself and one’s identity. Wolf’s 
                                                     
1 The Phaedrus tells a similar story, but (1) adds an essential role for interpersonal eros and (2) offers 
a fuller account of how the loving subject is transformed by his erotic engagement. The philosophical 
lovers in the Phaedrus find in their love for one another a path that connects them to the truth (252d). 
This is a pattern that permits them to imitate the god and the right way to live (253a) and which, if 
they remain chaste, yields virtue (256b). Like Socrates, then, the lovers in the Phaedrus also bring 
forth virtue, and in so doing, transform themselves and the world. 
2 What are “satisfying capacities”? Does he mean to say that the value of exercising our capacities is 
hedonic? 
3 “An enthusiastically meaningful life need not be connected to anything that is objectively valuable, 
nor need it include any thought that the things to which it is devoted are good. Meaning in life is 
created by loving. Devoting oneself to what one loves suffices to make one’s life meaningful, 
regardless of the inherent or objective character of the objects that are loved” (Frankfurt 2002, 250) 
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examples in the passage above, by contrast, also link the activity of the caring 
self to outcomes or states of affairs like beauty in music or film. In Wolf, the 
further value created by the fecund agent is not neutral or agnostic with respect 
to its mind-independent outcomes or objects. Let’s turn to her picture now. 
 
3. A Closer Look at Wolf’s Intersection of Affinity and Worth 
 
In her 2010 book, Wolf writes in familiar ways when she holds that meaning 
arises ‘‘when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness, and one is able 
to do something about it or with it’’ (26, emphasis added here and below). But 
she also speaks in somewhat different ways to illuminate things, saying that 
meaning arises from ‘‘loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in 
a positive way’’ (2010, 8; cf. 2010, 8-10). Later, these same ideas return: 
‘‘meaning arises when we actively engage in loving objects worthy of love in a 
positive way’’ (2010, 27). This way of putting the point leaves aside the 
evocative specification of what our caring might do to us and to the world; also, 
there is no more mention of Gould or Merchant and Ivory. In fact, when she 
captures the dynamic and generative dimension of meaning in life, she does so 
in a different way:  
 
By living in a way that is partly occupied by and directed toward the 
preservation or promotion or creation of value that has its source 
outside of oneself, one does something that can be understood, admired 
or appreciated from others’ points of view, including the point of view 
of an impartial indifferent observer. (2010, 28-29) 
 
With this passage, she is moving away from, or merely emphasizing less, the 
picture she offered in her 2002 piece. Indeed, the focus here is to specify what 
sort of objective worth is present in a meaningful life; there is less attention on 
the condition of the agent living a meaningful life (as she herself recognizes; see 
n. 5 below).  
In her 2007/2016 essay, a similar stress on the objective worth side of her 
formula emerges. She offers a series of cases, starting up from the most 
meaningless life she can think of, in order to “highlight by their absences other 
elements of meaningfulness” (116). Blob spends day after day, and night after 
night, watching sit-coms on TV and drinking beer. Blob’s life is lived in a “hazy 
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passivity” that while not unpleasant, is “unconnected to anyone or anything, 
going nowhere, achieving nothing” (2007/2016, 116). The Idle Rich Person, 
contra Blob’s passivity, has a life full of activity. But the activity is silly, 
decadent or useless. Finally, the Corporate Exec unlike the others, has activity 
that is serious (they work “twelve-hour, seven-day weeks, suffering great 
stress”) but does it only in order to amass personal wealth. Wolf also mentions 
Wiggins’ Pig Farmer as a person who resembles the Corporate Exec. Like the 
Exec, there is activity, and activity that has an aim. But it is an endless toil of 
buying land, to farm corn, to feed pigs, to buy more land, to farm more corn, to 
feed more pigs, etc.  
The dominant activities in the first group of lives share a common feature: 
they seem “pointless, useless, or empty.” She labels them all Useless. And unlike 
the cases below, they are activities which may succeed at what they are doing, 
but are not meaningful because their values are “shallow or misguided” 
(2007/2016, 117). Also, for Wolf these three cases are meant to be rather clearly 
meaningless, while the next three (and especially the last one) are cases about 
which, she acknowledges, it may be more controversial to say they lack meaning. 
First on the list is the Bankrupt Manufacturer who devoted “his life to creating 
and building up a company to hand over to his children,” only for the product to 
become obsolete right as he retires. Then comes the Scooped Scientist whose 
imminent discovery is published weeks earlier by another scientist. Finally, there 
is the person in a Fraudulent Relationship whose devotion made another person 
central to their life, but the relationship was a fraud (2007/2016, 117). These 
three cases she labels Bankrupt. They are aiming at the right kinds of ends, but 
are unsuccessful in bringing them off.  
These paradigms of meaningless lives provide the opportunity for her to 
show what a meaningful life must contain. Blob’s meaningless life helps to 
establish that meaning in life requires activity, and she means this to involve 
more than just motion or physical activity.4 After all, the cases of the idle rich 
person and the corporate executive help to secure a requirement that the activity 
                                                     
4 “If there is nothing we love or are able to love, a meaningful life is not open to us” (Wolf 2002, 237). 
In part five, I use the case of the Exiled Daughter to suggest, as various objective theorists have also 
done, that this is not true because we can have a meaningful life despite being in a disfavorable 
emotional state with respect to our dominant project. If Wolf’s claim is that meaning in life is 
unavailable to the person who could not love their project, perhaps because it does not merit love, then 
I would agree. But then this is really a problem for the project’s worth, not the agent’s attitude toward 
it; and as the rest of this paragraph and the next footnote shows, for Wolf the person must have the 
right attitude toward it.  
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involves active engagement, which they all notably lack. This term, active 
engagement, is doing rather heavy lifting. The projects we’re actively engaged 
in are ones that we identify with, embrace, and regard with pride (118-119).5 To 
be sure, one will not find meaning in life, she thinks, in a state of passive 
receptivity, nor in unserious flitting around in amusements. But crucially too, 
she claims, one will not find meaning where there is alienation or when “going 
through the motions.” Thus, Wolf’s alienated housewife (118-119, cf. 115-116 
and 121) lacks the subjective sense that her experience of endless chores is 
rewarding or fulfilling, and instead feels “emptiness and dissatisfaction” (116). 
So too for the conscripted soldier (2010, 113), where subjective affinity of the 
necessary sort is called “fulfillment” (see also Wolf 1997 and 2010). Let’s take a 
closer look at this so we can understand the significance of its absence. 
Fulfillment, Wolf says, is a type of hedonistically-valued subjective state, 
but one that is contrasted with the “fun” of an amusement park ride and other 
mere pleasures. But there is much more to it than this. It is a rewarding 
subjective experience that one feels, but also that has a cognitive component 
directed at the object or activity that provides the feeling. Wolf holds that to 
meet the affinity requirement, the object or source of the feeling must be seen as 
good or worthwhile in some independent way (2010, 24). Indeed, she thinks that 
the object of affinity is not merely desired but recognized as desirable and “felt 
to answer a certain kind of human need” (26). The felt need is for a kind of 
objective or independent value that one’s activity links up to. In fact, when we 
feel that were occupied with something of independent worth, it can be thrilling 
(29). Her view of affinity or fulfillment, then, really takes seriously the idea of 
its intersection with worth. She is careful not to make the feeling into something 
too intellectual, but it does involve an appreciation or felt sense of the 
independent value of the activity by which we are engaged. In the ideal case, the 
activities that engage us are ones that the alienated housewife “would proudly 
and happily embrace” as “constituting at least part of what her life is about” 
(2007/2016, 119).  
For Wolf, the affinity condition on meaning requires the right sort of 
subjective attraction, one denoted by “active engagement” or “fulfillment.” Not 
                                                     
5 Wolf cites her 2007/2016 and her 1997 as sources for the claim that “meaning in life consists in and 
arises from actively engaging in projects of worth” (2010, 26) but says in a footnote that “this 
formulation fails to emphasize the element of love (or passion or identification) as much as the other” 
(26, n. 12).  
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every subjective proattitude will rise to the level needed for meaning to emerge. 
Active engagement is rather thickly conceived to involve a range of attitudes 
and affects, as well as volitional and cognitive commitments.6 Only on this 
thick construal will we see subjective attraction as “a great and distinctive good 
in life” (2010, 15). This shows how complicated the intersection of affinity and 
worth becomes. It is no mere intersection, nor a haphazard coming together. The 
subjective state must be partly constituted by a judgment of the worth of the 
source of the subjective state; the affinity or sense of fulfillment must be fitting 
or apt. 
We can see this in her discussion of the first three cases under the Useless 
category when she says that the activity must be positive. Her sense of this term 
is not initially obvious. Wolf says she wants to be pluralistic about what sorts of 
activities meet this characterization of being “positive,” recognizing that people 
like different things (e.g., some like sports, others like intellectual pursuits). The 
only firm line she draws is saying that the activity must be value-bearing apart 
from the subject’s regarding it so (2007/2016, 119-120). This is objective worth, 
clearly. Additionally, Wolf draws on the three Bankrupt cases to say that we 
need some success in our activity if it is to contribute meaning to our life. Abject 
failure, or even significant thwarting, cuts against the intuition that an activity is 
meaningful.7 These points help us to see that the objective worth condition can 
only confer meaning in life when there genuinely is independent worth and there 
is some degree of success in bringing out that value or linking up to it.  
These arguments confirm that Wolf’s slogan characterizes two distinct 
sources of value which can intersect, and that the additional clause details a 
requirement of what must happen at that intersection. Affinity and worth are 
necessary, she thinks, but something like these extra elaborations, captured by 
the phrase “active engagement in a positive way,” merely show what sort and 
degree of affinity and what sort and amount of worth are needed for meaning to 
                                                     
6 See her 2010, 112-114 where, when responding to critics, she says that “fulfillment” names a 
complex and variable subjective state (like love), but she adds that this cannot be cashed out in terms 
of happiness. I argue in part 6 that to an important degree it can and should be cashed out in terms of 
happiness.   
7 There are many cases, however, where a measure of meaning can emerge (See Schmidtz’s failed 
sandbagging efforts [2001/2016, 103]; Wolf’s scooped scientist or her failed poet also come to mind) 
but an account would be required (as Wolf rightly agrees cf. 2007/2016, 117; I offer such a case and 
such an account in my discussion of the exiled corporate exec in part five). In her 2010 reply to critics, 
she affirms again that success matters, to some degree. See pp. 104-107 and her discussion of what 
we’d say to the failed scientist and how we can’t say whether a minor poet’s life is less meaningful 
than a major poet’s life (108).  
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appear.  
Soon I’ll raise a doubt about this picture by asking what would happen if the 
activities and experiences merit pride and identification, but the person having 
or performing them holds back, or does not find the characteristic subjective 
rewards in them. Wolf’s position entails that such a person is not living 
meaningfully, but objective theorists like Metz, Smuts, and Bramble disagree. 
And supporters of a rival hybrid view, like Evers and van Smeden, think that the 
affinity requirement is too strong and wish to recast it as a valuing requirement. 
Like these critics, I think that the affinity requirement, as Wolf characterizes it, 
opens her position to counterexamples. However, the impact of these 
counterexamples can be mitigated by Svensson’s stress that meaning in life 
“depends at least in part on what that person likes, enjoys, cares about, or 
desires” (Svensson 2017, 50), and my case in part five features a person whose 
project is desired and cared about, but who still experiences significant 
disaffection. In this way, I think that Wolf’s point about having subjective 
attraction to our projects and activities matters, and so I think she is right to 
advise us to consider what our affinity makes possible and how it does so.  
 
4. What the Search for a Third Condition Called Fecundity Shows 
 
Initially in Wolf, the third consideration for agents seeking to live 
meaningfully, which I call fecundity, looks like a separate claim about agents 
straddling the affinity-worth intersection who then bring forth special value. But 
that impression may be formed more by the way she is arguing there. Her 
examples—of Gould, and Merchant and Ivory—imply that she’s looking at 
exceptionally meaningful lives, or at least lives that are unambiguously 
meaningful. This approach helps her to draw out the full importance of having 
meaning as a concept distinct from happiness and morality.8 We can judge that 
Gauguin’s life, for example (cf. Wolf 2007/2016, 120), is quite meaningful even 
as he shirks moral duty by abandoning his wife and children, and, I would add, 
even as he endures considerable unhappiness, given all of his suffering, poverty, 
illness, and frustration. Once Wolf establishes meaning as a concept distinct 
from the concepts of happiness and morality, she can then begin to work through 
her particular conception of meaning as a hybrid of affinity and worth. This is 
                                                     
8 Metz uses “admiration” or “love” to capture the third value (Metz 2016). 
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where she makes refinements that detail what thresholds must be reached in both 
affinity and worth, or what degree of intertwining they have. As we have seen, 
her argument proceeds not with a vision of a life of resplendent meaning, but via 
several paradigms of meaninglessness that permit her to construct a particular 
conception of meaning that would successfully match our intuitions about 
meaning in life. Central to these intuitions, she believes, is that the concept of 
meaning in life speaks to our desire and need for objectivity.  
The case she makes for the necessity of objectivity is quite effective.9 To 
see what role is played by the affinity condition, I’ll examine a case of a 
meaningful life in which robust subjective attraction is lacking. But in the final 
section, I want to follow out Wolf’s advice on fecundity. I’ll show that fecundity 
is certainly a property found in many good lives, and so it is prudent for agents 
to consider the likelihood that their projects will have the generative and 
transformative impacts that fecundity denotes.  
 
5. Meaning Without Affinity: The Case of the Exiled Daughter 
 
Wolf has argued that even the intense activity of the Corporate Exec fails to 
meet the standard of “active engagement in a positive way” because their 
“misguided values” seem to misconstrue the worth of amassing a private fortune 
either as such, or in relation to the frenetic activity that it requires. The problem 
may also be that the goal of amassing personal fortune is not one that the person 
embraces in the right way. They may be doing it automatically, say, rather like 
the pig farmer who just continues the cycle endlessly. Or it may be something 
that they cannot or do not take pride in or identify with, or that won’t bear up if a 
justificatory demand is made. Whether through lack of objective worth, or 
insufficiency of subjective attraction, we can imagine that the Corporate Exec is 
one long dark night of the soul away from a collapse.  
Let’s consider a variation of the case. Imagine that a family now lives in 
exile, having fled a corrupt state that destroyed the family business, seizing all 
of its assets and all of the family’s wealth. This so aggrieves that father that he 
lives the rest of his life in bitterness. The daughter grows up and decides to 
amass a personal fortune equal to the amount that was seized, and strains every 
                                                     
9 Moreover, as Metz has argued, “many of what initially appear to be motives to adopt subjectivism 
lead us, upon reflection, to think that there are things that are good not solely because they are the 
object of a propositional attitude” (Metz 2013, 170).  
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nerve to achieve it before the father dies. It becomes her overriding project; it 
defines her. Surely the life of this Corporate Exec, the Exiled Daughter so 
described, is not meaningless anymore.  
Wolf would be right to object. On this scenario, it is not a “mere” personal 
fortune, but a project that has both real and symbolic meaning. The project aims 
at rebuilding the family fortune and, by doing so, mending the sorrow that ails 
the father, restoring the family’s honor, and providing the legacy that was lost. I 
believe, and think that Wolf would too, that this life is no longer a paradigm of 
meaninglessness, but perhaps even an exemplary case of meaning in life. But let 
me make it harder for her to accept this with one last wrinkle.  
It’s the same scenario but in this version, the daughter achieves everything 
in a state of disaffection.10 Perhaps she is burdened by demands of filial piety 
that she can neither fully endorse and make her own, nor entirely resist in order 
to live differently. Then we are back with a case that feels more like it is 
meaningless for Wolf. She resembles the alienated housewife insofar as both 
regard the endless swirl of unfulfilling obligations as something they cannot 
embrace and identify with. Let us add further that in this situation, the father’s 
mood brightens considerably; he finds himself delightedly telling stories of how 
he started his business back in his home country, and he now beams with pride 
when he speaks of his daughter. Other family members find inspiration in the 
daughter’s project, and they aren’t the only ones. The news media transmit the 
story in ways that draw positive attention to her and her family, while also 
driving increased scrutiny of her former home country and its corrupt past. 
Eventually, legal action is taken successfully against the corrupt officials, some 
of whom go to jail. All through this process, the family legacy is enhanced. 
People see the daughter as possessing the same traits that the father used when 
making his business so successful, and this inspires other emigrants in similar 
circumstances to take action. A political movement is born; in time the country’s 
corruption is removed, root and branch.  
One would be hard pressed to find a more profound impact of a life. Even 
                                                     
10 Landau 2017 (171) and Metz 2013 (183-4, cf. 135) each discuss a case like this one, with a pained 
or bored Mother Teresa, respectively. Bramble’s example of Alice the Master Economist (2015, 448), 
whose beneficial work is sheer drudgery for her, is closer to mine since our unhappy persons are each 
uniquely fitted to do the beneficial work that no one else can do. But my case is different still because 
other important features of fecundity are present in the Exiled Daughter. She finds that her capabilities 
are both expressed in and further refined by the work that she does, but for which she has lost her 
passion. 
 12 
without sharing the money or doing something with it (it remains “a personal 
fortune”), the daughter’s work has objective worth because it successfully 
carries out a positive project. Moreover, there is a significantly fecund outcome: 
her activity brings forth real value but it is value that only she could create. Such 
value is expressive of her own values and the values of family members whom 
she loves. The activity also tests her talents and refines her capabilities through 
her considerable struggle, with the result that she is altered for the better, at least 
in these respects. Still, like Wolf’s alienated housewife and the conscripted 
soldier, she finds no joy in the activity. What is more, she does not identify with 
or take pride in it, even as those closest to her, whom she loves, do so and urge 
her to do likewise. Or, if she identifies with or takes pride in it, she does so 
weakly. Either way, she lacks the customary felt-sense of fulfillment, or the thrill 
of connecting up with independent worth. It would appear that this is a case that 
lacks the right degree of, or an importance aspect of affinity, active engagement 
or fulfillment that Wolf believes is partly constitutive of meaning in life. 
Wolf or her supporter might say that this case is not likely, and I agree.11 
But supposing it psychologically possible, as I think it is, then the life in 
question is meaningful without being subjectively rewarding. So, at any rate, 
might Metz, Smuts, and Bramble argue. Even if they are right, however, I 
believe Wolf’s advice to persons who want to live meaningfully remains sound. 
We should look for experiences and activities that are apt to hold us in their 
thrall for a long while, and which test our capabilities, draw on our skills, and 
alter us for the better when engaging them. Such undertakings promote 
meaningfulness. They do so in part because they provide lasting inspiration, 
which sustains us through reversals, begets opportunities for additional creative 
or transformative activity and experiences, and makes more independent value 
more likely to appear.  
 
6. How Fecundity Describes One Kind of Very Good Life 
 
Wolf’s discussion of the alienated housewife, like my case of the Exiled 
Daughter, helps us to see how much of a loss alienation brings us. It is a loss to 
the goodness of our life. Even if our life remains good because it is meaningful, 
it would be better still were the subjective rewards present. Still, as many argue, 
                                                     
11 In her 1997, she calls the possibility “dubious” (208; cf. 222 on how happiness tracks 
meaningfulness much more frequently than it does meaninglessness). 
 13 
what matters for meaning is not our affinity for our projects but what we’re able 
to do with our projects. Diotima agrees. Though true virtue is begotten by the 
philosopher who is gripped by eros, it is the fact that he gives birth to true virtue 
that matters ultimately, not the state he is in when doing it, and still less the 
attitude toward his own state or the objects he produces while in that state.12   
It should also be noted, however, that what matters for meaning is not all 
that matters in life. Consider what Wolf says about the alienated housewife when 
the reader first meets her: 
 
When a person self-consciously looks for something to give her life 
meaning, it signals a kind of unhappiness. One imagines, for example, 
the alienated housewife, whose life seems to her to be a series of 
endless chores. What she wants, it might appear, is something that she 
can find more subjectively rewarding. (Wolf 2007/2016, 115).13  
 
This is exactly right. Like the Exiled Daughter, she wants something that is 
subjectively rewarding even as she is doing important work. Her work of 
parenting and supporting a family may be a deep ideal, one that was long 
dreamed-of and not to be abandoned when the going gets tough. What she wants, 
though, is that a certain kind of positive feeling attend the efforts to which she 
has committed herself. But the feelings are missing; the moods, emotions, and 
propensities that normally draw an agent toward creative or constructive activity 
are not there. I do not know what these feelings are if not the kind of things 
found in happy people. Therefore, I would call for us to reject the “ordinary 
understanding of happiness” and go for a richer one that better captures our 
intuition about what happiness is and the role it plays in our lives.14 This 
conception helps us to see that what the alienated housewife lacks is better 
                                                     
12 Diotima surely believed that our emotional condition mattered greatly to our ability to be creative 
and productive. Eros aims at eudaimonia, but one is eudaimon when giving birth in beauty. Elsewhere 
Plato holds that eros is a divine madness (Phaedrus 244a-245c, cf. 265a-b), but this is so because it 
fires us to exercise deep capacities that are proper to our nature and also helps us to transcend and 
perfect ourselves.  
13 “It is the absence of such feelings [sc. fulfillment] (as opposed to the absence of love, for example) 
that indicates that there is an important good missing in these lives that is not captured by our ordinary 
understanding of happiness, but which cannot be cashed out purely in terms of objective value either” 
(Wolf 2010, 113 cf. 113 n.3). 
14 See note 13 above. My paper takes some initial steps down the path recommended by Svensson 
2017, namely to examine “more demanding notions of happiness” and their relationship to meaning in 
life (48, n. 9). 
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understood as happiness, not meaning or an essential aspect thereof.15  
The alienated housewife and the Exiled Daughter want something 
worthwhile which at the same time provides them with rewarding experiences. 
These experiences are the sort that flow from and help to sustain the emotional 
states that Haybron locates as central to happiness. For him, happiness is “an 
individual’s responding favorably, in emotional terms, to her life—responding 
emotionally to her life as if things are generally going well for her” (Haybron 
2008, 111). This is not a wellbeing or hedonist conception. To be happy on the 
emotional state theory of happiness is to be in a condition he calls “psychic 
affirmation” unless it is in a more pronounced form, when it is called “psychic 
flourishing” (111). He goes on to analyze this into three broad categories of 
favorable emotional condition: attunement, engagement, and endorsement (112). 
They need not all be present together, but they are modes of response that 
correspond to a particular aspect or dimension of happiness. The Exiled 
Daughter lacks happiness, or she may be in some state of unhappiness.16 
Eventually this might sap the inner resources for doing the work that makes for 
meaning in her life. But on my view, were this to happen, then the failure to 
living meaningfully owes not to the presence of a disfavorable emotional 
condition per se but to the effect of that condition on her ability to create value.17  
Fecundity characterizes a life that has very much going for it. It is apt to be a 
life that is brimming with vitality and happiness, and it is apt, for that very 
reason, to be a life that produces and promotes objective value. But it is not the 
case that we do the activity to become happy. It is because we’re happy that we 
do the activity. We are advised to consider what marks on the world we are 
capable of leaving, but also what engagements we can focus and sustain long 
enough to create those marks. The chief insight of a hybrid theory is that it 
recognizes the importance of objective worth and the role of subjective affinity 
                                                     
15 “…[I]t is a mistake to think that just because someone is yearning for passion he is yearning for 
meaning” (Bramble 2015, 448).  
16 Paradigmatic cases of unhappiness might answer to one or more of these descriptions, a few of 
which are true of the Exiled Daughter, Alice the Master Economist, and the variations on Mother 
Teresa in note 10 above: “being depressed, melancholy, despondent, anxious, ‘stressed out’, seething 
with rage, overwhelmed by fear, worried sick, heartbroken, grief-stricken, lonely, empty, low, 
burdened with shame, bored, feeling insecure or worthless, feeling spiritually reduced, pressed-upon 
or ‘compressed’, or deeply dissatisfied with life.” (Haybron 2008, 49) 
17 Some people might construe long stretches of lack of happiness as being worse, inter alia, than 
sharp but brief bursts of unhappiness, as it relates to the motivations needed to initiate and sustain the 
work of having or producing experiences, acts, or objects of independent value. One’s judgement on 
this matter probably has more to do with temperament than principles.   
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in bringing it about. Ideally, I should consider, among available activities and 
experiences, which ones are tied to deep features of my nature, and which might 
sharpen or refine those features in ways that generate more value, or which 
equip me to be produce value in other areas or endeavors. From the standpoint 
of meaning, the subjective condition matters as part of what makes our creation 
and promotion of objective worth more likely. 
There is much more that needs to be said about fecundity. It may embrace 
multiple conceptions of meaning in life—from perfectionist, to utilitarian, and 
perhaps narrative value (cf. May 2015), among others—and some may be more 
at home in the concept than others. In addition, some aspects of Haybron’s 
conception of happiness might be emphasized more than other aspects as it 
pertains to the creation or promotion of objective worth. Finally, the stress on 
individuality—with the focus on uniqueness and creativity—may bind fecundity 
to some cultural contexts more tightly than to others. But as Wolf rightly 
recommends, we want to preserve the insight that it is better for us when our 
have active engagement, a propensity to undertake the activity or project in a 
wholehearted way, and in a way that prompts us to identify with it. But it is also 
better for us, and fundamental to our life’s meaning, that the activity links up 
with or creates value of the sort that can be recognized from a third-person 
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Abstract 
This paper provides a critical introduction to the most important phenomenological treatments of life. 
Formally, we may characterize these treatments as either reductive or non-reductive according to how 
they situate life ontologically vis-à-vis specifically human life, what the tradition calls “existence.” 
Whereas reductive or “existentialist” accounts posit an experiential continuum, a single horizon of 
disclosure articulated by structures which are present to varying degrees commensurate with 
organizational complexity, non-reductive accounts understand life and existence as modes of being 
in their own right, as defined by regimes of disclosure which are different in kind. On my reading, the 
Heidegger of the 1920s, his student Hans Jonas, and more recently, the French phenomenologist 
Renaud Barbaras fall into the reductivist camp, while the later (post-1930) Heidegger and Max 
Scheler can be counted among the non-reductivists. After briefly sketching out the respective 
positions, I suggest arguments in favour of the non-reductivist approach. 
 
1. Introduction: What is Life-Phenomenology? 
 
Life, as with all the foundational concepts of philosophical investigation – 
being, truth, the good – has the curious property of being at once too near and too 
far. In one sense, there is no great mystery about life. We can give a more or less 
stable, consistent, theoretically useful account of life in terms of biochemical 
states and processes. We can even speculate cogently about the more sublime 
cosmic origins of life (perhaps microscopic life is carried everywhere throughout 
the universe by meteoroids, as the theory of panspermia holds). To be sure, there 
are limit cases and lingering, perhaps insurmountable problems of definition. But 
on the whole these serve to confirm rather than undermine the strength of the 
scientific account of life. Indeed, it is that very strength and intelligibility which 
provide the background against which such problems and limits can first appear 
and make sense at all, as they do. 
In another sense, however, life eludes us entirely. If upon reflection we are 
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inclined to describe life, generally speaking, in scientific terms, this is not the way 
we typically think and talk about life in ordinary language. If I say “Lazarus rose 
from the dead,” I certainly do not mean that Lazarus suddenly began to maintain 
homeostasis or that he reacquired the ability to adapt to conditions in his 
environment. If when baking a loaf of bread I open a sachet of yeast and wonder 
whether it is alive, it is possible that I am simply asking whether it works – but it 
is equally possible that I am asking a question about what it means to attribute 
“living” to this little pile of brown dust at all. In this case, I am not asking whether 
it is in fact capable of performing some kind of energy-yielding chemical 
exchange, but rather whether that itself and as such bears any relation to, or is in 
any way commensurate with, what I know and understand of life. 
The success of the scientific account of life is due to the way in which it 
objectifies life. It sets life apart, as the defining feature of living beings, in order 
to make various empirical, or “ontic,” determinations about it. Life becomes 
comprehensible just to the extent that it remains something external, other. Even 
when we apply these empirical determinations to ourselves, it is only insofar as 
we bring ourselves into focus and take stock of ourselves, from the privileged 
position of the abstract distance opened up by the theoretical gaze, as equally 
objectified, as bearers of life taken as a set of features characteristic of certain 
kinds of organized systems. Likewise, it is only because life is held in focus in 
this way that local disagreements can arise concerning precisely which features 
belong to life and which do not. On the other hand, the life that we know and refer 
to in an average everyday way is manifestly not of this sort. It is rather the life 
that we know subjectively, “from the inside,” as it were. The special vantage point 
here is not that of the theorist who stands over and against life as an object of 
study but instead that of the living – one who lives out or lives through life, one 
for whom life is not merely another thing encountered in the world but rather a 
condition of encountering anything at all, not something experienced so much as 
a horizon of experientiality. 
Whenever we apprehend life in this way, from out of the midst of its very 
living, we understand life not ontico-empirically but ontologically, as a mode of 
being definitive of certain kinds of beings. What we see, more precisely, is the 
way in which what it means to be a being of a certain sort is a matter of what is 
given to such a being and how it, in turn, is open to, encounters, and relates to the 
given in its givenness. As beings whose way of being is (at least partially) 
determined by life, we are what we are precisely in our opening up onto, having, 
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and negotiating what manifests itself to us in just those ways which accord with 
life. 
To be sure, this is not to suggest that in our average everyday understanding 
of life we carry around and wield sophisticated ontological theories of life. The 
problem is rather just the opposite. If the scientific account of life makes life 
intelligible and manageable only at the cost of a certain artificial distanciation and 
objectification of life, the problem with our everyday understanding of life is that 
life is far too near and intimate to be able to say anything meaningful about it at 
all. That which puts us in touch with the very being of life at the same time ensures 
that this being forever escapes us. What we call the “mystery” of life resides 
precisely here, in the aporia of life’s ineluctable disclosure in retreat. To wonder 
at life is at once our prerogative and our curse. Stranded in the χώρα between 
absolute knowing and absolute ignorance, we are stirred and solicited by life 
despite, or rather because of, its very elusiveness. Intuitively, we all know that life 
exceeds – essentially – the sum of its biochemical concomitants, but the meaning 
of this excess seems structurally and permanently out of reach. 
When we ponder the possibility and meaning of the life of that sachet of yeast, 
we are above all questioning the silent ontological assumptions of the scientific 
account itself. We are asking, in essence, whether and how anything like a “living 
out” can be attributed to this stuff – whether it admits of any sort of relation to the 
given in its givenness, even formally. Of course we do not doubt that this stuff 
does what science says it does. Rather we are asking if that is all life really is. Is 
this stuff “open” in any meaningful sense? Does anything “appear” to it in any 
way, and how? And does that matter? It is in this way that reflection on the 
empirical determinants of life quietly but inevitably passes over into philosophical 
speculation about the being of life. 
How, then, shall we approach life in its most mysterious aspect? Can 
philosophy provide any insight into what our everyday proximity to life always 
already withholds from us? Does philosophy have any resources by means of 
which we might step into the midst of actually lived life and describe what is given 
to life in the specificity of its givenness? 
Generally speaking, whenever philosophy situates itself within the midst of 
the given in order to isolate and describe some cohesive set of formal structures 
of givenness, it is phenomenology. Formal structures here means neither 
empirico-psychological features nor a priori transcendental conditions, but rather 
something like “schemata” which articulate and specify an ontologically 
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determinate horizon of disclosure. Methodologically, then, phenomenology 
necessarily begins with some procedure of “bracketing” (epoché), a shifting of 
orientation or perspective by which the so-called “natural attitude” characteristic 
of unreflective, pre-philosophical daily life is suspended or disqualified in order 
that the particular horizon at issue (pure consciousness, being-in-the-world, 
perception etc.) can be set off and held in focus. In this way the given is 
apprehended not as object but precisely as given in conformity with these 
schemata, that is, as phenomenon. To take a simple and classic example, when I 
stand at the lectern, I position myself vis-à-vis an object of a certain size, shape, 
texture, and weight, and with a certain number of sides etc. From the perspective 
of pure consciousness, however, all that is ever given to me is a never-ending 
series of partial images, or “adumbrations,” that together constitute an objective 
unity structurally shot through with incompleteness, negation (such that I never 
have the “whole” object in view, or more precisely, there is a “hole” structured 
into and constitutive of the “whole” itself). 
To ask whether and how we might situate ourselves in the midst of life with 
an eye to its concrete being-lived is thus simply to ask about the possibility of a 
phenomenology of life. It is to ask whether we can in fact discover any such 
general experiential forms or patterns that would justify an interpretation of life 
as a horizon of openness in its own right. More specifically, it means asking 
whether any being that can be said to partake of this experiential horizon “has” 
things in certain ways that are exclusive to such partaking and therefore withheld 
from all beings we regard as standing outside it. To return to our yeast example, 
if we were to attribute life to this pile of dust in a phenomenological and not 
merely a biochemical sense (and ignoring as irrelevant the metaphysical problem 
of the possible relation between these), this would mean committing ourselves to 
the view that the yeast “has” things in ways that non-living entities (actual dust, 
for example) do not – ways that, moreover, are formally identical to the “ways-
of-having” characteristic of everything that lives (whether plankton or people). 
What would such a “having” entail? Or, put differently, what does it mean to be 
in a “living” sort of way? 
 
2. Reductivist and Non-Reductivist Approaches to Life 
 
Historically, philosophical attempts to provide a phenomenological account 
of life have tended to fall into two general camps, what I will call reductivist and 
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non-reductivist. On the reductivist side I count, for example, the early Heidegger, 
his student Hans Jonas, and the contemporary French phenomenologist Renaud 
Barbaras. On the non-reductivist side I include the later (roughly post-1929) 
Heidegger and Max Scheler. Reductivists are so named because they posit a single 
mode of being, “life,” of which the way of being characteristic of human beings, 
what the tradition calls “existence,” is only a particular moment or local 
modification. At the same time, the description of the lived content of life is 
modelled on human existence itself as life’s most advanced form and the 
completion of its “evolutionary ascent.” The reductivist itinerary is succinctly 
expressed by Jonas when he writes in The Phenomenon of Life that his aim is to 
provide “an ‘existential’ interpretation of biological facts” so as to “recover the 
inner dimension” which is necessary “for the understanding of things organic.”1 
Reductivism, in other words, proceeds in two directions at once: ontologically it 
collapses existence into (a mode of) life, while ontically it arrives at the concrete 
reality of life by way of a “privation” of the basic structures of existence (the so-
called “existentialia”) as the end and summit of life’s own teleological unfolding. 
(For this reason, we may use the terms reductivist, existentialist, and teleological 
interchangeably.) Non-reductivists naturally reject this approach. In place of an 
unbroken chain of being culminating in “existential life,” they posit a kind of 
“ontological surprise” irrupting into being itself – the spontaneous emergence of 
an entirely sui generis field of manifestation and relation. 
 
2.1. Reductivism: Early Heidegger, Jonas, Barbaras 
 
Reductivism can be characterized as a form of onto-phenomenological 
monism. This does not mean a metaphysical theory according to which the totality 
of being is conscious or pre-conscious (though it is certainly compatible with such 
a view: Jonas himself advances a neo-Schellingian Naturphilosophie whereby 
human Spirit is “adumbrated” in the lowest forms of inorganic matter). Rather it 
means only that the principal distinction to be drawn is between non-openness 
and openness simpliciter; in positing a single horizon of openness, it treats all 
openness as such as formally-ontologically identical. This horizon is known 
simply as world. World, Jonas says, is “the basic setting for experience – a horizon 
of co-reality thrown open by life.”2 In the same way, for the early Heidegger, the 
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“phenomenological category, ‘world,’ immediately names…what is lived, the 
content aimed at in living, that which life holds to.”3 The essence of life is 
therefore “being-in-a-world,” such that anything that lives, from protozoa to 
primates, must be said to have a world. That the terms “life” and “world” have the 
same fundamental meaning, Heidegger says, is expressed in ordinary language by 
the fact that “the one word can stand in for the other: e.g. ‘to go out into life,’ ‘out 
into the world’; ‘to live totally in one’s world,’ ‘totally in one’s life.’”4 In a 
passage that will surely sound strange to anyone familiar only with his later work, 
Heidegger insists on the basic and irreducible enworldedness of all living beings: 
 
Life is that kind of reality which is in a world and indeed in such a way that 
it has a world. Every living creature has its environing world not as 
something extant next to it but as something that is there for it as disclosed, 
uncovered…[Biologists] are now reflecting on the fundamental structure of 
the animal. But we miss the essential thing here if we don’t see that the 
animal has a world. In the same way, we too are always in a world in such 
a way that it is disclosed for us.5 
 
Accordingly, onto-phenomenological monism implies that all differences in the 
lived content of life can amount only to ontico-empirical differences in the world-
relation itself. If human existence and plant and animal life are not separated by 
an unbridgeable “abyss,” then there is only ever being-in-a-world more or less…, 
a continuum of what Jonas describes as “rising degrees of world-perception” and 
“scope and distinctness of experience” culminating in the human λόγος. Both 
Jonas and the early Heidegger share this teleological view of the ontologico-
evolutionary ascent of life. Jonas leaves no room for ambiguity or 
misinterpretation here: 
 
[There] is always the purposiveness of organism as such and its concern in 
living: effective already in all vegetative tendency, awakening to primordial 
awareness in the dim reflexes, the responding irritability of lowly 
organisms; more so in urge and effort and anguish of animal life endowed 
with motility and sense-organs; reaching self-transparency in 
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consciousness, will and thought of man: all these being inward aspects of 
the teleological side…of “matter.”6 
 
Indeed, Jonas traces the line of ascent to humanity back to bare matter itself, 
whose properties “found their opportunity along the course of mechanical 
evolution to realize, in the seeming automatism of causal sequence, some of the 
hidden potentialities of original substance: of which realization we are 
instances.”7 Conversely, “the more we descend to the lower rungs of the ladder 
of life-forms,” the more do these “hidden potentialities” dissolve back into their 
primordially constitutive elements, first into “obscure sensations” and the 
“elementary stimulation of organic irritability,” and ultimately into the “primeval 
restlessness of metabolizing substance”8 itself. Heidegger, likewise, although he 
shares none of Jonas’s idealist metaphysical leanings, advances essentially the 
same view. When Heidegger writes that “[everything] that is alive, to the extent 
that it exists, has a world, which does not hold for what is not alive,”9 it is clear 
that he is treating “existence” as the highest expression of life insofar as it involves 
the greatest “extent” of world. The essential point, to be clear, is not merely that 
the horizon of life expands and contracts corollary to the external development of 
the organism, but more fundamentally, that the ontologically defining features of 
life are already present, in nuce, even in the most primitive and germinal 
manifestations of life. This is why Heidegger can claim that even the most 
rudimentary life-form “knows about itself, even if only in the dullest way and in 
the broadest sense.”10 Whereas a stone, say, is simply “on hand,” even a “very 
primitive unicellular form of life…will already find itself,” though such self-
finding (Befindlichkeit) may be no more than “the greatest and darkest dullness.”11 
As for these ontologically defining features themselves, the lived substance of 
being-in-the-world, it is now easy to see that a certain “method” is implied. For if 
life is an experiential continuum of which the human stands at and as the summit 
in virtue of a “psychological totality which represents the maximum of concrete 
ontological completeness,” it follows that the essential meaning of this lived 
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substance is “determined by way of progressive ontological subtraction,”12 a kind 
of “reductive biology” whereby, as Heidegger says, we “determine the worldhood 
of the animal by certain modified ways of considering”13 our own world-relation. 
Now we know life just insofar as, and in the way that, we ourselves live it, namely, 
as resistance to what stands over and against us as a domain of opposition and 
constraint. For reductivists, accordingly, alienation is the basic experience and 
setting of all life: the living being forges its “internal identity,” first awakens to 
self-consciousness, in the struggle with finitude, its Sisyphean reckoning with the 
external powers that confront it and ultimately threaten it with death. In his 
summer semester lectures from 1925, Heidegger gives the example of a snail 
crawling out of its shell. Is the snail “in” its environment in the way that water is 
“in” a glass? Does the snail first encounter a world only by reaching itself out to 
something which it thereby, in and through such reaching, discovers as “not-
itself”? By no means. Rather, having a world is the a priori condition of its 
reaching out and encountering anything to begin with. The snail’s crawling out of 
its shell, Heidegger writes, “is but a local modification of its already-being-in-the-
world. Even when it is in its shell, its being is a being-outside, rightly understood. 
It is not in its shell like water in the glass”; rather “it has a world” from the 
beginning and essentially.14 But what sort of world is this? Fundamentally, “a 
world described as standing over and against it, an opposition which it broaches 
by first crawling out.” Jonas takes this abstract idea of the world as a zone of 
originary “opposition” to its logical conclusion. For Jonas, the dawn of life is itself 
“the emergence, with life as such, of internal identity,” but in that very emergence, 
life’s “self-isolation too from all the rest of reality.” Thus – 
 
Profound singleness and heterogeneousness within a universe of 
homogeneously interrelated existence mark the selfhood of organism. An 
identity which from moment to moment reasserts itself, achieves itself, and 
defies the equalizing forces of physical sameness all around, is truly pitted 
against the rest of things. In the hazardous polarization thus ventured upon 
by emerging life, that which is not itself and borders on the realm of internal 
identity from without assumes at once the character of absolute otherness. 
The challenge of selfhood qualifies all this beyond the boundaries of the 
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organism as foreign and somehow opposite: as “world,” in which, by which, 
and against which it is committed to maintain itself. Without this universal 
counterpart of otherness, there would be no “self.”15 
 
We are not far from the philosophy of Fichte here, for whom “infinite striving,” 
the “ceaseless struggle against a hostile world,” is “the condition of the possibility 
of all objects, of experiencing a world opposed to our activity.”16 Just as for 
Fichte neither self nor world can appear except in and through their mutual 
limitation, so too for Jonas and early Heidegger life just is the opening up of a 
zone of opposition tout court. Such opposition is the meaning of the “in” of the 
living being’s “being-in” its world. 
Although he comes armed with a more sophisticated conceptual toolkit, the 
contemporary French phenomenologist Renaud Barbaras takes essentially the 
same view. Like Jonas and early Heidegger, Barbaras thinks “existence in terms 
of life,” that is, not an addition to life “but only a new dimension of life.”17 
Moreover, “that to which life relates and that at which life is aimed”18 is the 
unitary horizon of “world,” which, as before, is described as inherently 
provocative and “alienating,” such that life is condemned to eternal restlessness 
and unsatisfactoriness. The main difference is that whereas Jonas, for example, 
understands alienation in terms of the threat of lost continuity of being (in short, 
of death), Barbaras locates it more anciently, in the nature of manifestation, i.e. 
“be-ing,” as such. 
Life, Barbaras writes, “is the condition of the appearance of a being that is 
absent from what presents it.”19 Because being necessarily retreats and recedes 
behind the manifold “adumbrations” by and through which it appears, “the being 
offers itself up to an exploration that is, in principle, unending.” For Barbaras, this 
a priori incompleteness and opacity of the world are the ontological corollary of 
a movement out toward the world. By a logic which is never entirely made clear 
(and which non-reductivism will call out and contest, even if only implicitly), it 
is precisely because the world “continuously slips away from the gaze that it is 
given as the end or goal of a movement.” The being solicits in its very withdrawal 
– “it offers itself up as a weak directionality because it cannot be possessed in an 
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intuition.”20 
Life, in short, is “desire,” that is, an impossible yet irrepressible drawing 
nearer toward what, if the integrity of life itself is to be conserved, can and must 
never come forth to meet or fulfil it. Desire does not first experience an object to 
which it subsequently draws near; just to the contrary, “it only experiences its 
object in advancing towards it,” in the sense that “it does not become conscious 
of its object except through the momentum with which it approaches it.” Thus 
insofar as desire is always already too late, “what desire reaches exacerbates as 
much as appeases it.” Desire “never meets its object except in the mode of the 
object’s own absence, and this is why nothing stops it.” It follows that what 
“fulfils” desire “only serves to further hollow it out,” which is “why it can only 
be effectuated as movement.” Life is what Plato called a “leaky jar”: it is the 
“insatiable advance of desire” which corresponds to “the non-positive excess of 
the world.”21 
It therefore matters little that Barbaras faults Jonas’s account for being too 
death centred. It is not the fact of finitude to which Barbaras objects, but only its 
origin and logic. Non-being does not stand opposed to being as subject to object, 
but rather inscribes the object itself and from the beginning. Accordingly, 
Barbaras arrives at the same fundamental interpretation of life, though by a 
different route and in a more originary sense. Life remains “an attempt at self-
realization” through “the mediation of an other” that resists it, only now resistance 
is understood in terms not of a “defiance” of the “equalizing forces of physical 
sameness” (Jonas) but of an originary self-refusal of the world itself. There is no 
essential break here with the interpretations of Jonas and early Heidegger. Where 
Heidegger speaks of the “opposition” of the world and Jonas the radical 
“fitfulness” and “deep anxiety of biological existence,”22 Barbaras invokes the 
romantic language of being “condemned” to a perpetual “longing” for the world. 
“Subjectivity is precisely the unity of this loss and this longing” – life “refers back 
to the event of a loss of its existence that takes the form of a longing.” If life is 
“characterized by a fundamental alienation,” this means not any struggle against 
hostile external forces but rather its a priori condition, “a lack of Being that 
prohibits [the subject] from ever fully being what it is and without which it would 
not even begin to desire, and hence, exist.” Life signals the birth of a self to be 
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realized in and through its pursuit of a world that structurally refuses it. As “a 
search for the self in the other,” life “is condemned to a never-ending quest, the 
insatiability of which is the measure of the subject’s self-privation.” 23  Such 
originary privation is “the advent of living being” – a “living that refers back to 
life as a form of scission deep within its core, that is to say, fundamentally, as its 
negation.”24 
 
2.2. Non-Reductivism: The Later Heidegger and Scheler 
 
For non-reductivists, the central problem with the teleological-existential 
view of life is that it leaves no room for the specificity of human life, which is 
now understood simply as a qualitatively enhanced manifestation of life in general. 
Ultimately the thesis of ontological continuity breaks down inasmuch as, if all life 
is an originary unsatisfactoriness vis-à-vis the world, we are compelled to 
maintain that even primitive life is constituted by what seem to be 
paradigmatically human forms of experience. If I see a garden snail munching on 
a leaf, there is a high burden of proof to meet indeed if I am to insist that the best 
interpretation of what this creature is doing is that it is fighting to maintain the 
integrity of its felt experience of selfhood against a hostile external world or, still 
more abstractly, that it is irresistibly solicited by the structural negation lurking at 
the heart of being itself. This raises the suspicion that reductivism is motivated 
above all by ethical concerns – and indeed it is clear that Jonas, for example, and 
for precisely this reason, simply cannot make up his mind about the ontological 
status of human life. At the very same time he claims that all life is subject to 
evolutionary ascent, he carves out a special subset of sui generis human faculties 
– representation, memory, self-creation – which emerge fully formed. But in that 
case, why does this special class of properties not also extend to such things as 
awareness of self and anxiety about death? Conversely, why do these special 
faculties not likewise appear in “rising degrees”?25 
Precisely these concerns are what motivate the non-reductivist theories of 
Scheler and the later Heidegger. The early Heidegger could advance a teleologico-
existential view of life on account of the fact that his main concern was rescuing 
life from what he saw as its illegitimate though near constant objectification by 
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the tradition from Plato onward. Thus Heidegger writes that the entire subject-
object schema “fundamentally and forever obstructs access to that which we have 
indicated with the term ‘factical life.’”26 Operating within this schema, “the basic 
phenomenon of being-in-the-world does not come into view.”27 In opposition to 
all theoretical “de-interpretation” and “de-vivification” of life, 28  Heidegger 
describes life as pure openness – a primordial “it lives” (es lebt) or, insofar as all 
living is in, through, against etc. a world, “it worlds” (es weltet) simpliciter.29 
Given the focus of this early philosophical itinerary, it is not surprising that 
Heidegger would, at this stage, think life in wholly universal terms. When the 
agenda is principally one of destructing all overly “theoretical” accounts of the 
subject, there is no reason not to regard animals and even plants as partaking of 
the same being-in-the-world as human beings, though to lesser degrees. Life (ζωή), 
Heidegger insists, “refers to a mode of being, indeed a mode of being-in-a-world. 
A living thing is not simply at hand (vorhanden), but is in a world in that it has a 
world. An animal is not simply moving down the road, pushed along by some 
mechanism. It is in the world in the sense of having it.”30 It is only later, in the 
process of working through the implications of his fundamental ontology, that 
Heidegger recognizes and clarifies that the kind of world-relation he has been 
describing could only first arise at all if it supervened on deeper structures (namely, 
time and what it makes possible, an understanding of being) that were, to all 
appearances (specifically, the living being’s alogia as the “sign” of the absence of 
such structures), the ontological prerogative of certain living beings exclusively, 
namely, us ourselves – and accordingly insists on an essential rupture within the 
open itself. 
This “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking about life, though long in preparation, is 
accomplished quite suddenly. As late as 1927, Heidegger is still speaking 
(cautiously, to be sure) in terms of a continuum of life ranging from the “mere” 
life of plants and animals to the “existential” life of human beings, and thus of the 
possibility of “making out reductively” how the animal might experience its 
“world.”31 By the time of the seminal winter semester lectures on theoretical 
biology two years later (titled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
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Finitude, Solitude), however, the problematic has shifted entirely. Inasmuch as it 
was simply a matter of emancipating the primordial openness of the “it 
lives/worlds” from all occluding and inappropriate objectification, Heidegger had 
no trouble invoking the “very simple” world of a “primitive animal,”32 and even 
speculating about the possibility of understanding the animal’s world “by certain 
modified ways of considering” our own world. By contrast, once it is determined 
that the animal is “poor in world” (weltarm) – that whatever the animal “has,” it 
does not have beings qua beings – such an itinerary becomes unintelligible. For 
in that case “it is not simply a question of a qualitative otherness of the animal 
world as compared with the human world, and especially not a question of 
quantitative distinctions in range, depth, and breadth” – as in any reductive 
account of “primitive” being-in-the-world. Indeed, “it is not a question of whether 
or how the animal takes what is given to it in a different way, but rather of whether 
or how the animal can apprehend something as something, something as a being, 
at all. If it cannot, then the animal is separated from man by an abyss.” 33 
Accordingly, the 1929-30 lectures are concerned above all with “finding out what 
constitutes the essence of the animality of the animal and the essence of the 
humanity of man,” and the former by way of an ontological determination of “the 
living character of a living being” as such34 – and indeed Heidegger pauses no 
fewer than seven times in the first thirty pages of the biology material to remind 
us, often emphatically, that “life” and “living-being” refer always and exclusively 
to the plant-being of the plant and the animal-being of the animal, never to the 
human-being, the “existence,” of the human. 
Heidegger’s contemporary Max Scheler held a similar position about life. 
Like the later Heidegger, Scheler argued that human reality exhibited structures 
and properties that were different in kind from those observed in all other living 
beings, and therefore that human beings, though undoubtedly “alive,” could never 
be defined ontologically by their participation in life. Human reality is not simply 
“above” life, but rather situated on an entirely different plane of being – the plane 
of spirit. This “novel phenomenon” is not merely “an addition to the psychic 
levels of impulsion, instinct, associative memory, [and] intelligence.” Rather, 
“[this] new principle is beyond what we call ‘life’ in the widest meaning of the 
word. What makes the human being a ‘human’ is not a new level of life,” but 
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something “opposite anything we call life, including life in the human being: it is 
a genuinely new, essential fact which cannot at all be reduced to the ‘natural 
evolution of life.’ If reducible to anything at all, this new principle leads us back 
to the one ultimate Ground of all entities of which life happens to be one particular 
manifestation.”35 
In his last published work, the short text The Human Place in the Cosmos (an 
expanded version of a presentation titled “The Special Place of Humankind” 
delivered at a conference in 1927, one year before his death and two years before 
Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts lectures), Scheler defines the essence of spirit 
in terms of an “existential detachment from organic being.” In other words, “a 
being having spirit is not tied anymore to its drives and environment, but is ‘non-
environmental,’” that is, “‘world-open’: such a being has ‘world.’”36 As with the 
later Heidegger, “world” is thought as the horizon of manifestation of beings qua 
beings. Whereas merely living beings “are ecstatically immersed in their environs,” 
a being that partakes of spirit “turns its centres of resistance and reaction into 
‘objects’ in order to grasp the ‘what’ of all objects itself.” Spirit, therefore, 
involves “matter-of-factness” (Sachlichkeit) in that it is “determinable by ‘what’ 
things themselves are.” Whereas an animal “is unable to turn the environment into 
an object” – that is, “is not removed from its environment and does not have 
distance from its environment so as to be able to transform its ‘environment’ into 
‘world’” – in contrast, “the being of objects is the most formal category of the 
logical side of spirit.”37 
This lack of “Seinsverständnis,” “being-understanding,” implies, a fortiori, 
that the animal, despite being conscious, can never possess that inward subjective 
consolidation or “in-gathering” (Sammlung) which we call “self” and “selfhood.” 
Unlike “the simple reporting-back of the contents of an animal’s lived body 
schema, the human spiritual act is tied essentially to a second dimension or second 
level of the act of reflection,” namely, “‘concentration on one’s own self,’ or the 
consciousness of the spiritual act-centre of itself, ‘self-consciousness.’” An 
animal, to be sure, is “conscious,” but it “does not own itself, it has no power over 
itself – and this is why it is also not aware of itself.”38 This, in turn, suggests that 
the essence of the reductive-existential picture of life – namely, life as a congenital 
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“fitfulness” and “unsatisfactoriness” vis-à-vis what stands over and against it as 
hostile, alien, foreign, inaccessible otherness – is unintelligible and untenable. For 
it is precisely because “an animal does not have a specific kind of self-centredness 
that unifies all sense data with its respective drive impulses and that releases the 
one ‘world’ ordered by the senses” that it has no experience of that “lack which 
is not a lack of this or that” (as Merleau-Ponty calls it39) which lurks at the root of 
all desire. Rather, desire “can only occur in a being having spirit and whose lack 
of satisfaction of its drives is always more than its satisfaction.” What the animal 
lacks, in short, is the temporal dimension that first opens up that horizon of 
expectation – the experience of never enough, the ceaseless approach to the ever-
still-outstanding – on which desire necessarily depends. Thus, “[we] call ‘empty’ 
what remains unsatisfied in the expectations of our drives – the primary 
‘emptiness’ which is, as it were, the emptiness in our hearts.”40 Man is “an eternal 
‘Faust’ or a bestia cupidissima rerum novarum,” one who “is never at peace with 
his environing world,” “always eager to break through the borders of now-here-
whatness,” and “always desirous to transcend the reality surrounding him, 
including the reality of his own self.”41 Being may very well be inscribed with an 
irreparable negation, as Barbaras maintains, but this fact is meaningful only to 
beings who are already “temporally primed,” as it were, to perceive it – and in 
perceiving it, to first become a subject as the subject of it, that is, as stirred and 
solicited by it, as essentially lacking or unrealized vis-à-vis being’s immanent 
withdrawal and concealment. This is why, unlike the animals, “who always say 
‘Yes’ to reality – even when they fear and flee – the human being is the ‘Nay-
sayer,’ he is an ascetic of life; he is an eternal protester against all mere reality.”42 
It is easy to see that non-reductivism is at a relative disadvantage when it 
comes to describing and interpreting the structures and meaning of “mere” life, 
for it is no longer a matter of simply “modifying” – paring down and peeling away 
– the contents of our own lived-experience to arrive at “the worldhood of the 
animal.” Rather we must attempt a procedure which is more akin to Bergsonian 
intuition than Husserlian epoché. Whereas for Jonas the reality of life is laid bare 
by “progressive ontological subtraction” from the “maximum of concrete 
ontological completeness” which is man, for Scheler the essence of life can only 
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be glimpsed by means of something like what Foucault will later call “limit-
experiences” – an attempt to neutralize or “inactivate” spirit. “If we try to place 
ourselves into the everyday state of an animal’s being,” Scheler writes, “we would 
have to think of very rare human ecstatic states – as they occur, for instance, 
during the receding stages of hypnosis, or during the intake of certain drugs, and 
we would also have to think of techniques that inactivate spirit, such techniques 
as are used by orgiastic cults.”43 
Much hay has been made of this interpretation of animal consciousness (the 
experiential content of life in general, in fact) as akin to drugged, doped, orgiastic, 
or hypnotized human consciousness, life as a rhapsody of impressions. It is true 
that both the later Heidegger and Scheler describe the living being as driven 
around within its “environment ring.” Scheler’s claim that living beings “are 
ecstatically immersed in their environs,” whereby “[the] structure of the 
environment fits exactly to, and is ‘fixated’ in, the physiological peculiarity of an 
animal,” such that everything it experiences “in its environment is securely 
embedded in the frame and boundary of its environment,”44 is perfectly echoed 
in Heidegger’s own claim that “[being] open in captivation is the essential 
possession of the animal,” such that the animal’s “being held captive to the 
disinhibiting ring” is “a having of that which disinhibits.”45 But here we should 
be sensitive to the full difficulty of the task at hand. The point is not to deny things 
to life so much as to circumscribe what belongs most properly to life. Thus just as 
Heidegger suggests that the openness of life may be so rich and abundant that “the 
human world may have nothing to compare”46 it with, so too Scheler goes so far 
as to claim that “[gifts], readiness to help, reconciliation, and similar observable 
facts one can find already among animals.”47 The problem is not the potential 
experiential richness of life but how this richness is to be interpreted – how, in 
other words, to think a kind of primordial Fichtean “resistance” of things which 
would be anterior to any “hermeneutic” disclosure, that is, any givenness of things 
as the things that they are, and still less as beings as such. This is what Scheler is 
getting at when he says that a living being “does not experience its drives as its 
drives but as dynamic attractions or rejections coming from things in its 
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environment.”48 “Things” in this sense are not beings but rather something like 
nodes of resistance, densities of attractiveness and repulsiveness simpliciter; the 
idea is that something can manifest itself not as an attractive or repulsive being 
but merely as attractive or as repulsive as such. 
Heidegger floats a similar view in his Aristotle lectures from the mid-1920s 
(technically still carried out within the framework of a continuity theory of being-
in-the-world, but there is nothing here that, in principle, the post-1930 Heidegger 
could not agree with). In these lectures, animal life is defined not by νοῡς, a pure 
observation or theoretical knowing, but rather by ὄρεξις, “desire” as a yearning or 
longing going-out-toward an ὀρεκτόν, a “desirable” simpliciter. Desire indicates 
the way in which the world matters to animals; it takes the form, not of an 
insatiable restlessness vis-à-vis the ineliminable provocations of non-being, but 
rather and simply of a δίωξις or φύξις (or φῦγή), a pursuit or avoidance (or flight), 
vis-à-vis what is disclosed and engaged as διακείμενον and ἀντικείμενον, the 
“disposed-to” and “opposed-to” as such. There exists, in other words, an entirely 
sui generis orectic form of manifestation: things can stand unconcealed, indeed 
can stand in a certain kind of “truth” (ἀλήθεια), and yet not “be” anything at all 
sensu stricto. Through ἁφή, “contact,” life orients itself to what discloses itself as 
favourable or threatening, as desirable or undesirable, as διακείμενον or 
ἀντικείμενον: an animal crawls up a tree trunk “so that it has the trunk in a certain 
way as its obstacle, so that the trunk with which it is there is nonetheless there for 
it as διακείμενον, ἀντικείμενον for the animal through ἁφή, through ‘contact.’”49 
This attempt to think resistance without being is what separates the “deepest 
and darkest dullness” predicated of primitive or “mere,” that is, qualitatively 
reduced or subtracted, life from the “benumbment” (Benommenheit) which 
Scheler and the later Heidegger posit as the essence of life taken as a mode of 
being in its own right. The latter represents not a lesser form of life but rather how 
life is destined to appear to us when we try to deactivate or step outside the source 
and substance of our very humanity. 
 
3. Conclusion: The Case for Non-Reductivism 
 
What I wish to suggest, in closing, is that non-reductivism has the upper hand 
not only theoretically but above all ethically. Phenomenologically speaking, life 
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is the mode of being concomitant with the spontaneous opening up of a zone of 
solicitation and repulsion. It is originary movement in the form of a ceaseless 
drawing-toward and pushing-away-from things – things which give themselves 
not as “beings” to pursue or to avoid but as the pursuable and avoidable as such, 
as it were. To live means simply to dwell in the midst of this zone, in the manner 
of such a movement. Conversely, what we call human existence is not just a more 
sophisticated manifestation or expression of such movement but rather a mode of 
being in its own right – one defined, at the most elementary level, by the 
experience of time. The immediate upshot of this is that we obviate entirely the 
kinds of problems that seem inevitable for reductivism (whose reductio ad 
absurdum is the existential angst of plants and protozoa). The “fundamental 
incompleteness” and radical “experience of dispossession”50 which reductivists 
such as Barbaras claim to discover at the heart of life are essentially temporal 
phenomena. As Levinas puts it, “in Desire there is no sinking one’s teeth into 
being, no satiety, but an uncharted future before me.”51 The negation of the world 
is here not mere logical not-being but rather the deeper, existential non-being of 
unfulfillment. This means that Barbaras’s effort to “think existence in terms of life” 
ultimately fails; his “‘additive’ anthropology” does not “replace the privative 
zoology”52 of the early Heidegger and Jonas but rather smuggles it in from the 
start as its silent presupposition. 
The problem with non-reductivism, on the other hand, at least as we are 
inclined to see it today, is that it appears to be ethically dubious in the way in 
which it cannot avoid “denying” certain things to non-human living creatures, 
such as the capacity to truly die as opposed to merely “perish” (Derrida, for one, 
famously addresses this issue in works such as Of Spirit and The Animal That 
Therefore I Am). Indeed, Jonas’s own life-phenomenology was motivated mainly 
by ethical concerns insofar as he thought that our technological transformation, 
now bordering on annihilation, of nature was due in large part to our failure to 
understand life in the context of the continuity and interconnectedness of the 
totality of being. 
As I see it, however, this is to get things backwards. Our technological 
domination and decimation of nature – the whole monstrous techno-capitalist 
juggernaut which now threatens us with collective destruction in the form of the 
                                                     
50 Barbaras (2008), pp. 14-15. 
51 Levinas (1969), p. 117 (emphasis added). 
52 Barbaras (2003), p. 161. 
 35 
climate emergency, and the will to power that underpins and fuels it – stems 
precisely from that constitutional restlessness, unsatisfactoriness, and anxiety 
which reductivists are so eager to discover in life itself. This is why there is always 
something slightly sinister in the blind urge to demote the human to a mere animal 
and to “elevate” the animal to a human being (formally, if always to a lesser 
extent). The problem is not merely that the animal is presumed to lack something 
vis-à-vis the human – not simply, in other words, that the thing which is left out 
is assumed to be something inherently good such that its omission in itself entails 
a kind of violence to the animal. The problem is instead that this purportedly good 
thing of which the animal is deprived is precisely that which, if present, would 
implicate it in the most obscene forms of violence – just as, by the same token, 
the human being’s own singular responsibility for such violence would be 
correspondingly blurred, muted, redistributed among life as such and as a whole. 
For if the radical, constitutional insatiability which compels the will to power is a 
product of the restlessness of life as such, then man no longer owns it – it is simply 
“the way of Nature.” The difference between an animal catching its prey on the 
one hand and the will to infinite, exponential growth on the other becomes one of 
degree, not of kind. The animal is gripped by the same will to power as that which 
drives, say, the typical Wall Street banker or the board of directors of Exxon 
Mobil; what it lacks is merely the “intelligence” necessary for implementing its 
will more “efficiently.” Conversely, and for the same reason, bending, crushing, 
and ransacking Nature is rendered justifiable and acceptable on the grounds that 
“Nature is cruel” – that is, Nature’s principle is the general one of which the main 
principle of human social interaction under the conditions of late capitalism 
(“Every man for himself”) is only a local and limited instance. If human beings 
are undoubtedly brutal, it is only because Nature itself is brutal, and we are, after 
all, a part and product of general Nature. Such are the problematic (if hidden) 
implications of reductivism. 
We should, I claim, be quite dogmatic on this point. Even if it could be shown 
that animals (above all, the so-called “higher” animals) exhibit some behaviours 
or capacities that appear to confirm the thesis of reductivism, nevertheless such a 
thesis should be withdrawn and withheld on principle and entirely a priori, not in 
order to reduce living beings to the status of objects to be manipulated and tossed 
aside by power, but rather so that they are absolved in advance of any 
responsibility for the consequences of power, or more precisely, for the effects of 
that sense of radical neediness and unsatisfactoriness that elicits and propels the 
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human existent’s insatiable lust for power. The surest sign that plants and animals 
are not like us is not that they do not speak but that they do not produce – that is, 
produce like us, in conformity to the inexorable, all-consuming logic of the will 
to more…, of desire. The way of Nature, Bataille pointed out a century ago, is 
growth followed by exudation, waste. Of all the known beings in the universe, 
only human beings reinvest their waste for the sake of ever more growth ad 
infinitum, with catastrophic consequences. If we thus deny plants and animals the 
word or the capacity to die, this is only in order that we might secure their 
innocence by denying them any complicity in the crimes which the beings in 
possession of those faculties have thus far been powerless to stop themselves from 
committing. The rampant devastation we are presently witnessing all around us is 
not merely an exacerbation of phenomena we encounter everywhere in Nature, 
but rather the profoundest expression of what we are. The ethical advantage of 
non-reductivism lies precisely here, namely, in that it both makes it possible and 
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Abstract 
In this paper I set out to accomplish two tasks. First, I develop a criterion as to what accounts for a 
satisfactory account of life’s meaningfulness. Second, I use this criterion to evaluate four accounts of 
life’s meaning, including Stoicism, existentialism, cosmological nihilism, and the theological 
purposive account. I argue that, in light of the criterion, that both cosmological nihilism and the 
theological purposive account are inadequate. While the existentialism account does meet the 
conditions of the criterion, it ignores important features of what it means to be human—the subject 
of what kind of meaningful life we are concerned with. Given that the Stoic account meets the 
criterion while correctly accounting for what it means to be human, I argue that Stoicism is a viable 




The meaning of life has been a central question of philosophy, going back at 
least as far as Plato (C. 424-348 BCE). In his Apology, Plato recounts Socrates’ 
famous statement that “The unexamined life is not worth living.”1 By assuming 
that Socrates is correct, not only do we come to understand that a life that is worth 
living will be a meaningful one, but we also understand that the meaning of life 
involves reflection and for a person to live meaningfully she should examine life, 
including her own.  
There have been more contemporary attempts to answer questions regarding 
life’s meaning and how to live meaningfully.2 While these are certainly important 
and worthwhile attempts to better understand the meaning of life, I believe more 
historical texts, in particular those provided by the Stoics, also offer significant 
contributions to our attempts to develop an understanding of life’s meaning. This 
approach of appealing to the Stoics is consistent with the Modern Stoicism 
movement to better understand and resolve contemporary philosophical problems 
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1 Plato (2002), 38a5-6 
2 Notably Metz (2013). 
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through the implementation of Stoic techniques and texts.3 While Stoicism has 
generally been viewed as a philosophy of life, as far as I am aware, there has not 
been any formal discussion regarding the meaning of life and Stoicism.4 
In this paper, I look specifically at the works of Musonius Rufus (30-100 CE), 
Seneca the Younger (c. 4 BCE-65 CE), and Marcus Aurelius (121-80 CE) to 
answer the questions regarding the meaning of a human life and what it means for 
a person to live meaningfully. For the purposes of succinctness, I refer to answers 
to these interrelated questions as the account of life’s meaning. In what follows, I 
discuss some potential skeptical concerns with even attempting to give an account 
of life’s meaning. These skeptical concerns provide a foundation for developing 
a criterion of satisfactoriness for an account of life’s meaning. I then argue that 
the Stoic’s account of life’s meaning fulfills this criterion. In subsequent sections, 
I assess the extent to which examples of existentialism, cosmological nihilism, 
and theistic externalism fulfill the criterion’s conditions. Lastly, I consider 
potential objections regarding the initial adoption of a Stoic perspective to the 
issue of the meaning of life.  
 
2. Skeptical Worries 
 
Why offer an account of life’s meaning? There may in fact be reasons for not 
doing so, one metaphysical and one epistemological. With regards to, what I call 
the metaphysical worry, there may not be a meaning of life to discover, so we 
should not seek an answer. This is a mitigated version of nihilism, the view that 
there is no meaning of life.5 In response to the metaphysical worry, when we seek 
a meaning of life, we at least have the possibility of discovering meaning. While 
it may very well be possible that there is no meaning to discover, it seems that our 
lives become more meaningful when we attempt to discover life’s meaning. This 
result is due in part to Socrates’ own thought that when we examine life, we live 
lives that are worth living (i.e., meaningful).   
The second reason for not offering an account of life’s meaning I call the 
epistemological worry. This worry can be expressed as: even if there is meaning, 
we can never know what it is—therefore, we should not seek an answer. This 
                                                     
3 See Irvine (2008), Pigliucci (2018), and Robertson (2019). 
4 I have conducted an extensive search to find any other academic discussions on the relationship 
between Stoicism and the meaning of life to no avail. I apologize if there are any papers I have 
overlooked, but I am also happy to incorporate those papers in subsequent discussions on the matter. 
5 I respond to nihilistic concerns later in this paper. 
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worry, however, flies in the face of many other human pursuits that have proven 
valuable for unexpected reasons. For example, in cosmology we can never know 
how the universe came into existence, in the sense that the universe’s origin will 
no longer be questioned. However, in having pursued the question of how the 
universe came into existence, presuming there was a time when the universe did 
not exist, we now have a better understanding of the behavior of light, the 
development of stars, and our own solar system. Similarly, by attempting to 
understand the meaning of life, we are able to understand what it means to be 
human and our relationships. For these reasons, even if we may not be able to 
know what the meaning of life is, we should still continue to seek an answer.  
My initial responses to the metaphysical and epistemological worries might 
give the impression that I am suggesting we should pursue the question of life’s 
meaning merely for the pragmatic benefits of having done so. But I want to go 
beyond pragmatism and state that it is not enough to pursue the question of life’s 
meaning simply because doing so gives our lives meaning or that there may be 
unanticipated benefits. Instead, we should give an account of life’s meaning. I 
acknowledge that we may not be able to produce the final answer of what the 
meaning of life is or what it means to live meaningfully, such that the question of 
life’s meaning is no longer asked, but some answer is better than no answer. In 
large part, we should give an account of life’s meaning since we orient our lives 
in accordance with what we take the meaning of life to be. Such an understanding 
has the capacity to influence and guide all our other pursuits, including 
professional, personal, and academic. Given the significant impact that an account 
of the meaning of life can have on how we live, we should give an account, while 
being open to its susceptibility to revision.  
 
3. Definitional Concerns 
 
Before setting out a criterion for a satisfactory account of life’s meaning, we 
should be clearer as to what is meant by ‘meaning of life’. By ‘meaning’ I mean 
‘flourishing’. There are, of course, other accounts of ‘meaning’ in the meaning of 
life literature, including ‘accomplished’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘valuable’, and 
‘pleasurable’. While I believe that each of these are important features of a 
meaningful life, I do not believe they are sufficient for understanding how we 
should orient our lives, which I believe we do in light of what we take life’s 
meaning to be.  
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To pursue pleasure as the meaning of life runs the risk of a person constantly 
seeking pleasures that quickly dissipate (e.g., an orgasm) that result in the person 
desiring the next pleasurable event. Epicureans and other hedonists are quick to 
respond to this challenge by ranking pleasures, with intellectual pleasures being 
the highest form since they are the most withstanding form of pleasure. But even 
thinking of intellectual pleasures as the measurement by which a person lives 
meaningfully leaves the individual person looking to some external factor to 
determine if her life has meaning. Doing so is problematic since it is outside the 
person’s control if those external factors will be available. Yet, it would seem that 
if a person truly has a meaningful life, it will not be contingent upon something 
outside the person’s life. Furthermore, the person who is not able to pursue and 
enjoy pleasures should still be capable of having a meaningful life.  
Something similar can be said regarding the view that a meaningful life is an 
accomplished life. The extent to which someone is able to enjoy accomplishments 
will be due to external factors such as the availability of opportunities that permit 
accomplishments to occur. A person who is not provided with these opportunities 
should still be able to develop an account of life’s meaningfulness despite being 
unable to have accomplishments.  
It is possible, though, that it is not so much that a person has accomplishments 
but has the feeling that she has lived an accomplished life given the available 
opportunities—no matter how few they may be. The reliance upon our own 
feelings or psychological states to determine how meaningful our lives are is 
problematic. A person with few life experiences will unlikely be able to 
distinguish between meaningful accomplishments and accomplishments not 
worthy of notoriety. Furthermore, a person who experiences emotional 
disturbances is not in the proper position to assess the meaningfulness of her own 
life. It is an open-ended question, though, as to what sort of accomplishments are 
meaningful ones; who is not capable of experiencing emotional disturbances 
(since we are all susceptible to these sort of disturbances); or at which point of 
our lives we are capable of assessing whether or not our accomplishments have 
contributed to the meaningfulness of our lives.6  
These lingering issues give pause to accepting other emotionally based 
accounts of the meaning of life, including life-satisfaction views. It is not clear as 
to which aspects of a person’s life with which she should be satisfied to have a 
                                                     
6 Haybron (2010) offers a similar line of reasoning, indicating that we are very bad at judging how 
well our own lives are going.   
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meaningful life. Also, individuals with different emotional capacities will 
experience different levels of satisfaction. It is unclear, though, how much 
satisfaction is needed to have meaning. Furthermore, it is not clear at which point 
of a person’s life she should claim to be satisfied with her life to determine she 
has a meaningful life. 
For someone to have a valuable life requires that either the person values her 
life or engages in a life that is valued. Requiring a person to value her own life 
befalls similar problems to the other subjective evaluative accounts. The person 
may not be mature enough or in the right emotional state to value her life in the 
right way to contribute to her understanding of the meaning of her life. 
Furthermore, it is likely that at later points of her life she will come to realize that 
things that gave her life value at earlier points are not as valuable as she had once 
thought. For these reasons, it is not sufficient to have a person value her life for 
her to have a meaningful life. On the other hand, in requiring a life to be valued 
for it to be meaningful begs the question by whom is the life valued? If it is the 
agent herself, then we encounter the aforementioned problems. If it is someone 
other than the agent, then we run into similar difficulties of looking to external 
factors to determine if someone’s life is meaningful (as in the case of pursuing a 
pleasurable life as means to having a meaningful life). There may not be someone 
who is fit to value someone else’s life or it is possible that no person is available 
to provide an evaluation. So, it is not adequate to think of a meaningful life as one 
that is valued. Therefore, understanding the meaningfulness of life in terms of a 
valuable life is unlikely to be a viable way for understanding the meaning of life.    
While the previous line of reasoning would leave ‘flourishing’ as the most 
viable way of understanding ‘meaning’, there are independent reasons for doing 
so. First, flourishing is a description of how the person’s life is going—regardless 
of how the person feels about her life. It is counterintuitive that a person may not 
know if she is living a meaningful life, but it is possible for a child to flourish 
without having the capacity to know if she is doing so. Yet, others with more 
experience would be able to recognize the child’s flourishment. The child’s 
flourishment, however, is not dependent upon the recognition—it is there such 
that it can be recognized. Similarly, an adult’s flourishing does not depend upon 
her recognizing that she is flourishing. Such recognition might enhance her 
abilities to live meaningfully, but the recognition is not the determinant. For this 
reason, understanding ‘meaning’ in terms of ‘flourishing’ avoids many of the 
problems facing attempts to understand ‘meaning’ in terms of ‘satisfactory’, 
 43 
‘accomplished’, and ‘valuable’.  
Second, a person’s capacity to flourish will be constrained by the 
environmental factors in which she is situated. Yet, a person has the capacity to 
flourish as well as she can within those constraints—especially when such 
constraints are beyond her control. This way of thinking of a person’s capacity to 
flourish ensures that a person does not have to appeal to external factors to live a 
meaningful life, thereby avoiding the problems facing thinking of ‘meaning’ as 
‘pleasure’ and one sense of ‘accomplished’. For these reasons, ‘flourish’ is the 
preferred way for thinking of ‘meaning’.7  
With regards to ‘life’ I mean ‘human life’. There are different forms of life 
and we should not assume that what constitutes the meaningfulness of a human 
life will be the same things as a dolphin’s, tree’s, or worm’s life. It may turn out 
that what allows them to have meaningful lives will be determined by the same 
factors—albeit achieved through different means. My present concerns, however, 
will focus on what it means for a human to have a meaningful life. In the next 
section, I propose a criterion of satisfactoriness to use when determining which 
account of life’s meaning a person ought to adopt.   
  
4. Criterion of Satisfactoriness for an Account of Life’s Meaning 
 
There are four criteria that a satisfactory account of life’s meaning ought to 
fulfill. It should be metaphysically non-skeptical, epistemologically non-skeptical, 
accessible, and empirical. I treat each of these as being independently necessary 
for a satisfactory account and argue that they are jointly sufficient (yet, neither 
one is independently sufficient).  
Given the earlier discussion of metaphysical and epistemological worries that 
comprise skeptical attitudes towards developing a satisfactory account of life’s 
meaningfulness, a successful account should at minimum assuage us of skeptical 
concerns. With respect to the metaphysical worry, in allowing for the possibility 
of there not being a meaning of life we should also take seriously the possibility 
of there being a meaning of life. But it is not enough to simply state that there is 
a meaning of life out there to be discovered. Instead, an account of the meaning 
                                                     
7 This may lead us to believe that a virtue ethics approach is the preferred approach to living a 
meaningful life. While Stoics certainly adopted much of virtue ethics, more would need to be said in 
this paper to make the case that a meaningful life is not just a flourishing life, but an ethical life 
(insofar as it flourishes). While I am inclined to agree, I am not making that claim here. Thank you to 
an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this matter.  
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of life should be stipulated as a working hypothesis so that it can be evaluated in 
terms of its capacity to aid in our abilities to live a meaningful life—presuming 
that in having an account of the meaning of life we are then able to better 
understand how to live meaningfully.  
In response to the epistemological worry, in having at minimum stipulated an 
account of life’s meaning, we can establish the conditions for what is involved in 
knowing the account. In particular, we need to at least assume that we can know 
what the account of life’s meaning entails so that we can assess if an account is 
more satisfactory than alternative accounts. The way we should go about 
assessing the viability of any account of life’s meaning will be determined by the 
last two criteria. 
For us to know whether we are appropriately adopting an account of life’s 
meaning, we should have some degree of access to evidence. This accessibility 
condition is particularly important given that we should know whether we are 
living meaningfully. Without being aware of how successfully we have 
implemented the account we do not have the capacity to determine if the account 
is appropriate or how to live in accordance with the view. If we cannot determine 
if the account is appropriate, then we have no reason for preferring one account 
over others. Furthermore, if we do not know if we are living in accordance with 
the account, then we are unable to properly (re)orient our lives. For these reasons, 
a satisfactory account of life’s meaning will require that we can have access to 
some level of evidence that warrants the adoption of the view.  
The kind of evidence we should have access to ought to be empirically based. 
The adoption of an account of life’s meaning will ultimately alter our experiences 
of how we live. This does not mean that we should only look to the extent to which 
we value, have pleasure, feel accomplished, or are satisfied with our lives, 
although these may be useful indicators. Instead, we should look to the observable 
effects of having adopted an account of life’s meaning. These effects will likely 
conform to the details of the adopted account, but the effects need to be observable 
to ensure that it is through the adoption of the account that a person’s life is more 
meaningful for having done so. If the effects are not observable, then the person 
does not know how to realign how she is living to live in better accordance with 
the adopted account. Furthermore, the effects can serve as a test as to whether the 
adopted account should continue to serve as guidance as to how the person should 
live. For these reasons, the effects need to be observable.   
Given the above considerations, we can outline the criterion for a satisfactory 
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account of life’s meaning as follows: 
 
An account of life’s meaning is satisfactory if-and-only-if it is:  
1. Metaphysically Non-Skeptical: Assumes that there is a meaning of 
life M. 
2. Epistemologically Non-Skeptical: Assumes that we can know M. 
3. Epistemically Accessible: We can have access to the evidence in 
support of the belief that M.  
4. Empirical: The evidence in support of the belief that M is observable. 
 
In what follows, I will assess four different accounts of life’s meaning in their 





In answering the question of what constitutes a meaningful human life, we 
should be clearer on what it means to be human. Humans are social creatures. In 
addition to the feeling of loneliness being itself a negative experience, those who 
are left in isolation are susceptible to maladaptive traits. For example, those who 
are placed in solitary confinement are prone to anxiety, post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), hallucinations, and paranoia.9 Thus, indicating that humans 
require some kind of social interaction to pursue a meaningful life, if not to 
survive. 
The claim that humans are inherently dependent upon the social is reminiscent 
of Aristotle’s (c. 384-322 BCE) own thoughts as to what it means to be human 
when he writes,   
 
Man is by nature a social animal…Society is something that precedes the 
individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is self-
                                                     
8 Metz (2013) sets out a similar criterion for determining what ‘life’s meaning’ connotes. My aim, 
however, is to determine what we should expect from a satisfactory account—not necessarily what the 
term ‘meaning of life’ should pick out. While I do discuss in Section 3 what I believe is the 
appropriate interpretation of ‘life’s meaning’ that is not the central aim of this paper. I do believe, 
however, that there is some overlap between our two accounts insofar as my account is naturalistic, not 
reduced to pleasures, and allows for a person to take both a part-life and whole-life view. My concern 
in this paper, though, is to assess how the Stoics can offer insight to the meaning of life.   
9 Hagan, Wang, Aimnawung, et al. (2018).  
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sufficient as not to need to, and therefore does not partake of society, is 
either a beast or a god.10  
 
Not only does Aristotle correctly identify that each person is born into a social 
context, but that a person needs to participate in that societal context if the person 
is to live meaningfully as a human.  
Aristotle’s views had a strong influence on Stoic thinkers. For example, 
Musonious Rufus suggests that human beings are participants, along with other 
organisms, in nature, indicating that nature is inherently social and that all living 
organisms participate in those social relations when he writes, “Human beings and 
other animals on the earth are involved in the turning and changing of the universe, 
as are divine beings.”11 Seneca suggests that we have an inherent need for others 
in his claim that “If we take away all interaction, and we renounce the human race, 
living turned inward only on ourselves, a need for things to do will be the 
consequence of this kind of isolation.”12 Similarly, Marcus Aurelius observes that 
humans are situated in relationship with other aspects of nature in claiming that 
“There are three relations: The one to the body which surrounds thee; the second 
to the divine cause from which all things come to be; and the third to those who 
live with thee.”13 These relations shape how we should live, in suggesting that 
“We were born for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids…so to work in 
opposition to one another is against nature, and anger is opposition.”14 
Since I believe that the Stoics are on the right track regarding what it means 
to be human, it is worthwhile to also consider what insights they offer on what it 
means to live a meaningful human life. The biographer and historian Diogenes 
Laërtius (180-240 CE) offered some insight on this matter. He maintained that the 
Stoics divided humans into two classes: virtuous and nonvirtuous.15 Those who 
are virtuous are able to achieve their respective purposes and aims. Those who are 
nonvirtuous are incapable of fulfilling their respective purposes and aims. For this 
reason, we can begin seeing how the Stoics would maintain there being a close 
relationship between living virtuously and having a meaningful life. For 
Musonius Rufus, this is due to there being “an inborn capacity in the human 
                                                     
10 Aristotle (2013), I.1253a. 
11 Rufus (2011), p. 88.  
12 Seneca (2015) De Tranquillitate Animi 3.7  
13 Marcus Aurelius (2006) Meditations VIII, 27 
14 Marcus Aurelius (2006) Meditations II, 1 
15 Diogenes Laërtius (1925) Lives of Eminent Philosophers 101 7.84-131 
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being’s soul for proper living and that the seed of virtue exists in each of us…it is 
entirely fitting for us to be good.”16 Seneca maintains that our relationships will 
allow this “inborn capacity” to manifest itself when he writes, 
 
Here’s why we don’t just shut ourselves up courageously behind the 
walls of one city, but set out to have contact with the whole world and 
proclaim that it belongs to us: it’s so that we can give a wider playing 
field to virtue…You are never so shut out of the greater part of life that 
the better part of it is not left to you.17 
 
From the above references, we can begin constructing a Stoic account of life’s 
meaning. The Stoic approach is clearly teleological, since it determines what our 
purpose is in virtue of being human. If anything, keeping in line with Socrates’ 
claim, our purpose is to live meaningful lives. For the Stoic, living meaningfully 
involves living virtuously. In doing so, a person is able to flourish (or exhibit 
eudaimonia). Therefore, to live meaningfully is to flourish.  
To summarize, what it means to be human is tied to our relations to other 
humans, our communities, and the cosmos, at large. The better we are at working 
cooperatively with others, the more meaningful our lives become since it is 
through the flourishing of these relations that our own lives are better able to 
flourish. Therefore, the meaning of life is to flourish and the meaning of a human 
life is to flourish as a human being.18 It is important to note, though, that this does 
not require subjective well-being, although subjective well-being may be a side 
effect of flourishing. 
In looking at the Stoic account of life’s meaning, we get an answer to the 
metaphysical worry. The meaning of human life will be tied to the kinds of 
creatures we are—in particular, we understand ourselves as social creatures. 
Therefore, the meaning of life and how to live meaningfully will be tied to those 
social relationships. Furthermore, in knowing what kinds of creatures we are, we 
are able to know what is needed for us to not just merely survive, but to also 
flourish—therefore allowing us to know what is needed to live meaningfully. If 
we are living virtuously, then we are able to flourish. Now, there is the difficulty 
of recognizing if a person is living virtuously if the person is themselves not 
                                                     
16 Rufus (2011), p. 26.  
17 Seneca (2006) De Tranquillitate Animi 4.4 
18 On this account, then, the meaning of a tree’s life is to flourish as a tree, and so on.  
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virtuous. Yet, this is why it is so important that a person surround herself with 
virtuous individuals so that others can serve as role models. While there is no clear 
way of knowing with whom we should associate, we can use guess work and be 
open to revisions in clear cases of relationships not being virtuous to better 
enhance our chances of flourishment. The extent to which our relationships 
become more virtuous, or at least less prone to vices, allows us to observe the 
extent to which we are flourishing by identifying our abilities to further cultivate 
virtuous relationships. While the Stoic account does not perfectly satisfy all the 
conditions for a satisfactory account of life’s meaning, it fares better than other 





While the Stoic account I offer here focuses primarily on our capacity to enter 
virtuous relationships, it is fundamentally an internalist view since meaning or 
purpose comes from humans. For this reason, I will discuss existentialism, since 
it is also an internalist account. One of the more prominent existentialist accounts 
comes from Sartre (1905-1980). In his 1948 Existentialism is a Humanism he 
provides an account of the meaning of life that is wholly dependent upon the 
individual person. His account can be summarized by the following passage: 
 
Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing 
himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, on the other 
hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist. 
Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation 
to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and center of his 
transcendence. There is no other universe except the human universe, the 
universe of human subjectivity…This is humanism, because we remind 
man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus 
abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not 
by turning back upon himself, but always seeking, beyond himself, an 
aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realization, that man 
can realize himself as truly human.19 
                                                     
19 Sartre (2007), p. 53.  
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Sartre’s view has some similarities with Stoicism in that he grounds the 
meaningfulness of life in terms of a human life. Yet, he focuses on the individual 
human life instead of allowing human relations to play as prominent of a role as 
they do for the Stoics. For Sartre, it is through the pursuance of projects that are 
beyond the individual that a person is able to more fully realize herself. Through 
such realizations, the person is able to determine the meaningfulness of her life. 
On the surface, existentialism appears to be a viable theory when considered 
in terms of the criterion for satisfactoriness. Even though there is no meaning “out 
there” for the individual to discover, the existentialist allows there to be meaning 
of life in terms of whatever projects the individual has freely chosen to pursue. In 
other words, the meaning of life is whatever the person determines to be her 
meaning. Therefore, the metaphysical worry is met. Given that the meaning of life 
is self-determined for existentialism, the individual person can then establish the 
criteria needed to know if she has in fact achieved this sort of meaning. She would 
then be able to determine the kind of evidence needed to assess if she has fulfilled 
that meaning, which she would then be able to observe in terms of her own life 
experience. So, it would seem that the existentialist view is in good standing.  
Unfortunately, with allowing the meaning of life to be up to the individual it 
also makes the meaning of life arbitrary. The first problem with this arbitrariness 
is that it would allow someone with little life experience to determine what the 
meaning of life is for herself. A person with little life experience may choose 
projects that she would not have chosen at a later point in her life. We do not 
expect children to dictate many things regarding what constitutes a meaningful 
life, although Sartre does advocate for allowing children to learn through making 
their own mistakes.20 There are, however, instances in which a parent should 
intervene when the child engages in behaviors that may be detrimental to her long-
term well-being. We also expect some level of paternalistic involvement when 
anyone engages in behaviors that are at odds with her own best interests, which 
the person does not always recognize as such (e.g., someone who is not mentally 
competent to sufficiently express her autonomy). While I agree with Sartre that a 
person has the freedom to choose for herself, we should also allow others to 
recognize and assist when some choices may be harmful.  
Allowing some level of paternalistic intervention applies also to when 
                                                     
20 Sartre (1943).  
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someone engages in projects that are not conducive to the person living a 
meaningful life. Meaning, that not all projects are of equal value when considering 
which ones will allow a person to live meaningfully—even if they are projects 
chosen by the individual. On Sartre’s view, and this is the second problem with 
the arbitrariness of existentialism, is that any project that allows the person to 
realize herself will be seen as a project that contributes to the meaning of her life. 
Consider the example of the The Self-Taught Man from Sartre’s Nausea, in which 
The Self-Taught Man realizes his life’s meaning in terms of reading every single 
book in the library.21 On the face of it, it does not seem problematic that someone 
would like to read books, but in reading the books The Self-Taught Man is not 
pursuing knowledge or making use of the information—instead, it is the arbitrary 
task of reading all the books. It is no different than a person who wishes to eat 
every flavor of Cheetos or watch every show on Netflix. In accordance with 
existentialism, these projects are conducive to the person living meaningfully, but 
I maintain that these projects do not make a person’s life more meaningful since 
they do not contribute to the person’s flourishing—they are arbitrary 
accomplishments.  
The existentialist could respond by suggesting that it is the individual person’s 
life and, therefore, up to the person to determine which projects contribute to the 
meaningfulness of her life—no matter how seemingly arbitrary they may seem.22 
The existentialist, however, is mistakenly identifying a person’s life as being 
solely her own. Given our dependency on others, our lives are intimately tied to 
our relations (as the Stoics correctly recognize). To ignore the roles that our 
relationships play in shaping who we are is to ignore what it means to be human. 
Once we recognize the significance of our relationships, we move away from that 
view that any project will make a meaningful contribution to our lives. So, while 
the existentialist account of life’s meaning satisfies the conditions of the criterion 
for a satisfactory account of life’s meaningfulness, it falls short in allowing any 
project to count towards a meaningful life since it ignores important features of 





                                                     
21 Sartre (2013).  
22 Thanks to Otávio Bueno for this point.  
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7. Theological Purposiveness 
 
While both Stoicism and existentialism are instances of internalism, there are 
also externalist views that maintain that the meaning of life will come from some 
source outside humanity. A candidate source is God. In particular, is the 
theological purposive account that states God has a plan for the universe and that 
a person’s life is meaningful to the degree that one helps God realize His plan.23  
Unlike existentialism, the theological purposive account does not meet all the 
conditions for the criterion of a satisfactory account of life’s meaningfulness. It at 
least meets the metaphysical worry by positing the existence of God and 
acknowledging that the meaning of life will be dependent upon God having a plan 
for our lives. The account, however, becomes problematic when evaluating the 
epistemological aspects of the criterion.  
There are multiple difficulties with coming to know God and what His plan 
is. In terms of knowing God, there is the challenge of knowing which account of 
God is correct. Even in assuming that the Judeo-Christian view of God is the 
correct one, there are difficulties in justifying belief in Him. Hume had laid out 
some of the challenges of using either miracles or testimonies of religious 
experiences to justify belief in God’s existence.24 There are additional problems 
of relying upon religious texts. First, many religious texts have been viewed as 
being apocryphal. Second, there are disputes as to whether or not religious texts 
should be read literally or metaphorically.  
Presuming that these challenges can be resolved, there remains the obstacle 
of knowing God’s plan. Even Leibniz, a theist, maintained that we did not have 
God’s perspective and, therefore, could not know God’s plan.25  In terms of 
knowing God’s plan, we run into similar difficulties of knowing if God exists, 
since we can only appeal to religious texts or testimonies regarding religious 
experiences to have a sense of what God’s plan is. Without knowing what God’s 
plan is, and without having a clearer way of resolving the difficulties of assessing 
the only available evidence, it is difficult to know if we are correctly living in 
accordance with that plan.  
It is possible that through the adoption of what we take that plan to be that we 
can assess our lives and the extent to which they are more meaningful through the 
                                                     
23 Affolter (2007). 
24 Hume (1947).  
25 Leibniz (1952).  
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adoption of that plan. We, however, run into the problem of underdetermination 
in which it is not clear if our lives have become more meaningful due to us 
fulfilling God’s plan, the mere belief that we are fulfilling God’s plan, or some 
other cause. Without resolving the issue of how to know what God’s plan is, we 
are unable to resolve the problem of underdetermination. For these reasons, the 
theistic purposive account is unable to satisfy the criterion for life’s meaning.26 
 
8. Cosmological Nihilism 
 
Other externalist accounts involve looking to the cosmos as a whole for the 
source of life’s meaning. I believe that looking to the cosmos befalls similar 
problems as the theological purposive account. For this reason, I will not discuss 
positive cosmological accounts. Instead, I will discuss potential problems of 
adopting cosmological nihilism—the view that a single human being or the entire 
human species is insignificant, without purpose and unlikely to change in the 
totality of existence.27 
Cosmological nihilism has much in common with existentialism. Both views 
acknowledge that there is no meaning in life when viewed from the perspective 
of the cosmos. Existentialism, however, posits that there is meaning insofar as an 
individual realizes projects that transcend the self. Benatar, however, endorses 
cosmological nihilism “My view of cosmic meaning is indeed nihilistic. I think 
that there is no cosmic meaning.”28 This view clearly does not satisfy the criterion 
for life’s meaning. There is no meaning posited, so it not only fails to resolve the 
metaphysical worry, but instead endorses metaphysical skepticism. For this 
reason, there is nothing to know. But this is exactly the point of cosmological 
nihilism. So, the cosmological nihilist would not be concerned with not satisfying 
the criterion. Given that we use our understanding of the meaningfulness of life 
to orient our lives, cosmological nihilism is inadequate for understanding how to 
live.  
Benatar acknowledges that we should not be looking for meaning by adopting 
the cosmological view, since there will not be anything to find. Rather than 
looking to the cosmos for meaning, we should look at our lives and relationships 
                                                     
26 Metz (2013) also rejects the theological purposive account, but for metaphysical reasons—whereas 
my argument is focused on epistemological reasons for rejecting the theological purposive account.  
27 Crosby (1988), Storey (2011), and Benatar (2017).  
28 Benatar (2017), p. 62.  
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for meaning. He acknowledges that while life is meaningless, as a whole, it has 
meaning. He maintains,  
 
Many different meanings are possible. One can transcend the self and 
make a positive mark on the lives of others in myriad ways. These 
include nurturing and teaching the young, caring for the sick, bringing 
relief to the suffering, improving society, creating great art or literature, 
and advancing knowledge.  
 
Whereas the existentialist provides an account as to why these sorts of activities 
contribute to the meaningfulness of our lives, Benatar does not. He should, though, 
offer some explanation as to why humans are capable of deriving meaningfulness 
from their experiences, projects, and relationships where there is not cosmological 
meaning.  
In large part, I believe that this lack of an explanation is due to him not 
offering an account of what it means to be a human, person, or self. But some 
account should be given if we are interested in what constitutes the meaning of a 
human life. Benatar’s discussion, however, only focuses on the meaning of life 
(in general). This is where I believe that existentialism is preferable to Benatar’s 
account, since the existentialist is centrally concerned with the meaning of life as 
it relates to the subject of experience (i.e., human beings). But, given that the 
Stoics are more successful in accounting for the significance of human relations, 
the Stoic account is more viable than the existentialist account. Therefore, the 
Stoic account is preferable to the cosmological nihilist’s in accounting for how 
we can have human meaning—even if we reject the idea of there being 
cosmological meaning (which I do not believe we should).  
 
9. Objections and Implications 
 
While I have provided reasons for adopting ‘flourishing’ instead of other 
candidate definitions of ‘meaning’, I have given priority to Stoicism to understand 
what it means to live a meaningful life. In addition to the ways in which I believe 
that Stoicism more successfully satisfies the criterion for life’s meaningfulness, 
there may still be concerns with adopting a Stoic framework. In particular, some 
additional explanation should be given as to why humans are better off when they 
live and work virtuously in accordance with others. In large part, it is not simply 
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due to the pragmatic benefits of living and working virtuously with others (e.g., 
security), but I would go so far as to say that we do flourish when we live 
virtuously and that it is due to the sorts of creatures that we are that we see this 
result.    
Compare this assessment to other living organisms. For example, a sunflower 
has particular natural needs to flourish as a sunflower. It requires an appropriate 
environment in which it has full and bright sun, in addition to well-drained soil. 
The sunflower will not grow if it does not have these things. Furthermore, the 
quality of these things will determine the ways in which it grows. The better 
quality these things are then the more likely the sunflower will flourish. Human 
beings are similar insofar as in addition to food, shelter, and water, we also need 
social interactions. The quality of food, shelter, and water will impact our abilities 
to maintain good health. Furthermore, the quality of our social interactions will 
impact our capacity to develop and make meaningful contributions to those 
relations. A way to measure these relationships is in terms of virtue. By entering 
virtuous relationships, we greatly increase our chances of becoming virtuous. By 
becoming virtuous ourselves, we further enhance the virtuosity of the 
relationships. Thereby, enhancing the overall community. Since humans are born 
into a community, the more virtuous the community is in which they are born, the 
greater chance the person has in becoming virtuous. Yet, this is a natural feature 
of us in a similar way to how the environmental factors impact a sunflower’s 
capacity to flourish.   
With regards to the meaningfulness of our lives, when adopting this Stoic way 
of thinking, our lives have meaning and we can understand how to live 
meaningfully insofar as we pursue a virtuous life. The meaningfulness of our lives, 
however, will not be tied to us as individuals (as the existentialist would have it). 
Instead, meaning will be tied to the extent to which our relations can flourish. 
Furthermore, we should not believe that by looking only at our relations that there 
is no meaning when viewed from the cosmological perspective. Instead, there is 
still cosmological meaning in the sense that the meaningfulness of our lives will 
be tied to the kinds of creatures that we are. 29  Therefore, we also have 
cosmological reasons for adopting the Stoic account of what it means to live a 
meaningful life.30  
                                                     
29 I am not making a claim about natural kinds. 
30 It is at this point of the discussion where my account has some overlap with Wolf (2015). In 





In this paper, I have set out to motivate the pursuance of a Stoic account of 
the meaningfulness of life. At its core, the argument can be summarized as 
follows: With regards to the question of what it means to live a meaningful life, 
we can either adopt an externalist or internalist position. As least some specific 
variations of two externalist views, the cosmological and theological, are 
unsatisfactory. When considering some specific variations of two internalist views, 
existentialism and Stoicism, existentialism is unsatisfactory due to its deemphasis 
of human relations in shaping the meaningfulness of our lives. Not only does 
Stoicism adequately fulfill the criterion of satisfactoriness of life’s 
meaningfulness, but it correctly emphasizes the importance of human relations as 
well as accounting for how we can have meaning in our lives as a result of 
pursuing various projects that enable us to transcend ourselves in the contexts of 
our relationships. In large part, this is due to how in pursuing those projects we 
are further cultivating virtue in both ourselves and our communities. Therefore, 
we have reasons to further explore, if not accept, a Stoic view of what it means to 
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Abstract 
The relational account by Robert Nozick (1981; 1989) posits meaning as engaged, external 
connection to an array of value, and it has been widely influential in debates concerning life’s meaning. 
Thaddeus Metz (2001; 2013; 2016) proffers several counterexamples to the view, arguing that it does 
not best account for what is conceptually important to meaning in life. We evaluate these criticisms, 
determining that while some objections are less persuasive, others are more compelling, particularly 
Metz’s subjectivist critique which we go on to expand in developing a novel counterexample to the 
relational view. We conclude with positing another final counterexample—a being who accrues 




In recent decades, the relational theory has been one of the most prominent 
accounts in the philosophical literature on life’s meaning. The basic notion is 
simple: meaning in life requires that one intensely connects with an array of value 
beyond oneself. It was first made popular by Robert Nozick in his two works 
Philosophical Explanations (1981) and Examined Life (1989); many have 
subsequently adopted his approach, or at least prominent features of it, as a viable 
framework for grasping meaning in life (Cooper 2003: 29-30, 132; Bennett-
Hunter 2014; Bennett-Hunter 2016: 1277; Benatar 2017: 18, 54). 
One of the most notable critics of this view is Thaddeus Metz (2001: 145-147; 
2013: 29-31; 2016). In analyzing the relational view, he makes a careful 
distinction between a conception of life’s meaning (“a theory of what makes life 
meaningful”) and the concept of a meaningful life (“what the competing 
conceptions of a meaningful life are about”) (Metz 2001: 138).1 Metz divides his 
counterexamples to Nozick’s account by what Metz takes to be strong 
formulations of a relational conception of meaning in life and a relational concept 
                                                     
* Graduate Students, Department of Philosophy, 85 Humanities Instructional Building, University of 
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1 A distinction made well-known by John Rawls (1999: 5).  
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of meaning in life (2001: 145-146; 2013: 18-21; 28-31). Specifically, he postulates 
“the idea of connecting with something valuable for its own sake beyond one’s 
person” for the former notion (Metz 2013: 28) and “the idea of connecting with 
final goods beyond one’s animal self” for the latter (Metz 2013: 29). 
We render differently a relational conception of meaning and a relational 
concept of it, as will be clear later (the terms “relational account” or “relational 
theory” encompass both these aspects). However, Metz’s counterexamples will 
be understood as applicable to our analysis of the relational view since the central 
elements of intrinsic value as ultimate terminus (for the relational conception of 
meaning) and external connection (for the relational concept of meaning) are 
common to both Metz’s and our characterizations. The focus of this paper will be 
on the aspect of external connection as it functions within Nozick’s account. In 
other words, we do not dispute that value is needed for meaning. What we 
question is whether one must connect externally to that value in order to gain 
meaning (this is also the central element that Metz’s counterexamples center on). 
Thus, even though this paper splits up a relational conception and concept of 
meaning for purposes of aligning with Metz’s delineation, the distinction will not 
be important for the rest of the paper. For our critique of the crucial aspect of 
external connection is a criticism of both the relational concept and conception of 
meaning—in other words, an objection to the relational account. 
We begin with a brief survey of Nozick’s view and go on to consider the 
merits of Metz’s objections. We then offer two primary challenges to the relational 
account: first, in comparing rival subjectivist theories, outward connections do not 
seem to be much of a factor in living a meaningful life, casting doubt on the claim 
that external relations are necessary for meaning. Second, it seems that an entity 
which makes purely internal connections is able to obtain meaning, again calling 
into question the element of outward connection that is vital to the relational 
theory.  
 
2. Nozick’s Relational Account 
 
As we interpret Nozick according to the concept/conception schema that Metz 
uses, the concept of meaning in life is inherently relational: “We can understand 
the question of something’s meaning, roughly, as the question of how it connects 
up to what is outside it” (Nozick 1981: 601). Again, Nozick writes concerning this 
concept of meaning, “To seek to give life meaning is to seek to transcend the limits 
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of one’s individual life” (Nozick 1989: 166). In other words, one must connect 
externally, not internally, in order to live a meaningful life. Admittedly, the 
internal/external distinction is somewhat vague, yet it seems that enough sense 
can be made of the idea of something being beyond one’s self in order to 
intelligibly discuss making meaning through external connections.2  
However, Nozick’s relational account does not stop there. He fleshes out this 
framework with his conception of what makes life meaningful, namely the idea 
that meaning in life requires that one strongly connects outside oneself to worth 
(Nozick 1989: 167-168). Worth is the category he classifies value and meaning 
under, although he sees value as that which primarily endows meaning, 
particularly intrinsic value (Nozick 1981: 610-613). The rationale for value’s 
primacy is that if meaning were the only aspect of worth that one could link to in 
order to acquire meaning, a regress problem would occur that would be difficult 
to stop (Nozick 1989: 167-168). This is because intrinsic meaning is hard to 
fathom given meaning’s inherently relational nature—there is always another 
connection that needs to be made in order for meaning to accrue (Nozick 1981: 
599). He writes, “We need not look beyond something to find its (intrinsic value), 
whereas we do have to look beyond a thing to discover its meaning…The regress 
of meaning is stopped by reaching something with a kind of worth other than 
meaning—namely, reaching something of value” (Nozick 1989: 167-168).3  
Regarding these outward relations, it is not mere connections that matter. 
They must be strong ones that interact in some important way (e.g. passion, 
engagement, etc.) with the non-trivial thing connected to (Nozick 1989: 168). And 
the greater the diversity of value one connects to outside oneself, the more 
meaning one accrues: “This meaning will depend upon the array of external or 
wider values connected with it and upon the nature of the connections, their 
strength, intensity, closeness…The meaning of a life is its place in a wider context 
of value” (Nozick 1981: 611). Thus, in summary of Nozick’s conception of a 
meaningful life: in order to live such a life, one must substantively link beyond 
oneself to worth—particularly, a wider context of value where intrinsic value 
ultimately grounds one’s transcendent relations toward meaning.  
One question that arises under this framework is whether one must connect to 
                                                     
2  For instance, other philosophical debates such as epistemic internalism/externalism or personal 
autonomy find ways of having sensible discussion centering on what is internal or external to one’s self 
despite the oftentimes unclear nature as to what counts as internal or external to the self. 
3 Nozick also considers the notion of a deity as a meaning-conferring destination for linkages; ultimately, 
he thinks this schema a coherent but insufficiently plausible idea (Nozick 1981: 609). 
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intrinsic value in order to gain meaning, or whether one can link to instrumental 
value or even just another meaningful, non-intrinsically valuable entity in order 
to gain meaning. Certainly, Nozick envisions that chains of meaning must 
eventually end up with intrinsic value, otherwise the regress never stops. However, 
he still adheres to a traditional intrinsic/instrumental framework of value (along 
with some novel categories he stipulates) (Nozick 1981: 312-313). Given this 
retention, perhaps gaining meaning through instrumental value is also what he has 
in mind, such as when he writes, “Meaning is a connection with an external value, 
but this meaning need not involve any connection with an infinite value; we may 
well aspire to that, but to fall short is not to be bereft of meaning. There are many 
numbers between zero and infinity” (Nozick 1981: 610-611).  
Or consider something that is non-intrinsically valuable yet meaningful. One 
prime candidate of this sort is chess, about which Nozick states, “An example of 
value without importance is chess…By connecting up with larger themes of 
combat, games might be said to have meaning also…But the game is not, I think, 
important. It does not have any impact beyond itself, even though it is an activity 
that can dominate someone’s life” (Nozick 1989: 170-171). Nozick considers 
chess to be somewhat meaningful because it connects to themes of combat. 
Additionally, it is arguable that he sees chess as non-intrinsically valuable as well, 
since he describes it as lacking importance, “any impact beyond itself,” and 
something that fails to deepen the lives of those who participate in it (Nozick 
1989: 171)—logically consistent yet hardly fitting descriptions for something 
which is supposed to possess the highest sort of value.4 Given that one seems able 
to gain meaning by connecting to something meaningful since meaning is a 
variety of worth (it just can’t be meaning all the way down), it is plausible to think 
that meaning can be gained also by linking to something meaningful without 
intrinsic value. Thus, although intrinsic value is the ultimate foundation for 
meaning because it is the final terminus for meaningful connections, it seems that 
on the relational theory, some meaning can be gained via linkages to non-




                                                     
4 Not to mention chess’s arguably low degree of organic unity which depends on “the degree of diversity 
and the degree of unity to which that diversity is brought” (and for Nozick, something possesses intrinsic 
value “to the degree that is organically unified”) (Nozick 1989: 164).  
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3. Metz’s Objections—Possible Rebuttals 
 
Metz objects to the relational view with a flurry of counterexamples regarding 
activities that grant one meaning in life but fail to involve any external connection:  
 
Consider that the following could in principle make one’s life somewhat 
more meaningful: publicly standing by what one reflectively believes to 
be right, exhibiting courage and performing a difficult act because it is 
right, being true to oneself, overcoming addiction, not letting oneself be 
bossed around, discovering new particles and confirming the existence 
of certain laws of nature. Since integrity, virtue, authenticity, autonomy, 
self-respect, and knowledge are internal to a person, or at least do not 
essentially involve a relationship to an external final good, and since they 
are prima facie candidates for a meaningful life, the concept of a 
meaningful life cannot just be that of an existence that has ‘a connection 
with an external value’ (Metz 2013: 29). 
 
However, it seems that these sorts of examples could plausibly be construed as 
giving meaning because of a linkage to an outward good even if they do not 
necessarily involve an external connection. For example, in the case of scientific 
discoveries, they could be meaningful because they are explanations that connect 
with what the world is really like, that is, they accurately represent the “facts” of 
the physical world (Kim 1988: 225). Nozick’s own tracking theory of knowledge 
is similar to this picture: “Knowledge is a particular way of being connected to 
the world, having a specific real factual connection to the world: tracking it” 
(Nozick 1981: 178). Additionally, externally connecting to facts is the sort of thing 
that confers meaning on Nozick’s view. He writes, “For a life to have meaning, it 
must connect with other things, with some things or values beyond 
itself…Tracking, either of facts or of value, is a mode of being so connected, as 
is fitting an external purpose” (emphasis mine) (Nozick 1981: 594-595). 
Or in the case of possessing virtues, agents may live meaningful lives qua 
virtuous because they link up to an objective moral reality that counts virtues like 
justice and courage as objective goods. For instance, if one were to do as Nozick 
does and seriously consider how a Platonic account might interact with the 
relational view, then one could say that to be virtuous is to participate in the Form 
of the Good (Nozick 1981: 595). This is the form that for Plato was the ultimate 
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grounding of truth and virtue which gave the other forms, such as justice, their 
goodness (Santas 1989: 144). Being virtuous through connecting oneself to the 
Form of the Good would presumably be an external link given that it is an entity 
we should distinguish “from everything else” (Republic VII.534b), is 
“independent of any desires, attitudes, or interest a sentient being may take in it” 
(Santas 1985: 239), and described as something whose “remoteness…is a 
metaphorical version of the thesis that value is not in the world…” (McDowell 
1979: 347).  
In other words, under the present realist analysis, what makes actions 
meaningful like acquiring scientific knowledge or living virtuously is that the 
agent engages with something outside himself—in this instance, facts of the world 
and objective values, respectively. And we do not think this is an implausible view. 
In fact, it seems that one of the main motivations for holding a realism about any 
given X (realism conceived of as linking to the “really real”) is that such a stance 
provides a kind of significance and motivation to the pursuit of X that could be 
characterized as giving meaning to it.5 Thus, the relational notion of connecting 
to something else that has value seems flexible enough to adequately characterize 
many of Metz’s counterexamples as meaningful through external linkage.  
Metz does offer more difficult counterexamples against the relational account 
which are harder to construe as making external connection in producing meaning. 
These are supernaturalist accounts where “a person’s life is meaningful insofar as 
she honours her soul or realizes what she essentially is qua spiritual substance 
endowed with a freedom independent of the laws of nature” (Metz 2013: 29). 
Since on these ultra-mundane frameworks a person’s soul seems very much 
internal to individuals and engagement solely with the soul seems conceptually 
capable of making life meaningful, such cases are more challenging for the 
relational theory to explain.  
We think these are better counterexamples. However, in giving the relational 
view a run for its money, it still might plausibly account for the dynamics of 
meaning in instances of honoring one’s soul or realizing one’s spiritual substance. 
                                                     
5 For an example of the phenomenon I am describing here, see Michele Moody-Adams’s criticism of 
Richard Rorty’s claim that the pursuit of justice needs no referent outside our own desires: “Could the 
student or the freedom rider engage in these activities [for justice], if they accepted Rorty’s view? Rorty 
wants to say they could and that all you need is solidarity, I want to say that that’s just nonsense…I think 
that you need the idea that at some point human moral inquiry could be progressing closer and closer to 
the grasp of an objective truth. Could be, but not necessarily is. You need that aspiration, you need that 
hope in order to be able to carry out the activity” (Moody-Adams 1998: 131).  
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To start, one might take Metz’s notion of meaning gained through realizing one’s 
higher nature as a form of self-knowledge, that is inquiring into the self (i.e. 
knowing the self’s nature)—this can be conceived of as “self-awareness [which] 
yields a grasp of the material or non-material nature of the self” (Gertler 2020). 
This sort of self-knowledge would involve propositions as its object, namely 
propositions concerning the true nature of the self.  
Thus, in the case of realizing one’s ensouled nature, let p be the proposition 
that one is a soul with freedom independent of the laws of nature and let q be 
someone who is a soul endowed with a freedom independent of the laws of nature. 
Thus, if q gains meaning through realizing p, q gains propositional knowledge of 
p. But propositional knowledge stands in a relation to the knower; indeed, the idea 
of a relation holding between knower and proposition is typically seen as a basic 
feature of attributions of propositional knowledge (Blaauw and Pritchard 2005: 
119; Hornsby 2005).6 Moreover, the connection between p and q can be credibly 
construed as an external relationship. A soul is not typically thought of as 
composed of propositions, particularly under substance dualism (Moreland 1987) 
or the Platonic doctrine of the soul as a metaphysically simple entity (van Inwagen 
2002: 171; Phaedo 78b-80e) (i.e. propositions are not substances nor are 
metaphysical simples composed of propositional parts).7 In other words, under 
the framework at play, propositions are external to souls, even if the latter 
incorporates the former, such as with a mind intaking propositional content. 
Alternatively, under a traditional knowledge/reality divide, propositions, as 
contents of statements, are representations while souls are things to be 
represented—they are distinct things (Kim 1988: 225).  
Accordingly, it seems plausible to say that p is external to q, and so when q 
accrues meaning via p, q does so by making an external connection outside q. To 
be clear, we do not necessarily hold the assumptions and commitments put forth 
                                                     
6 For a (somewhat) dissenting perspective, see Fodor (1978), for whom propositional attitudes are 
relational, but to say that “propositional attitudes are relations to propositions” is unclear since this 
relation must be mediated by internal representation (see especially p. 520).  
7 One might respond by saying that propositions may somehow be located within oneself so that when 
one realizes one’s spiritual substance, one is internally connecting. However, the notion of internality 
and externality we are using in this instance centers not around location but composition. A pacemaker 
may be internal to the body but is compositionally external to it, based on the usual conception of 
composition that a thing’s component parts must be of the same category of the thing which they 
compose (Lowe 2002: 236). However, if one makes a case for how propositions are in the same 
ontological category as souls or that the former can compose the latter, then Metz’s supernaturalist 
counterexamples would gain persuasiveness. 
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here, such as the claim that propositions must be external to souls. Instead, what 
we offer is a possible framework through which the relational theory could rebut 
the soul-based accounts of meaning in life that Metz suggests are ways of gaining 
meaning without going outside oneself. To summarize, the counterargument to 
Metz is the following:  
 
1. If q acquires meaning via p, then q connects to p. 
2. Propositions (such as p) are not internal to souls (such as q).  
3. Thus, if q acquires meaning via p, then q connects externally to p.  
 
4. Metz’s Objections—Expanding on the Counterexamples 
 
Having laid out some disagreements and possible replies to several of Metz’s 
counterexamples, we do think that other objections he presents to the relational 
account are much stronger. For example, he writes, “Conceiving of meaning as 
merely a function of connection with something external is not sufficient to 
capture the evaluative dimension of meaning, and, more generally, does not 
express anything fairly exclusive to meaning in life” (Metz 2013: 28). It is this 
last bit about the deficient generality of the relational theory that we find 
compelling. If meaning in life just is that phenomenon which results when one 
connects to value, it is unclear what work the relational theory of meaning is doing. 
Value talk (and other variations) seem able to do all the conceptual work that 
relational meaning is supposed to perform. In discussing the good life, if one 
speaks of connecting to value and another speaks of connecting to value which is 
also accompanied by meaning, the latter notion does not seem to add any salient 
dimension to the conversation—nothing seems to be lost by dropping talk of 
meaning.  
In other words, making meaning in life as generic as connecting to value 
makes meaning superfluous. Other concepts can easily fulfill the light theoretical 
responsibilities that meaning is supposed to handle. For example, consider 
Stephen Darwall’s discussion of human welfare, where in the spirit of Aristotelian 
eudaimonia, he claims “that a person’s welfare is enhanced, her life is made better 
for her, through active engagement with and appreciation of values whose worth 
transcends their capacity to benefit (extrinsically or intrinsically)” (Darwall 2002: 
76). He goes on to say that “the most beneficial human life consists of activities 
involving the appreciation of worth and merit” (Darwall 2002: 80). Pleasures such 
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as musical performance or parenting are important to our welfare because 
“through them, we are connecting with things that matter. The benefit comes 
through the appreciation of agent-neutral values—worth and merit—with which 
these activities connect us” (Darwall 2002: 95).  
It is hard to ignore the fact that Darwall’s notion of welfare is almost identical 
to Nozick’s relational theory of meaning. Both center on non-trivially connecting 
with things of value (and most of Darwall’s examples of welfare-endowing 
connections can be seen as external linkages). But if the idea of welfare (or 
eudaimonia as Darwall likens welfare to) can perform the same type of theoretical 
work in pursuing the good life that meaning claims for itself, then there seems to 
be little philosophical room left for the relational notion of meaning in life as 
engaged, external connection to a wider context of value. It is this weakness that 
we take to be the central merit of Metz’s objection that the relational account 
“does not express anything fairly exclusive to meaning in life” (Metz 2013: 28). 
Introducing concepts in value theory with non-unique capabilities are apt to be 
redundancies of limited use in theorizing the good life.  
Metz’s more central criticism against the relational theory is its inability to 
account for prominent subjectivist conceptions of meaning in life, such as the one 
proposed by Richard Taylor where what matters for a meaningful life is the 
satisfaction of one’s desires (Taylor 1970). Using the ancient Greek myth of 
Sisyphus who is condemned by the gods to roll a stone up a hill ad infinitum, 
Taylor says that if the gods were to inject in Sisyphus the voracious desire to roll 
stones up hills, then Sisyphus’ life would have meaning because he would be 
doing exactly what he wants to do with his life. On Taylor’s view, the meaning of 
life is to do whatever it is that we have a deep and abiding interest to fulfill. Metz 
says that Taylor’s desire-satisfaction subjectivism has been quite influential and 
extensively discussed, “probably the most widely reprinted and read discussion 
of the meaning of life in the past 40 years” (Metz 2013: 31). Because of this, the 
weakness of the relational view is that its concept of meaning simply must deny 
that Taylor’s view even counts as a theory of meaning in life since on his desire-
satisfaction framework, agents accrue meaning without connecting with anything 
beyond themselves. Metz concludes that it “is difficult to rest content with an 
analysis that entails that the many who consider Taylor’s theory to be about 
meaning are conceptually confused” (Metz 2013: 31). 
Although we do not hold this specific criticism that Metz makes, we do agree 
with his broader critique that Taylor’s subjectivism poses a problem for the 
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relational view since desire-satisfaction illuminates how external connection does 
not quite capture the definitive features of meaning in life. Our novel version of 
the objection is simple. Imagine that the gods rescind their punishment and instead 
implant in Sisyphus the deep desire to simply do nothing, from which he will 
experience immense pleasure (or happiness). Consequently, Sisyphus lies down 
unconscious for some time at the top of the mountain and experiences great 
pleasure and satisfaction from his total inaction. In other words, he connects to 
nothing external in his blissful idleness (call this Sisyphus 1). Now consider 
Nozick’s experience machine where one can plug into a contraption to simulate 
any assortment of desirable and pleasurable events for as long as one wants 
(Nozick 1974: 42-45). This would be connecting with something valuable outside 
oneself, since the machine is external to the individual. And this is not just any 
type of value but plausibly intrinsic or final value, as pleasure is widely 
categorized as such among hedonists and non-hedonists alike (Goldstein 1989: 
273; Hurka 2001; Feldman 2004: 31; Goetz 2012: 14; Metz 2013: 29). 8 
Furthermore, imagine that in this alternate world, Sisyphus 2 climbs down from 
the mountain and temporarily hooks up to the experience machine, encountering 
the same magnitude of pleasurable/happy fulfillment he experiences in the case 
of desire-satisfaction from complete idleness.  
Before moving to the substance of the objection, it is worth pointing out that 
Nozick considers a lifetime committed to the experience machine as un-
meaningful, but not because the machine lacks value. He does think that there is 
value to the machine, if it is used limitedly.9 He writes the following:  
 
Notice that we have not said one should never plug in to such a machine, 
even temporarily. It might teach you things, or transform you in a way 
beneficial for your actual life later. It also might give you pleasures that 
                                                     
8 There is a distinction sometimes made between something having intrinsic value (value in itself) and 
final value (value for its own sake), with the former specifying the location or source of the value, while 
the latter refers to the object’s value as an end (Korsgaard 1983: 170). It seems that the concept of final 
value is the one that philosophers have generally found more important (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015: 34), 
although some deem “intrinsic value” an appropriate reference to final value’s denotation (Kagan 1998: 
293; Zimmerman and Bradley 2019). In this paper, the terms “intrinsic value” and “final value” refer to 
Nozick’s idea of intrinsic value as the value something “has in itself apart from or independently of 
whatever it leads to or its further consequences” (Nozick 1981: 311).  
 
9 Whether he thinks the machine has intrinsic value is unclear since that would depend on its organic 
unity, Nozick’s measure of intrinsic value. A point in favor of its possessing intrinsic value, however, 
would be qua source of pleasure, arguably an intrinsic good. 
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would be quite acceptable in limited doses. This is all quite different from 
spending the rest of your life on the machine; the internal contents of that 
life would be unconnected to actuality” (Nozick 1989: 108).  
 
Herein lies the primary reason why Nozick rejects a lifetime hooked to the 
machine. Such an act privileges the value of pleasure in a way that makes no room 
for other values, most importantly, connecting to reality. He writes, “I am saying 
that the connection to actuality is important whether or not we desire it—that is 
why we desire it—and the experience machine is inadequate because it doesn’t 
give us that” (Nozick 1989: 107). In other words, a lifetime in the machine fails 
to connect to a “wider context of value,” one of the key aspects of a meaningful 
life on the relational view (Nozick 1981: 611). He goes on to say concerning a life 
solely constituted by pleasure and happiness, like the one the experience machine 
provides, that a “life cannot just be happy while having nothing else valuable in 
it” (Nozick 1989: 113).10 Although “[o]f course we wish people to have many 
such moments and days of happiness,” Nozick writes, “it is not clear that we want 
those moments constantly or want our lives to consist wholly and only of them” 
(Nozick 1989: 117). While pleasure is valuable, a life totally consumed by it is 
limited in meaning because such an existence is constrained regarding the 
diversity of value it can link with. 
Hence, on Nozick’s view, the experience machine is valuable in the sense that 
pleasure is a value that can appropriately be part of a meaningful life as long as 
other values (like linking to reality) are present. With this background, our 
contention is that the two scenarios of our Sisyphus counterexample indicate that 
connecting to value outside oneself is not what is fundamental for meaning in life. 
Under the relational theory, Sisyphus 2 accrues more meaning in life than 
Sisyphus 1 since the latter experiences value (pleasure) without external linkage 
while Sisyphus 2 connects to a machine outside himself in experiencing the value 
of pleasure. In fact, Sisyphus 1 gains no meaning whatsoever since no external 
connection with value is made. But are these implications plausible? Is the mere 
fact of external connection the decisive difference in the meaningfulness of the 
two lives? We think that the basic intuition here is that Sisyphus 1 and Sisyphus 2 
are more or less equivalent in overall meaningfulness (whether the degree is high 
or low). The mere fact that Sisyphus 2 involves an external relation in 
                                                     
10 Nozick doesn’t carefully distinguish between pleasure and happiness but seems to classify pleasure 
as a type of happiness (Nozick 1989: 108). 
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experiencing pleasure while Sisyphus 1 encounters the same sort of desire 
satisfaction absent linkage outside himself does not seem to be a decisive (or even 
relevant) factor in evaluating the meaningfulness of the two Sisyphuses. And if 
this is so, then external connection to value is not what is definitive for meaning 
in life, contra the relational account. 
Another way to put forward the basic intuition that undergirds our objection 
is this: many would consider meaning in life to be a highly desirable good. Now 
imagine if people were told that they must spend the rest of their lives either as 
Sisyphus 1 (pleasure without transcendent connection) or Sisyphus 2 (pleasure 
via the experience machine). Thus, if meaning is a great good and conceptually 
relational, then would not people have strong reason to prefer the experience 
machine over idle pleasure lacking external connection if the degree of pleasure 
is the same in both cases? It seems to us that people would not have an 
overwhelming preference for the experience machine option since it exhibits no 
greater virtue over the alternative, particularly in the dimension of meaning. Of 
course, there might be reason not to prefer either option but given a forced choice 
between the two, the fact that one scenario includes external connection and the 
other does not seems insufficient as an important, rational consideration to 
persuade either way. So if meaning in life is conceptually relational and generally 
considered a great good, but it is not consistently favored, then this gives some 
reason to believe that perhaps a relational understanding of meaning is not quite 
capturing what is necessary for it. Hence, we conclude that meaning as external 
connection to value does not adequately explain what is important for meaning in 
life. 
 
5. Meaning via Internal Connections: A Triune God 
 
In this section and the next, we attempt to provide a case of a life that is 
meaningful through solely internal connections, thus providing a counterexample 
to the relational view’s claim that for “a life to have meaning, it must connect with 
other things, with some things or values beyond itself” (Nozick 1981: 594).11 Our 
                                                     
11 Another deity-involved counterexample which we do not explore is positing that God just “glows 
meaning,” exactly the kind of explanation about which Nozick incredulously asks, “How in the world 
(or out of it) can there be something whose nature contains meaning, something which just glows 
meaning?” (1981: 593). Perhaps God has the Form of Meaning in the divine mind (i.e. meaning as an 
abstract object constituted by God’s thought) (Welty 2014: 81) so that God simply emanates meaning 
as part of the divine nature, making the meaning of God’s life an entirely non-external affair. Or maybe 
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first example is the Christian Trinity. Of course, many do not think that 
contemporary models of the Trinity are logically coherent or consistent with 
biblical and creedal formulations (Winter 2013; Tuggy 2016). However, our 
counterexample does not assume any one model of the Trinity nor its general 
coherence; rather, it supposes that the basic structure of the Trinity is coherent 
enough to speak of as one entity, formed by three persons, and which gains 
meaning through solely connecting with itself.12  
Before getting into the concept of the Trinity, we wish to make a few prefatory 
points. First, although we do not delve into what constitutes a person, we think 
that the three individuals of the Trinity fulfill most mainstream criteria for 
personhood. These include being “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself” (Locke 1689/2017: 115), having a 
capacity for a “first-person perspective” (Baker 2000: 20), and possessing a will 
that is able to form “second-order desires” (i.e. desires for desires) (Frankfurt 
1971: 6-7). Second, despite the plurality of persons, we deem it coherent to 
conceive of a triune deity as a single being that can be characterized as having a 
unitary life. One way to think of this notion is through the mythological dog 
Cerberus who has three heads but is one biological organism (this is the 
illustration that William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland offer in explicating their 
“Trinity monotheism” model of the Christian God) (2017: 592). Similarly, one 
can speak of the Trinity having three persons but existing as one, united being, 
since the Godhead is a single “divine organism.” The members of the Trinity can 
also be thought of as a single life in being “necessarily united in their purposes 
and in their actions towards the world,” (Hasker 2013: 257) since the unity of 
one’s mind and intentions is often seen as central to living one life as opposed to 
several.13 In these ways, we deem it sensible to discuss the notion of meaning in 
the Trinity’s life, while also speaking of the relations among the persons as 
                                                     
God just creates meaning, like how God creates the world (although this particular case might run into 
the “bootstrapping objection” found in discussions of divine aseity where God might already need to 
possess a property, like meaningfulness, in order to create it) (Craig 2016: 60-61). At any rate, these 
sorts of scenarios at least seem conceptually possible and (mostly) unproblematic. There seems to be no 
obvious reason for a theist to reject them. However, we will not further pursue such an easy line of 
objection. 
12 This position is consistent with speaking of particular aspects of meaning in the life of each 
individual person of the Trinity as well.  
13 This is why those who display very different purposes and conduct in one setting as opposed to 
another are called “two-faced” (if they act with hypocrisy) or accused of living a “double life” (if certain 
elements of secrecy are involved).  
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“internal connections” (i.e. internal to the one life of the triune God).14  
The concept of the Trinity has historically been that there is one God made of 
three persons—Father, Son, and Spirit. The starting point for this idea comes from 
various Christian creeds, such as the Athanasian Creed (c. A.D. 500) which states, 
“Yet there are not three almighty beings; there is but one almighty being. Thus the 
Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Yet there are not three gods; 
there is but one God.” Accordingly, Christian philosophers are generally united 
on this essential framework of the Trinity. For example, Michael Murray and 
Michael Rea state that “[f]rom the beginning, Christians have affirmed the claim 
that there is one God, and three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—each of 
whom is God” (Murray and Rea 2016).15 Similarly, William Hasker writes, “Yet 
the question, ‘One what?’ also needs to be answered, if we are to have a satisfying 
answer to the metaphysical problem of the divine three-in-oneness. To be sure, 
the question can easily be answered, ‘One God,’ and all trinitarians will agree to 
that” (Hasker 2013: 50). In other words, the Trinity is three persons that integrate 
into one entity with a single existence, whether that three in one is conceived of 
as three properties of divine personhood with the same divine substance (Rea 
2009: 419), three centers of self-consciousness with one soul (Craig and Moreland 
2017: 593), or three divine individuals who jointly establish a collective, single 
source of the being of all else (Swinburne 1994: 180). For our purposes, it does 
not matter what precisely explains this three-in-oneness. All we need to establish 
is that the Trinity, at the very least, is one completely unified being that “is not a 
single person, but the closest possible union and communion of the three divine 
persons” (Hasker 2013: 258).  
Our claim is for the conceptual possibility of a triune God possessing a 
meaningful life via purely internal connections, without transcending outside 
Godself. 16  To begin, imagine that the members of the Trinity have always 
                                                     
14 As in the previously discussed case of propositions being external to souls in the sense of being 
compositionally external, the three persons of the Trinity are internally situated because they compose 
the Godhead. To reiterate, a simple notion of composition is that for x to compose y, x and y must be in 
the same ontological category. The three persons of the Trinity fulfill this criterion because they are of 
the same divine substance as the Trinity (at least according to most models of the Christian God). Hence, 
it is plausible to think that the act of one person of the Trinity relating to another, while external to the 
two, is internal to the one life of the Trinity. Here, the “one life” of the Trinity is understood by extending 
the notion of self to include multiple persons within a single being. 
15 For a dissenting view of the Trinity’s theological history, see Tuggy (2016).  
16 Although there is controversy over differentiating what is internal or external to God, particularly 
concerning abstract objects, we think that the examples we have chosen in this section of God’s 
meaningful life through solely internal connections are clearly divine aspects and relations internal to 
 72 
intensely loved each other. In fact, this is an argument often given for a plurality 
of persons within the Godhead (Swinburne 1994: 190-191; Swinburne 2008: 28-
38; Craig and Moreland 2017: 593). It is claimed that since God is a perfect being, 
God must be essentially loving since love is a necessary attribute of a morally 
perfect being. Hence, there must be several divine persons for God to ceaselessly 
express this attribute of love. So if the Trinity has been in thoroughly loving 
relationships within the Godhead’s three persons since eternity past, it seems that 
a triune God’s enduring interactions of complete love is a viable possibility for at 
least a somewhat meaningful life. And this three-person love within the one God 
would be through solely internal connections, as prior to any creational act, God 
would be existing alone in all reality, with each member of the Trinity bestowing 
great love upon the other. Thus, we think that the notion of a triune God 
exclusively connecting internally through ceaselessly loving Godself through 
inter-relations of love within the Trinity is a “prima facie candidate” for a 
meaningful life (Metz 2013: 29). Accordingly, the relational account’s 
requirement that connections beyond oneself are needed for meaning seems 
inadequate for capturing what is at the heart of having a meaningful life.  
But perhaps one may be skeptical that the case of the Trinity is a strong 
counterexample to Nozick by virtue of the plurality of persons present in the 
scenario. One might say that the “one life” of the triune God accrues meaning 
externally because the divine persons obtain meaning outside themselves. While 
we have tried to emphasize that it is from the perspective of the one Godhead that 
the connections to value are internal (not from the perspective of any individual 
divine person, where linkages will be external), we present another variety of 
meaning via internality for those yet unpersuaded.  
 
6. Meaning via Internal Connections: An Aristotelian God 
 
Imagine that instead of the Trinity, Aristotle’s “most good” deity is the one 
who reigns supreme (Metaphysics 1072b30). For Aristotle, this is the sort of 
individual who does nothing but contemplate Godself since the divine is the most 
excellent thing to direct one’s thoughts, and to contemplate anything else would 
be to engage in a less-than-perfect activity (Steenberghen 1974: 557; Craig 1980: 
35). In fact, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle cites God’s rational activity as 
                                                     
God (e.g. interrelations among the members of the Trinity), and so we hope to sidestep the 
aforementioned debate (Craig 2016: 81-82).  
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the standard for human flourishing: “Therefore the activity of God, which 
surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human 
activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of 
happiness” (X.1178b21-24). Furthermore, he says concerning this act of divine 
contemplation that “it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most 
excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking” (Metaphysics 
XII.1074b33-34). 
It is of course difficult to know exactly what Aristotle speaks of with the 
phrase “thinking on thinking,” but suppose that God’s contemplation here is 
utterly simple, non-relational, and unconnected to propositional knowledge 
(Beere 2010: 27). In this sort of scenario, we deem an Aristotelian God as still 
being able to have a meaningful life solely through this type of contemplative 
internal connection. Suppose the deity’s eternal self-contemplation is the most 
excellent expression of reason imaginable while also being highly pleasurable. It 
seems that this type of divine life is not incapable of meaning, as it would fulfill 
many traditional conceptions of meaning in life which stipulate activities such as 
intense engagement with rationality or experiencing great pleasure as sufficient 
for meaning. At any rate, what we hope to have shown is that it is difficult to 
characterize an Aristotelian God’s life as deficient in meaning simply because the 
deity’s connections to value are internal instead of external. If the difficulty looms 
large enough, then our counterexample should persuade those partial to the 
relational theory to reconsider whether external linkage to value is necessary for 
meaning in life.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In summary, we think that although the relational account is more resistant to 
some of Metz’s counterexamples, it is less resilient against others and the 
variations of them that we have developed in this paper, particularly our 
subjectivist example of Sisyphus 1 and 2. It also seems that life could be 
meaningful through solely internal relations, such as a triune God’s existence of 
love only among the persons of one Godhead living a single life or an Aristotelian 
deity’s perpetually exercising rational self-contemplation. As said at the outset, it 
is the idea of external connection being needed for meaning that this paper 
disputes. Now, all this does not mean that the relational theory has nothing to offer 
regarding how to best grasp meaning in life. For instance, one could take Metz’s 
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suggestion that perhaps “meaning can be essentially relational without being 
exhaustively relational” (Metz 2016: 1252). In other words, the relational theory 
could explain how meaning increases through one’s reaching beyond oneself 
while not limiting all avenues of meaning to external connections. This is quite 
possible, especially when considering the fact that most paradigmatic examples 
of meaning-making, like family relationships or aiding the poor, involve relating 
to entities beyond oneself. What looks less attractive, though, is the idea that 
transcendence beyond oneself toward a wider context of value is all there is to 
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To collaborate across cultures to efficiently tackle global environmental problems, we need to 
understand better the various ways in which individuals and groups value nature through their own 
situated worldviews. The Life Framework of Values aims at mapping the global diversity of values 
under the four dimensions of living from, with, in and as nature. Yet, it still faces difficulties to capture 
the interdependent and ever-changing aspects of the relation of human life to nature. This paper 
proposes a fifth dimension: living through nature. We are living through the world, continuously 
interacting with our milieu, shaping it and being shaped by it. Flows keep crossing the porous and 
dynamic borders of our bodies and communities. Finally, the example of Dōgen’s philosophy of 
mutual interdependence and impermanence is presented to illustrate the dimension of living through 
the world. 
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The reality of environmental changes and the threat that these changes pose 
to human ways of life cannot be denied. 1  In particular, climate change, 
desertification and biodiversity loss are “scientific facts” that enjoy wide 
consensus among the world scientific community. As environmental issues are 
global, questions such as “what meanings we give to life”, “what we want to 
sustain” and “what matters to us in nature” must be asked at the global level if we 
want to build solutions together. These questions of meaning in life lie at the 
crossroad of disciplines as diverse as philosophy of meaning in life, 
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environmental ethics, ecology and natural sciences. Crucially, they are also tied 
to norms and values and face a high diversity of worldviews. In this diverse global 
context, the distinction between scientific facts and situated value judgments is 
the key to prevent the imposition of one dominant worldview on others.  
Umbrella terms such as “the world” and “nature” attempt to cover the bundle 
of facts, phenomena and states of affairs that are and that surround us. Yet, there 
is an irreducible gap between this neutral objective reality and what we can 
perceive and access from our limited standpoint. To the best of our capacity and 
knowledge, we translate what we perceive into scientific facts using conventions 
that can be scientific, logic, linguistic, or else. These facts are the theories that can 
approximate the best what we can access of the reality according to the current 
scientific consensus. Filtered by authors and editors’ decision-making, they can 
be recorded in reports and journals. This filter makes the difference between what 
we can say and express, and what we actually say and. Far from being neutral, 
actions and speech –scientific or not– are strongly influenced by norms, values 
and meanings, and they are determined by the decision-making processes of 
individual phenomenological agents.  
Two remarks must be made. First, values require valuers. Meanings require 
thinkers. They are not facts existing outside of our thoughts, but beliefs that 
depend on our experience. Second, perceivers, thinkers and believers are always 
individuals. Yet meanings and beliefs are built through interactions with other 
people. We understand things in the world and value them within the frame of a 
particular worldview that we learn and appropriate in the process of growing up 
and living together with others in a specific sociocultural context. Worldviews are 
not neutral scientific facts; they are the frame and lenses through which one 
perceives and acts. They are sets of meanings, values, beliefs and habits that are 
partially invisible to their beholders, but crucially influence their decision-making 
and ways of life. Particular worldviews are held by individuals, often shared 
within groups and dominate in particular milieus, shaping how people live, think 
and act. Ultimately, we are always irreducibly trapped in our specific standpoint 
and we frame our perception and reality in a particular sociocultural worldview. 
Of course, we can minimize the weight of the subjective and cultural lenses by 
using tools and seeking towards objectivity; that is the core of the scientific 
enterprise. But when we understand, express and do something, we can never 
totally erase our standpoint, as it is inseparable from the fact of consciousness and 
thinking. Specifically, we cannot perceive, understand and act in the world 
 80 
without being human. 
This paper explores some attempts to grasp the diversity of ways life and 
nature are valued, inscribed in different worldviews. First, the Life Framework of 
Values is presented. This framework recently gains traction among researchers 
and policy-makers aiming at capturing the various ways in which nature matters 
to human beings. Second, I suggest that the four axes of the framework (living 
from, with, in, as nature) do not encapsulate the dynamicity and temporality of the 
relation itself, and propose to add a fifth dimension, namely, living through nature. 
Finally, I illustrate the dimension of living through nature by shortly describing 
Dōgen’s philosophy of impermanence and interdependence of things. 
 
2. Life Framework of Values 
 
International environmental law-makers, environmental non-governmental 
organizations and the scientific community have attempted to capture the 
diversity of ways in which nature matters to different human societies (e.g. IPBES 
2016, IPBES 2019, Jamieson 2008, James 2019). The need for international 
collaboration at the global level to efficiently address global environmental issues 
confronts us with the challenge exposed previously, namely, that how individuals 
and groups value the world largely depends on their worldviews, these lenses that 
are most of the time invisible to their beholders. The idea of ecosystem services 
was arguably the most successful attempts to classify and to shed light on the 
various ways in which human beings benefits from the environment (Jax et al., 
2013). Yet, the idea of ecosystem services has suffered from its popularity among 
economists and is criticized for pushing forward a monetary valuation of the 
environment at the expense of other forms of valuation, thus supporting the 
commodification of nature. As a result of these criticisms, the idea of “nature’s 
contributions to people” was introduced, particularly popular among social 
sciences and humanities, because it was seen as encompassing non-monetary 
ways of valuing nature, including indigenous perspectives on the relation between 
human beings and their environment. Notably, the Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) used the 
concept of nature’s contributions to people in its Global Assessment of 
Biodiversity.  
Recently, building on this conceptual tendency to include more diverse 
perspectives in the assessment of nature’s values, some researchers suggested the 
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Life Framework of Values to capture the global multiple ways in which people 
value nature. This framework aims at facilitating the expression of values that 
tend to be concealed in the usage of the concept of ecosystem services, because 
“if these ethical values are not elicited, they may not be considered in subsequent 
decision-making” (O’Connor and Kenter, 2019; Kenter et al. 2019; Meinard et al. 
2016). 
The Life Framework of Values provides a taxonomy to articulate different 
ways of valuing nature and the world. O’Neill et al. (2008) distinguished three 
ways in which the world matters to human beings. We first live from the world, as 
we fundamentally depend on the environment, for the fulfilment of our bodily 
needs (food, water, air, shelter, etc.), and for learning, inspiration and other various 
experiences. This first dimension is captured in the concept of ecosystem services 
that shows the different ways in which the environment matters to humans as a 
resource and provides us with a series of essential services. Second, we also live 
with nature and other species perceived as important others with whom we share 
the world. This view values nonhuman elements of the world as others who matter 
precisely because they are different from us. Human-nature dualism underpins 
this way of valuing the environment because we live with it. Third, we live in the 
world as a place that is the stage and matrix for our lives. Living in the world 
encompasses aspects of attachment to the land dear to many indigenous and local 
communities (e.g. Himes and Muraca 2018).  
Kenter and O’Connor added the fourth dimension of living as the world. 
Living as the world “points out to the more-than-human as self, individually and 
collectively” (2019, emphasis in the original). They illustrate this fourth 
dimension with aspects as various as “indigenous notions of oneness and kinship” 
(Gould et al. 2019), embodied and relation perspectives on life (Raymond et al. 
2017), Deep Ecology (Naess 1988) and “non-dual spiritual experience” (Wilber 
2001). Putting together so diverse aspects rooted in radically different traditions 
and worldviews not only makes the category of living as unclear and ambiguous, 
but it also presents important difficulties. To illustrate these difficulties, let us 
briefly sketch the debates between Deep Ecology, ecofeminism and accounts of 
“non-dual” “Asian” traditions. 
Deep Ecology claims that living beings have inherent worth regardless of 
their instrumental value compared to human needs (Drengson and Inoue 1995). 
Various formulations of this claim became the central demand of ecocentrism, 
which built itself in opposition to anthropocentrism. In particular, the “intrinsic 
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value of nature” has been argued to be anthropogenic (Callicott 1986, 142-143), 
or “discovered, not generated, by the valuer” (Rolston III 1988, 116). Yet, 
crucially, as values and meanings require thinking agents, this claim is deemed to 
be nothing but a normative assumption depending exclusively on the beliefs of 
the individual human beings defending this claim. In other words, natural 
elements can have “intrinsic” values only insofar as some individual human 
beings believe so. Thus, it cannot be argued for exclusively on objective or factual 
grounds, but must be defended transparently as a normative claim held by human 
individuals and groups. As a self-designed ecocentric theory, Deep Ecology 
rejects any claim of superiority of the human species over other species in the 
natural world (Seed et al. 1988, 36). The realization of our intimate dependency 
to the environment would lead the individual to adopt a strong ecocentric 
perspective, and to “expand the self” in an identification process with “others”, 
including other human beings, other animals, other living beings, ecosystems, and 
finally, the whole biosphere (Bragg 1996; Naess 1973, 1988). 
Ecofeminist thinkers also oppose the conception of the human self rooted in 
contemporary modern capitalist society and originated in patriarchal religious 
traditions placing human –especially man– as a ruler and a master above the rest 
of the living beings (Warren 1990; Plumwood 1993). Yet, many worry that the 
dissolution of the self in the environment, as implied by Deep Ecology thinking, 
may lead to a disappearance of agency and a dilution of responsibility. In 
particular, Val Plumwood argues that while Deep Ecology recognizes rightfully 
the wrongness of the dualism separating human from nature, its answer is a 
process of unification; “a metaphysics that insists that everything is really part of 
and indistinguisable from everything else” (1991, 13). By doing so, Deep Ecology 
is falling into a kind of atomism ignoring differences which are fundamental parts 
of everyday life (Grimshaw 1986), and a requirement to identify and address the 
different needs of other living beings.  
Proponents of ecocentrism and biocentrism sometimes suggest that Asian 
traditions that include meditative practices support the account of non-dual 
spiritual experiences of dissolution of the self in the world (e.g. Curtin 1994, 
James 2016, Loy 1999). Yet, utmost care must be taken when addressing the 
incredible diversity of “Asian traditions” and “mindfulness practices”. Indeed, 
there is a large scholarship within Asian traditions of thoughts that discusses the 
relation between humans and their world (e.g. Imanishi 2011, Yuasa 1987, Cheng 
2014). For example, in Buddhist studies only, there are multiple records of 
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traditions presenting “non-dual spiritual experience”, which nevertheless are 
rooted in radically different worldviews, in particular regarding the relation 
between human beings (or monks in particular) and the world (or natural elements 
in particular) (e.g. Dunne 2011). Needless to say, putting in the same box these 
highly diverse spiritual experiences triggered by meditation practices and other 
“indigenous notions of oneness and kinship” is not self-evident and requires 
justifications. Seen through the lenses of the dominant worldview of materialist 
and instrumental dualism, it is unsurprising that these various traditions appear to 
present similarities (McCarthy 2010). However, approached from within one of 
the aforementioned traditions, they might present irreconcilable differences. 
Moreover, while arguing for non-duality, many of these traditions still attribute a 
particularly privileged status to human beings compared to other living things. 
This is unsurprising, as modes of relation to nature depend on human-made social 
conventions, as suggested by the anthropologist Descola (2011). 
   
3. Living through Nature 
 
Setting aside those ambiguities regarding living as, living from, with, in, as 
nature does not encapsulate the dynamicity and temporality of the relation itself. 
In contrast, each of these four axes of the Life Framework of Values seems to 
presuppose the existence of two separable elements (humans and nature), and 
describes different ways in which they can relate. Living from captures an 
instrumental relation in which we, as agents, take what we want from the 
objectified nature. Living in partially includes relational values the importance 
that some elements of our surroundings, including the land itself, can have for us 
on a symbolic and identity- level. Living with reflects a dualist –but not 
necessarily hierarchical– relation in which human beings are cohabiting with 
sublime, dangerous and wild otherness, to which are attributed intrinsic values.  
Finally, living as tends to overlap the “human” element on the “natural” element 
and seeks correspondences, or even oneness, possibly at the expense of the 
concrete differences. Notably, living as might tend to erase the fundamentally 
human standpoint of our experiences and understanding. This obliteration risks 
concealing differences in needs, and thus faces the risk of judging other species’ 
needs and existence relatively to human needs, values and limited perceptions, as 
it is pointed out by the ecofeminist critique of Deep Ecology. 
Previously, we established that we never access the environment as it is, and 
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that there are no values, norms and meaning to be found in the environment itself. 
Both our relation to the environment and our decision-making processes regarding 
what we do and what matters to us are mediated by webs of meanings and norms 
that cover our surroundings. These can be referred to as the “milieu”, a term 
coined by Augustin Berque (1996) and inspired by Watsuji Tetsurō’s (1889-1960) 
concept of fūdo 風土 (2004). The milieu, that is the environment as lived and 
perceived by subjective human beings, articulates immaterial worldviews, 
material usages of the space and attachment to the land (Droz 2018). Indeed, 
worldviews, ideas and values are not floating in an immaterial vacuum from 
which individuals freely pick up what they prefer and build their own lenses and 
opinions. Instead, we grow up in a particular sociocultural context, within a 
political and social structure, and we learn to express ourselves and think in a 
specific language. This is how the milieu as a matrix shapes who we are and what 
we can do. We make sense of the world through our interactions with others, and 
our behaviours are guided by the practices that are common and accepted in the 
place where we live. Even what we can imagine is largely limited by our cultural 
imaginary. 
The relation between human beings and their surrounding environment is 
dynamic and historical. On the one hand, there are no fixed borders between 
individuals and their surroundings. Instead, we are in a state of constant change, 
at the nexus of various flows. On the other hand, these changes unfold through 
time. As individuals, we live and die. We are growing old, getting sick, changing 
of social positions and worldviews. It is difficult to put limits and to draw borders 
between the elements of the webs of relations that constitute the milieu. Living 
through the world and nature might capture better the dynamicity and temporality 
of the relation.  
There are two facets to living through: the porosity of borders and the 
temporal impermanence of things. First, borders are blurred, porous and flexible. 
As individuals, we are clearly living through the world. Identity, self-image and 
social status are dialectically built and changing through interactions with others 
(Hermans 2011). The fact that ideas, meaning and values are built and changed 
through participatory sense-making implies that they do not belong to or are made 
up by particular individuals alone (De Jaegher et al. 2016). Instead, they appear 
as the only partially intentional result of countless more or less deliberate 
interactions with others and the world. The borders of the body are also porous 
(Yuasa 1987). Our body is continuously breathing and exchanging elements with 
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its immediate surroundings. Recent studies in biology and medicine show the 
surprising reach of the effects of changes in the bacteria of our microbiomes on 
our health, including on our mood and levels of anxiety (O’Doherty et al. 2016, 
Rees et al. 2018). They show that our microbiomes are interacting with the biomes 
surrounding us. Our microbiome, which is closely linked to many bodily 
functionalities and moods, is constantly influenced not only by what we eat and 
absorb, but by what we breathe and touch, as well as by the microbiomes of the 
people surrounding us. Our agency too is constrained by the design of our 
surroundings. The idea of affordances coined by Gibson (1979) shows how our 
perceptions of our environment are determined by what we could and want to do. 
Unsurprisingly, there are a high variety of theories of the self that attempt to 
account for experiences of oneness (as mentioned in living as), for questions of 
body ownership expanded to prosthesis, for the inclusion of intimate family 
members in one’s own conception of the self, and for no-self arguments 
widespread in Buddhist and Taoist traditions. 
Milieus themselves do not have clear and fixed borders. As they depend on 
the experience and practices of their subjective inhabitants, they are changing to 
the discretion of their habits. In particular, today’s high individual mobility for 
work or private purposes modifies the shapes and sizes of milieus and increases 
their porosity and mutual influences. Similarly, the drawing of borders of groups, 
be it nations, ethnicity or culture, is highly complex, multi-layered and political. 
In place of borders and clearly delimited things, thinking in terms of flows 
might be more accurate and efficient. Flows are constantly moving through things 
in the world. We already mentioned flows of nourishment, nutrients, bacteria (air, 
food, etc.) at the micro scale of bodies. Ideas and values, mediated through 
communication technologies and global networks, are also flowing through 
geographical, linguistic and cultural borders. Studies of globalization made clear 
that flows of goods and information are today covering the whole globe. 
Admittedly, the porosity of borders and the ubiquity of flows does not erase 
borders. Our body is still delimited by our skin, and we still perceive the world 
from our specific standpoint. Similarly, nation states still have geographical 
borders, and flows of information on the Internet are largely guided by 
sociocultural affinities, linguistic limitations and political censorship. 
Nevertheless, the porosity of borders is challenging the belief that there are clearly 
delimited things that can be fully separated from each other. The relation between 
things in the world (whatever scale or criteria we use to define “things”) does not 
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appear to be optional or secondary to the existence of these things. Instead, things 
–including human beings and natural elements– are interdependent, mutually 
determined and inseparable. 
Yet, if ideas and values can flow between milieus and if various worldviews 
can coexist in the same shared milieu, they are still anchored in particular milieus, 
embodied in the practices and behaviours of their beholders. Because, again, they 
do not exist independently of individual phenomenological agents, and the latter 
are always embodied and situated at a particular historical and geographical point. 
Which means that we can partially situate particular worldviews, the practices 
they support and their concrete impacts on the world in specific milieus. This 
gives us leverage points to identify what bundle of values and meanings are at the 
root of some practices and projects that lead to harmful environmental 
consequences. Besides, thanks to its concrete local anchorage, the milieu allows 
us to approach the diversity of practices and worldviews without resting on 
assumption of national or ethnic homogeneity. Indeed, any local milieu is 
irreducibly particular if only by virtue of the specific historical and geographical 
features of the place. So the experiences and ways of life of its inhabitants will 
inevitably be particular, regardless of the political attempts to conceal its 
particularity under a cover of sociocultural unity. 
The second facet of living through the world or nature is temporal 
impermanence. Birth, growth, aging, reproduction and death are central 
characteristics of human life, and even of life in general. While the definition of 
life in sciences is still widely debated, it is largely consensual that living things 
“take in energy from the environment and transform it for growth and 
reproduction” and that they “respond, and their stimulation fosters a reaction-like 
motion, recoil, and in advanced forms, learning.”2 Abstractly said, transmission 
and adaptation of information appear to be a key aspect of life. Human birth, death 
and reproduction are associated with various rituals, meanings and symbols in 
different sociocultural milieus. They give rhythm to the life of the individual, and 
the “life” of the community. But temporal impermanence is not limited to our 
bodies and physical things. Individuals learn and change of beliefs and habits. 
Ideas, beliefs, values and worldviews are also changing, gaining popularity or 
sinking into oblivion. Still, in comparison with the individual life span, 
worldviews and ideas appear to have some inertia.  
                                                     
2 https://www.nasa.gov/vision/universe/starsgalaxies/life%27s_working_definition.html. Consulted on 
October 2nd 2019. 
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The bundle of meanings, practices, values and beliefs anchored in particular 
local environments that constitute milieus is continued, changed and transmitted 
throughout generations. As we have seen, the individual is shaped and guided by 
the milieu as a matrix and shapes the milieu through the imprints left by her 
actions (Berque, 1996). The individual lives, influences and is influenced by 
different milieus, and dies. Yet, through her way of life, the individual embodies 
and transmits meanings and values. The traces that the individual left in the 
milieu(s) continue to exist beyond her death (Droz, 2019). These traces can be 
material in the form of buildings or books, or they might be projects and ideas that 
survive the individual. The individual legacy, her posthumous reputation, her 
ideals and projects, but also her family and children continue to exist in her milieu 
after her death, at least for a while. In short, the milieu carries the signifying traces 
of the past, co-creates significance with the living human beings and transmits it 
to the future.  
This historical process of transmission of values and meaning is not 
ineluctable and neutral. It is mediated by our individual decision-making and by 
common policies, educational programs and large-scale projects. Notably, 
because we have some choice to do otherwise, we are also ethically responsible 
for the consequences of our way of life. By acting and thinking in a particular way, 
we support its existence and transmission, including beyond our death. These 
considerations reflect the highly political and ethical nature of questions of 
cultural survival and endangered languages and knowledge. Crucially, the 
continuation of particular worldviews is not uniquely immaterial, but also has 
concrete physical impacts. Indeed, the continuation of particular ways of life in a 
milieu is maintaining specific landscapes, and supporting particular ecosystems 
that depend on human activities (Flint et al. 2013). 
To summarize, the impermanence and the close intertwining of the 
sociocultural and environmental aspects of human life indicate how we are living 
through the world. We are constantly mutually influencing each other’s 
worldviews and values, and changing as a result. Moreover, these worldviews and 
values encourage ways of life that supports different types of ecosystems and 
species. Living through milieus captures the impermanent dynamicity of the 
relation between humans and their environment, and the porosity of their borders. 
It sketches worldviews based on processes and flows that are continuously in 
movements, in the line of recent developments in “process philosophy” (Winters 
2017; Seibt 2018).  
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4. Example: Dōgen’s Impermanence 
 
Living through was characterized by the temporal impermanence of things 
and their interdependence, as their porous borders are constantly permeated by 
various flows. Living through insists on the difficulty to draw fixed lines between 
two separate objects (such as humans and nature). It does not reject the other types 
of relations captured by the other prepositions, but adds another dimension. The 
relation between humans and nature can be seen as an instrumental relation 
between subjects and objects (from), as side-by-side coexistence (with), as nature 
providing a passive contextual receptacle (in), and as filled with correspondences 
and overlaps (as). In addition, the relation between humans and nature can be 
understood as interdependent, constantly changing and mutual interpenetrating 
(through). Echoes of each of these types of valuation can be found within most 
the worldviews and sociocultural contexts, with varying emphasis given to each. 
The emphasis on instrumental aspects of living from nature is well-known and 
largely dominating political and economic discourses nowadays. In contrast, let 
us briefly explore a radically different worldview that gave centrality to the aspect 
of living through nature. 
 The impermanence of things is one of the foundational claims of 
Buddhism. About 800 years ago, the Japanese Buddhist monk Dōgen (1200-1253) 
left his original affiliation with the Tendai School and founded a rival school of 
Zen Buddhism (Sōtō) after returning from his trip in China (Yokoi 1976). He left 
an extensive collection of texts that are still studied nowadays and remains a 
central figure of Zen Buddhism (Nishiyama and Stevens 1977, Takahashi 1983). 
The interpretation of Dōgen’s work is recognized to be hard, and attempting to 
draw different types of valuation of nature from his texts might appear to be 
anachronistic. An important first obstacle in treating the valuation of “nature” in 
Dōgen’s work is the very fact that the concept of was nonexistent in his historical 
and geographical context. The concept of "nature" as construed contemporary 
sciences was introduced in Japan in 1796 as a translation from Dutch into “jizen” 
(自然 , pronounced today as shizen) (Iwanami Buddhism Dictionary 1989; 
Iwanami Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1998; Jannel 2015). Before this translation, 
the word shizen had a different meaning rooted in Ancient Chinese. In particular, 
ziran (its Chinese pronunciation) was used by Laozi in relation with a way of 
being characterized by non-doing (wuwei) that humans can or should practice, and 
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with the co-determined emergence of things (Yinyuan), a fundamental premise in 
both Buddhist and Taoist cosmologies. Ziran as a translation for the Western 
"Nature" is likely to have been taken back into Chinese from the Japanese 
translation. Both meanings (Way of being existing by itself, and Western-style 
nature) coexist nowadays in the Chinese word Ziran and the modern Japanese 
word shizen (written with the same Chinese characters). There are other words 
that might get close to the idea of nature within these traditions, such as the 
equivalents for “world”, of “under heaven”, but they tend to include human beings 
in opposition to other godly realms and carry strong connotations intertwined in 
Buddhist and Taoist cosmologies. Still today, this historical background raises 
important difficulties in the approach and the discourses of “values of nature” in 
East Asia. 
Nevertheless, these difficulties perfectly illustrate the role of worldviews as 
the lenses that limit and shape how we see and make sense of the world. Dōgen 
himself warned us that we “should not be limited to human views” and “naïvely 
think that what one views as water is “what dragons and fish see as water and use 
as water.”” (Dōgen 1990: 2:198). While there was no clear opposition between 
“humans” and nature, because there was nothing such as the contemporary 
concept of nature, Dōgen still recognized the particularity of our human lenses. In 
other words, he noted that we are living with other living beings who perceive the 
world differently than us. He further acknowledged, in another text, that the living 
beings are living from and in their own environment:  
 
Fish swim through water, and swim as they may there is no limit to the 
water. Birds fly through the sky, and fly as they may there is no limit to 
the sky. And yet, fish and birds have never once left the water or sky. It 
is just that when the required activity is great the use is great, and when 
the need is small the use is small. In this manner, although they never fail 
to exhaust the borders of each and every point, turning about [freely] here 
and there, if a bird were to leave the sky, or if a fish were to leave the 
water, they would die instantly. One should know that [for a fish] life is 
by means of water, and [for a bird] life is by means of the sky. It is [also] 
the case that life is by means of birds and fish. And by means of life birds 
and fish are able to be. Moreover, we should proceed a step further. That 
there is the verification-in-practice of [human] lives is also just like this 
(Genjokoan, translation by Davis, 2009, 258). 
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Dōgen highlighted here the instrumental dependence of fishes, birds and humans 
on our direct environment, as each lives “by means of”, that is, from it. In addition, 
he pointed out that living things never leave their particular milieu, because if they 
did, they would “die instantly”. In other words, we are always living in a specific 
world or milieu on which we existentially depend. He adds that even if the fish 
were to leave water and aim at the sky, it “could not find its way or attain its place 
in” it. That is because this way of life, “this place, is neither great nor small, 
neither self nor other, neither already in existence nor [first] manifesting now, it 
is just as it is”. We belong to a place, to our milieu, in a way that there is no clear 
border separating it from us, and in a way that we could not exist “truly” out of it.  
In his historical, geographical and religious context, Dōgen’s revolutionary 
philosophical stance was to claim that all things have Buddha nature. He writes 
that “the grasses, trees and lands”, like “the sun, moon, and stars are mind; because 
they are mind, they are living beings; because they are living beings, they “have 
the Buddha nature.””(Busshō, translation by Bielefeldt, 2010, 21). Here is not the 
place to dive in the depths of his mysticism. Still, this description hinges at valuing 
living things in the world because of they share the same nature as human beings 
do, and thus living as living things, each in our specific place in the world. This 
perspective finds echoes in recent multispecies research that places human beings 
as members of a community of diverse species (e.g. Ogden et al. 2013; Locke and 
Muenster 2015; Kirskey and Helmreich 2010).  
Echoes of living as the world are also found in Dōgen’s most famous quote 
that points at the spiritual experience of oneness towards which practitioners must 
aim: “To study the self is to forget the self. To forget the self is to be verified by 
the myriad things [of the world]. To be verified by the myriad things is to let drop 
off the body-mind of the self and the body-mind of others.” (Genjokoan, 
translation by Davis, 2009, 256). By carefully studying ourselves, we would 
notice the porous and artificial nature of the separation between us and the world. 
Izutsu explains: 
 
One cannot become water because one is observing it from outside, that 
is to say, because the ego is, as an outsider, looking at water as an “object”. 
Instead of doing so, Zen continues to argue, one must first learn to “forget 
one’s ego-subject” and let oneself be completely absorbed into the water. 
One would then be flowing as the flowing river. No more would there be 
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any consciousness or ego. Nor would there be any “consciousness of” 
the water. Strictly speaking, it is not even the case that one becomes the 
water and flows on as the water. […] Simply: The water flows on. No 
more, no less” (Izutsu 1982: 81). 
 
Interestingly, the tensions found in expressions such as “flowing as the river”, 
widely discussed in Buddhist studies, echo the debates between Deep Ecology 
and ecofeminism regarding the dangerous dissolution of the self that could lead 
to a disappearance of agency and responsibility.   
Crucially, the experience of living as is for most practitioners a temporary 
exercise and not a constant state of being, namely, that we are living through the 
world. The experience of weakening the borders between the self and the world 
teaches us that the borders separating things in the world are porous and sheds 
light on the fundamental interdependence of all things. Dynamic interdependence 
is one facet of living through the world. The second facet, impermanence, is 
recurrent in Dōgen’s discussion of time (Moriyama and Sakon, 2018), and clearly 
transpires from this last quote: “In a like manner, if one tries to discern the myriad 
things with confused assumptions about the body-mind, it can mistakenly seem 
as though one’s own mind and nature are permanent.” (Genjokoan, translation by 
Davis, 2009, 257). 
In sum, the aspects of living from, in, with, as and through the world can be 
found together in Dōgen’s work. As it appears from this short depiction of his 
worldview, he does not emphasize aspects of living from the world as do current 
dominant worldviews. Instead, he stresses the interdependence and 
impermanence of the “myriad things” and warns us against the common mistaken 
assumptions of fixed and permanent independent beings, starting with ourselves. 
The spotlight is shed on how we are living through the world, as impermanent and 




Global environmental issues present us with the need to understand how 
individuals and groups value nature and the world through their own situated 
worldviews. We need to understand what meanings different people give to life 
and nature in order to find some common grounds and tackle together global 
environmental problems. Yet, we always access ourselves and the world through 
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the lenses of our situated sociocultural worldview, tainted with normative values 
and judgements. Such questions regarding meaning of life and nature require an 
interdisciplinary dialogue, especially in a global and diverse context. Accordingly, 
this paper bridged inputs from ecology, anthropology, environmental ethics, 
Japanese philosophy and philosophy of meaning in life.  
One of the current interdisciplinary framework to map the different ways in 
which nature matters to humans is the Life Framework of Values. It is composed 
of four axes; living from, with, in and as nature or the world. Yet, these four axes 
fail to capture the dynamicity and temporality of the relation between humans and 
their surrounding reality. This paper highlighted a possible fifth dimension: living 
through nature. We are continuously in changing and interdependent interactions 
with our milieu, shaping it and being shaped by it. Flows keep crossing the porous 
and dynamic borders of our body and communities. This dimension of living 
through was briefly illustrated by the example of Dōgen’s philosophy of 
interdependence and impermanence. 
As individual, sociocultural groups and humanity, we are living through the 
world. We exist as a nexus of flows. We have the possibility to influence the 
orientation of these flows; that is ethical decision-making. We exist in the midst 
of these flows, but we cannot separate ourselves from them, or fully objectify them 
into something we are living with, or completely erase differences and equalize 
us as the world. Nowadays, communication media and the internet confront us 
with flows of diverse meanings and values that are often taken out of their 
contextual worldview, increasing the risks of misunderstandings and conflicts. It 
is thus crucial to remind us that besides some general considerations that human 
life requires some basic environmental and social conditions, questions regarding 
meaning and value remain normative. Meanings and values are not to be found in 
reality, but they are to be assigned from within a particular worldview, and 
embodied and lived by subjective human individuals. Importantly, any single 
permanent global answer to these normative questions would risk imposing the 
subjective perspective of a dominant group at the expenses of other worldviews.  
To foster intercultural collaboration and minimize conflicts and 
misunderstanding, we need to understand better the various ways in which we 
value and make sense of nature. In this quest, the Life Framework of Values 
provides a precious starting point. The recent addition of the fourth dimension of 
living as is a particularly encouraging step towards including worldviews that are 
usually marginalized in global political and scientific discourses. Yet, as shown in 
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this paper, some perspectives on the temporality and dynamicity of human life 
still seem difficult to account for with the four dimensions living from, with, in 





Berque, Augustin. 1996. être humains sur la terre, principes d’éthique de 
l’écoumène. Paris: le débat Gallimard.  
Bielefeldt, Carl. 2010. “Treasury of the Eye of the True Dharma, Book 3, 
Buddha Nature (Busshō).” (Introduction and Translation), Soto Zen Journal 25, 
17-23. 
Bragg, Ann Elizabeth. 1996. “Towards Ecological Self: Deep Ecology Meets 
Constructionist Self-Theory.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 16, 
Academic Press Limited, 93-108. 
Callicott, J. Baird. 1986. “On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species.” The 
Preservation of Species, Bryan G. Norton (ed.), Princeton University Press, 
138-172. 
Cheng, Kai-Yuan. 2014. “Self and the Dream of the Butterfly in the Zhuangzi.” 
Philosophy East and West 64:3, 563-597. 
Curtin, Dean. 1994. “Dōgen, deep ecology and the ecological self.” 
Environmental Ethics 16:2, 195-213. 
Davis, Bret W. 2009. “The Presencing of Truth: Dōgen’s Genjokoan.” Buddhist 
Philosophy: Essential Readings, Jay Garfield and William Edelglass (ed.), 
Oxford University Press, 251–259. 
Dōgen. 1990. Shobogenzo. Mizuno Yaoko (ed.). Tokyo: Iwanami. 
De Jaegher, Hanne, Anssi Peräkylä, and Melisa Stevanovic. 2016. “The Co-
Creation of Meaningful Action: Bridging Enaction and Interactional 
Sociology.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 371, 1-10. 
Descola, Philippe. 2011. L’écologie des autres – L’anthropologie et la question 
de la nature. Paris: Editions Quae, Sciences en questions. 
Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue. 1995. The Deep Ecology Movement: An 
Introductory Anthology. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books. 
Droz, Laÿna. 2018. “Watsuji’s Idea of Self and the Problem of Spatial Distance 
in Environmental Ethics.” European Journal of Japanese Philosophy 3, 145-
 94 
168. 
Droz, Laÿna. 2019. “Watsuji’s Milieu and Intergenerational Ethics.” 
Environmental Ethics, 41:1, 37-51.   
Dunne, John. 2011. “Toward an understanding of non-dual mindfulness.” 
Contemporary Buddhism 12:1, 71-88. 
Flint, C. G., I. Kunze, A. Muhar, Y. Yoshida, and M. Penker. 2013. “Exploring 
Empirical Typologies of Human–Nature Relationships and Linkages to the 
Ecosystem Services Concept.” Landscape and Urban Planning 120, 208–217.  
Gibson, James. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
Gould R., Pai M., Chan K., and Muraca B. 2019. “How one indigenous 
worldview informs relational values and social values.” Sustainability Science 
14, 1213–1232. 
Grimshaw, Jean. 1986. Philosophy and Feminist Thinking. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Hermans, Hubert J. M. 2011. “The Dialogical Self: A Process of Positioning in 
Space and Time.” The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Shaun Gallagher (ed.). 
New York: Oxford University Press, 654-680.. 
Himes, A, Muraca B. 2018. “Science direct relational values: the key to 
pluralistic valuation of ecosystem services.” Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability 35, 1-7. 
Imanishi, Kinji. 2011. Le monde des êtres vivants, une théorie écologique de 
l’évolution. Pamela Asquith (trad.), Paris: Wildproject. 
IPBES. 2016. Preliminary guide regarding diverse conceptualisation of multiple 
values of nature and its benefits, including biodiversity and ecosystem 
functions and services. Nairobi: UNEP. 
IPBES. 2019. Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on 
biodiversity and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Nairobi: UNEP. 
Iwanami Buddhism Dictionary. 1989. Iwanami (Iwanami Bukkyō Jiten). 
Izutsu, Toshihiko. 1982. Towards a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. Boulder: 
Prajna Press. 
Jamieson, Dale. 2008. Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction. Cambridge 
University Press. 
James, Simon. 2016. Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics. London: 
Routledge. 
 95 
James, Simon. 2019. “Natural Meanings and Cultural Values.” Environmental 
Ethics 41 :1, 3-16. 
Jannel, Romaric. 2015. “Vie de concepts: le vocabulaire philosophique au 
Japon. ” A L'épreuve, 10-12.  
Jax, Kurt et al. 2013. “Ecosystem services and ethics.” Ecological Economics, 
93: C, 260-268. 
Kenter, Jasper O. et al. 2019. “Loving the mess: Navigating diversity and 
conflict in social values for sustainability.” Sustainability Science 14, 1439–
1461. 
Kirksey, S. Eben. and Stefan Helmreich. 2010. “The Emergence of Multispecies 
Ethnography.” Cultural Anthropology 25, 545-576. 
Locke, Piers and Ursula Münster. 2015. “Multispecies Ethnography.” Oxford 
Bibliographies. Oxford University Press. 
Loy, David. 1999. “Loving the World as Our Own Body: The Non-Dualist 
Ethics of Taoism, Buddhism, and Deep Ecology.” Asian and Jungian Views of 
Ethics, Carl Becker (ed.). Westport: Greenwood Press.  
McCarthy, Erin. 2010. Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through 
Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Meinard, Yves, Malgorzata Dereniowska and Jean-Sébastien Gharbi. 2016. “The 
ethical stakes in monetary valuation methods for conservation purposes.” 
Biological Conservation, 199:67-74. 
Moriyama, Shinya and Sakon Takeshi. 2018. “Dōgen on Time and the Self.” 
Tetsugaku 2, 135-150. 
Naess, Arne. 1973. “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement.” Inquiry 16: 1. 
Naess, Arne. 1988. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nishiyama, Kosen and John Stevens. 1977. A Complete English Translation of 
Dōgen Zenji’s Shobogenzo (The Eye and Treasury of the True Law) Vol. II., 
Nakayama Shobo. 
O’Connor, Seb and Jasper O. Kenter. 2019. “Making intrinsic values work: 
integrating intrinsic values of the more-than-human world through the Life 
Framework of Values.” Sustainability Science 14, 1247-1265. 
Ogden, Laura A., Billy Hall and Kimiko Tanita. 2013. “Animals, Plants, People, 
and Things: A Review of Multispecies Ethnography.” Environment and Society 
4, 5-24.  
 96 
O’Neill, John, Alan Holland and Andrew Light. 2008. Environmental Values. 
London: Routledge. 
O’Doherty, Kieran C., Alice Virani and Elizabeth S. Wilcox. 2016. “The Human 
Microbiome and Public Health: Social and Ethical Considerations.” American 
Journal of Public Health, 106:3, 414-420. 
Plumwood, Val. 1993. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London/New York: 
Routledge.  
Plumwood, Val. 1991. “Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental 
Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism.” Hypatia 6:1. 
Raymond, Christopher M., Matteo Giusti and Stephan Barthel. 2017. “An 
embodied perspective on the co-production of cultural ecosystem services: 
toward embodied ecosystems.” Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 1, 1-22. 
Rees, Tobias, Thomas Bosch and Angela Douglas. 2018. “How the microbiome 
challenges our concept of self.” PLoS Biology 16:2. 
Rolston III, Holmes. 1988. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the 
Natural World. Temple University Press. 
Seed, John, Macy Joanna, Fleming Pat and Naess Arne. 1988. Thinking Like a 
Mountain: Toward a Council of All Beings. Philadelphia and Santa Cruz: New 
Society Publishers. 
Seibt, Johanna. 2018. “Process Philosophy.” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).Accessed on November 1st 2019.  
Takahashi, Masanobu. 1983. The essence of Dōgen. Yuzuru Nobuoka (trans.). 
Routledge. 
Yuasa, Yasuo, 1987. The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory. 
Nagatamo Shigenori and T. P. Kasulis (trans.). Albany: SUNY Press. 
Yokoi, Yuho, 1976, Master Dōgen: An Introduction with Selected Writings. 
Weatherhill.  
Warren, Karen. 1990. “The promise and power of ecofeminism.” Environmental 
Ethics 12:2, 125-146. 
Watsuji, Tetsurō. 2004. Fūdo: Ningengakuteki Kōsatsu. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
first published in 1935. 
Iwanami Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998. Iwanami (Iwanami Tetsugaku Shisō 
Jiten). 
Winters, Andrew M. 2017. Natural Processes: Understanding Metaphysics 
Without Substance. Palgrave. 
 97 
Wilber K. 2001. No boundary. Boston: Shambhala Publications.  
 98 
Journal of Philosophy of Life Vol.10, No.1 (July 2020):98-119 
Nothingness, the Self, and the Meaning of Life 
Nishida, Nishitani, and Japanese Psychotherapeutic Approaches to the 




In my paper I propose to explore how four influential 20th century philosophers and psychotherapists 
in Japan, Nishida Kitarō, Nishitani Keiji, Morita Masatake and Yoshimoto Ishin have given shape to 
their meditations on nothingness, emptiness and the self, and in what ways did their works point to 
similar directions when it comes to the question of fending off the dangers of nihilism and finding a 
new meaning in life. After introducing various concepts of nihilism and setting the historical and 
intellectual context of the era, I shall delve into the theoretical configurations of the self in relation to 
nothingness and emptiness in Nishida’s, Morita’s, Nishitani’s and Yoshimoto’s views. The paper will 
conclude with the delineation of some common features in the four thinkers’ oeuvre that could assist 
the self in getting rid of the threat of nihilism by transforming itself into an emotionally and 
existentially more stable mode of being. 




Some ten years after listening to Heidegger’s lectures at the University of 
Freiburg on Nietzsche and nihilism, Nishitani Keiji, one of modern Japan’s most 
original and insightful philosophers, has decided to give a series of lectures in 
Kyoto which got published in 1949 under the title Nihilism.1 The text warns 
against the imminent dangers of nihilism and explains its particular relevance to 
Japan. In his precautionary remarks and in-depth analysis Nishitani makes it clear 
that nihilism is not merely a European or western phenomenon: it has spread way 
beyond its point of historical emergence, and thus holds serious threats to the 
cultural lives and national identities of other countries, among them Japan, as well. 
Why is that so? How could European nihilism be a serious hazard to the Japanese 
culture? Nishitani explains that it is because Japan is already in a deep crisis. In 
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fact, Japan has been in crisis for some time, but the crisis had gone largely 
unnoticed. Consequently, Japan is unaware in terms of the extent of the spiritual 
malaise and the menacing ennui that has been swirling forebodingly under the 
surface of its manifest historical events.2 The movement of nihilism conceals 
itself extraordinarily well, and therein lies the essence of its danger: that it can 
escalate in a barely noticeable yet fairly rapid manner. Nishitani expounds: 
 
Up until the middle of the Meiji period a spiritual basis and highly 
developed tradition was alive in the hearts and minds of the people. 
Indeed, the reason Japan was able to take in western culture with such 
unprecedented alacrity was that people then were possessed of true 
ability born of spiritual substance. However, as Europeanization (and 
Americanization) proceeded, this spiritual core began to decay in 
subsequent generations, until it is now a vast, gaping void in our ground. 
3 
This “vast, gaping void” at the core of one’s existence is not a matter that could 
be labeled as unique to this historical period or could be simply understood as the 
consequence of a mere chronological chain of events that comes from the past and 
leads to the now. For Nishitani, as for his predecessors like Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, the nature of nihilism could be conceived in essentially twofold ways: 
one, it can be seen as universal and existential; two, as particular and historical. 
This duality is something that can and should be grasped in one single vision in 
order to understand how nihilism operates in actual reality; neither aspect of its 
movement ought to be downplayed. What is crucial here is that the problem 
should not be objectified and externalized as though it were just another problem 
among many others. The question of nihilism is the most urgent, the most personal 
and radical of all.4 
“On the one hand, nihilism is a problem that transcends time and space and is 
rooted in the essence of human being, an existential problem in which the being 
of the self is revealed to the self itself as something groundless.”5 For Nishitani, 
                                                     
2 Nishitani (1990), p. 177: “As noted above, our crisis is compounded by the fact that not only are we 
in it but we do not know that our situation is critical. Thus our first task is to realize that the crisis exists 
in us, that modern Japan is a living contradiction with a hollowness in its spiritual foundations.”   
3 Op.cit., p. 175. 
4 Op.cit., p. 2: “In short, nihilism refuses treatment as merely an external problem for one's self, or even 
contemplation as a problem internal to each individual self. This is the essence of nihilism. (…) Nihilism 
demands that each individual carry out an experiment within the self.” 
5 Op.cit., p. 3. 
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the existential side is clearly very important and not something to be neglected. 
Nevertheless, the void is always there for the individual as the groundless ground 
of its personal existence. Although this fact is habitually covered up and made 
forgotten by the cultural structures of the civilization into which one is born, when 
these structures experience a deep and lasting inner crisis one cannot avoid to see 
the true groundless nature of one’s existence. At times like this the uncomfortable 
truth comes to the fore, namely, that where one assumed to have fixed and reliable 
ontological foundations to be present there is nothing save for a formless void. 
Recognizing the presence of the abyss is agonizing, yet it is the only way that can 
revitalize the creative spiritual energies of both the individual and the civilization 
in toto. 
 
The essential thing is to overcome our inner void, and here European 
nihilism is of critical relevance in that it can impart a radical twist to our 
present situation and thereby point a way toward overcoming the 
spiritual hollowness. This is the second significance that nihilism holds 
for us. The reason the void was generated in the spiritual foundation of 
the Japanese in the first place was that we rushed earnestly into 
westernization and in the process forgot ourselves.6  
 
Nishitani’s thoroughgoing analysis, no matter how convincing and alarming it 
may sound, has been formulated in a cultural milieu and historical era that is 
obviously not identical to the one we live in at the current moment, some seventy 
or eighty years after his thoughts were put down on paper. But is this era so 
entirely different than the one in which Nishitani lived? Has the danger of nihilism, 
in its second, historical sense, been successfully fended off and done away from 
among our primary cultural concerns? There may be some voices today again that 
would argue that historical nihilism is still lurking around, it still has not been 
overcome or replaced by anything more constructive and reassuring compared 
with the “gaping void”.7 These voices might feel inclined to claim that a major 
shift has never taken place, but, instead, the long lasting decadent and self-
destructive trends of the western world resulted in the evident multiplication and 
the deepening of the various crises that seem to produce new challenges by the 
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day.8  
Among these voices James Tartaglia’s is one of the most salient nowadays. 
He contends in his 2016 book Philosophy in a Meaningless Life that instead of 
rejecting nihilism or trying to fight it, one should rather embrace it, because 
human life is indeed meaningless. “There is no overall point to human life. We 
are each of us born into a certain specific situation, at a particular place, in a 
particular historical epoch, and with particular parents, and from this unchosen 
starting point we must continue to exist until our time runs out.”9 Tartaglia goes 
on to argue that although human life does not have an unequivocal comprehensive 
meaning, this is no reason to despair after all. Nihilism has the power to 
reinvigorate not only philosophy but one’s attitude towards life’s goals as well. 
The philosophy of the meaning of life is inherently connected with the fact that 
we are living in a nihilistic age, but according to Tartaglia, this is not an issue that 
should be overcome. Nihilism is a fact of human life, and if one intends to improve 
the current situation, one ought to see nihilism in a positive light, in lieu of 
attempting to replace it with a purportedly more sensible approach to life: an 
approach that no one really knows what it consists in.  
Some might even argue that non-western cultures, like Japan, which have 
been profoundly influenced by most aspects, both positive and negative, of 
western civilization, could not yet actually renew and regenerate themselves, but 
are still fundamentally at the same historical situation by and large where they had 
been sixty or eighty years ago. It may be plausibly posited that Japan is still 
searching for its own identity, and this long-going/ongoing search has not been 
without its difficulties and drawbacks. As professor Kazushige Shingu, renowned 
psychotherapist and psychiatrist from Nara University, has noted not long ago: 
There is an increasing social demand for identity because in Japan we faced, 
initially, the collapse of the traditional construction of society based on 
Confucianism and Buddhism, later the opposition between East and West, 
between Communist and Liberal world. Now also this structure crashed and we 
are facing the overwhelming power of Neoliberalism. (…)We are living a deeply 
ambivalent and contradictory situation and it is true that, in this situation, we have 
                                                     
8 Possenti (2014), p. 211: “Having captured the spiritual sensibilities of an entire age, nihilism has now 
become the prevailing cultural climate in which we live. It is the air we breathe from birth, the 
irreplaceable lens through which we view every problem. Nihilism is thus the term that best sums up 
human civilization’s march toward decadence; it is a negative nihilism that saps us of the will to live 
and work.” 
9 Tartaglia (2016), p. 21. 
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the tendency to close into ourselves, as if we were psychoanalyzing ourselves (…) 
I think this is a cause of suffering.10  
Discovering – or creating anew – its own identity and an overall meaning of 
life while trying to find a way out of the distressing situation that causes 
widespread suffering and increased mental disturbances among the population is 
a cardinal goal for which Japan has been striving for a considerable time through 
various channels. If we follow them, some of these channels will lead us into the 
camps of Kyoto School philosophy, while others into the mental health care 
circles of Morita and Naikan therapies. In what follows we will investigate how 
Nishida Kitarō, along with Nishitani Keiji, worked on a potentially promising 
philosophical way out of nihilism, while Morita Masatake and Yoshimoto Ishin 
have developed two dissimilar, yet apparently converging therapeutic approaches 
that are embedded in the Buddhist tradition. All these scholarly and pragmatic 
endeavors have yielded a seemingly new, yet, at its core, a rather ancient 
foundation to a form of ethics which aims to cope with the challenges posed by 
nihilism. This ethics, as we will soon have an opportunity to observe, does not 
intend to cover up the existential void of nihilism but, instead, attempts to build a 
bridge over it while leaving the void in plain sight. Nevertheless, before turning 
our attention to the intellectual labor carried out by Nishida, Nishitani, Morita and 
Yoshimoto of bridging the void of nihilism, first we need to deepen our 
understanding regarding the true nature of the threat, in order to see how nihilism 
has come to be the notoriously dreaded cultural phenomenon of the modern period 
 
2. The Advancement of the History of Nihilism  
 
The modern epoch brought into being a world in which the effects of 
nihilism are spreading. Now, we can see, today, if we look with care and 
thought, that nihilism is a rage against Being: ‘nihilism’ means the 
destruction of Being: the Being of all beings, including that way of being 
which we call ‘human’ and consider to be our own.11 
 
If there is a single philosopher who is routinely associated with the notion of 
nihilism then that person is, without doubt, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s 
musings on the emergence of nihilism from the cultural logic of Christianity is as 
                                                     
10 Bucci et al. (2014), p. 122. 
11 Levin (1988), p. 5. 
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well-known as his prophesied solution for the problem of nihilism which he 
declared to have found in the overcoming of man by the overman (Übermensch) 
and in creating new values instead of the hollowed-out old ones. Nietzsche was 
confessedly a nihilist himself in the sense of striving to actively assist the 
unavoidable progress of nihilism to come to its fruition with the explicit aim of 
propelling the development of European history to its subsequent, post-nihilistic 
stage. Nietzsche saw himself as much an outstanding herald of the times 
disseminating the news about the imminent advent of the mass decline of 
European civilization as the chosen thinker in whom the nihilistic tendencies of 
the west have culminated. Notwithstanding his apparent merits in laying bare the 
scarcely perceptible progression of the movement of nihilism, it would be a 
mistake to fall for Nietzsche’s less than modest, somewhat self-aggrandizing 
presentation concerning the origins of nihilism. As Slocombe reminds us, 
“Nihilism did not originate with Nietzsche, however, and neither did it end with 
him. Before Nietzsche, philosophies of nihilism are evident from classical Greece 
to Enlightenment Europe; since Nietzsche, and especially since the Holocaust, 
nihilism is no longer a marginalized philosophy, but one that has become central 
to an understanding of the history of modernity and twentieth- and twenty-first-
century culture.”12 
The first usage of the term “nihilism” in its philosophical sense can be traced 
back to a letter, dated 21st of March 1799, written by Jacobi and addressed to 
Fichte. In this letter Jacobi criticized Fichte for the kind of transcendental idealism, 
initiated by Kant and sustained by Fichte himself, which seeks to address all 
philosophical questions without involving anything external (i.e. God) to the self. 
This kind of transcendental idealism becomes, according to Jacobi, a form of 
‘nihilism’ (Nihilismus). For if God is removed from philosophy, philosophy 
becomes sheer egoism or solipsism, and there remains nothing upon which the 
inquiring self could stand on. Consequently the self, without God, turns into an 
“empty self”, and, vice versa, God, without its absolute validity, changes into 
nothingness.13 Following this famous letter, nihilism as a “term was generally 
connected with atheism and with a rejection of all existing sources of authority by 
critics such as Jacobi and Jean Paul, and later by Turgenev, and Dostoevsky. They 
were all convinced that if the I was posited as absolute, God was nothing, and that 
without God all authority could have no other basis than shifting human will and 
                                                     
12 Slocombe (2005), p. 1. 
13 Weller (2008), pp. 1-2. 
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opinion.”14 The connection of nihilism with atheism and the refusal of authority 
then grew even more pronounced when Russian radicals who came to be known 
as “Nihilists” started a political movement in the 1860s which was boldly 
propagating anarchistic ideals while rejecting all forms of authority from the Tsar 
to the Russian Orthodox Church to the aristocracy.15  
Nietzsche referred to nihilism as the “uncanniest of all guests”. If nihilism is 
a guest, then it is certainly not the kind of the guest that would feel embarrassed 
about entering our home: it has come without invitation and will proceed without 
hesitation. 16 Being uncanny, it will exude an eerie atmosphere; one does not 
know what to expect from it, but it is evident that its presence is palpably 
unsettling and is felt by everyone. Generally speaking, the notion of nihilism, even 
though its meaning is not unequivocally clear – in fact, it can denote several things 
at the same time – conveys an overwhelmingly negative sense: one expects 
something dreadful, sinister, destructive. As Weller observes, “Since its 
introduction into the discourse on modernity at the time of the French Revolution, 
targets for the charge of nihilism have included atheism, Christianity, Judaism, 
rationality, metaphysics, ontology, transcendental idealism, logocentrism, 
deconstruction, technology, democracy, Nazism, fascism, socialism, bolshevism, 
humanism, and anti-humanism.”17 Indeed, nihilism has been tied to almost any 
movement or –ism that appeared to be undesirable or hostile to its adversaries.18 
Nevertheless, nihilism has not exclusively been characterized as negative or 
destructive. Marmysz comments that nihilism can – and has been – viewed as 
something positive or productive as well: a field or a ground that allows for 
previously unknown creative forces to appear. 
 
The problem of nihilism (…) is nothing new. It is, in fact, a perennial 
                                                     
14 Gillespie (2015), p. 80. 
15 Crosby (1988), p.4. 
16 Metzger (2009a), p.1: “The figure of the guest, ‘standing at the door,’ suggests that he is foreign, an 
outsider or alien from whom one can safely dissociate or differentiate oneself. The fact that nihilism is 
the ‘uncanniest of all guests,’ however, suggests that he makes our home itself foreign and alien; his 
chill figure is not simply unwelcome, it renders us homeless (heimatlos).” 
17 Weller (2011), pp. 9-10. 
18 In the case of Leo Strauss, Nazism was the infamous manifestation and embodiment of German 
nihilism. See: Strauss (1999), pp. 357-358: “The fact of the matter is that German nihilism is not absolute 
nihilism, desire for the destruction of everything including oneself, but a desire for the destruction of 
something specific: of modern civilisation. That, if I may say so, limited nihilism becomes an almost 
absolute nihilism only for this reason: because the negation of modem civilisation, the No, is not guided, 
or accompanied, by any clear positive conception. German nihilism desires the destruction of modem 
civilisation as far as modern civilisation has a moral meaning.” 
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concern and a source of anxiety that has had an influence upon human 
life and thought throughout history. A phenomenon that has affected both 
individuals and whole cultures, nihilism has been likened to a “malaise,” 
a “cancer,” and a “sickness,” while also having been called a “divine way 
of thinking,” and an inspiration to artists and scholars. Nihilism has been 
deemed both a “disease” and a “cure”; something to be feared as well as 
welcomed. In short, it is a phenomenon that has been considered both an 
evil and a good.19 
 
What positive features could nihilism possibly hold? For one thing, if one is to 
begin anything from scratch, nihilism is the sweeping power that has the potential 
to erase anything that would otherwise stand in the way and hinder the creation of 
revolutionary novelties. In order to give life to something new, naturally, 
something old needs to give way to it. As things stand, the old typically does not 
want to give up its place voluntarily to the new. The movement of nihilism can 
provide the necessary thrust that sets the emerging innovative forces free. That is 
why Nietzsche believed that a new beginning – which was symbolized in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra by the carefree and obliviously inventive play of the child – 
necessitates the prior destruction of the aged “tables of value”. Accordingly, Baker 
adds, “Nietzsche believed that the outcome of nihilism – the death of God – is 
itself the opportunity for what he terms ‘the great liberation’. Not the inexistence 
of God but his death”20  
The “death of God” stands for the lack of values, the pervading 
meaninglessness and the perceived futility of human life. Since the belief in the 
metaphysical truths and the entire Christian mega-narrative has crumbled, man 
has nowhere to turn but towards his innermost self. The triumph of subjectivity, 
whose gradual expansion began with the renaissance and Descartes, has come to 
its completion in the nihilistic individualisms of Stirner and Nietzsche. However, 
this supposed triumph is, in fact, also a staggering defeat, for the subject of 
epistemology, the ego cogito that has objectified the entire world, could not avoid 
the undesired outcome of objectifying itself as well in the end. Man has become 
just another field of inquiry for science, therefore the distance between himself 
and his knowledge of himself grew steadily until it came to be no longer 
bridgeable. Hence the self has lost touch with its authentic selfhood which points 
                                                     
19 Marmysz (2003), p.1. 
20 Baker (2018), p.1. 
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outside of its individual self and which could provide meaning and values. 
 
The triumph of subjectivity is self-destructive, because it has inflated the 
human ego without developing self-respect, the true basis of agency, and 
the social character of human vision. Moreover, the triumph of ‘Man’ 
necessitated the death of God. But, since God had been the sole source 
of our values and the origin of all meaningfulness, the death of God only 
accelerated the spread of a latent culture of nihilism, cancer of the spirit, 
contagion of despair.21 
 
As we have seen in the Introduction, Nishitani attended Heidegger’s lectures on 
Nietzsche’s Nihilism and has followed Heidegger’s philosophical etiology as to 
the causes of the spiritual pathology of western civilization. Heidegger famously 
claimed that the process of nihilism is an inevitable one, since it is practically 
coded into the advancing self-oblivion of western metaphysics. In other words, it 
could not have happened in any other way; it was the “destiny” of European 
intellectual history to have nihilism emerge from its underbelly at a certain point 
and allow it to blossom. 22  In Heidegger’s view, even though Nietzsche 
maintained that western metaphysics had ended and a new epoch had begun with 
him, Nietzsche was, indeed, still operating from within the same tradition that 
held him captive.23 Heidegger, in a strikingly similar way as Nietzsche before 
him, asserted that he was the first one in the history of philosophy who had 
succeeded in overcoming the failings of the self-destructive western metaphysics 
and had instigated a new way of philosophizing; to be precise, a new way of 
thinking (Denken).  
How did Heidegger see mankind’s responsibility in bringing about the advent 
of nihilism? 
 
For Heidegger, modern man is ‘empty’ and estranged from the world, 
incapable of valuing, moved only by the restlessness of his ‘will to will’, 
by his sense of some endless possibility to enhance his subjectivity. 
Perhaps it would seem logical to conclude that, for Heidegger, modern 
                                                     
21 Levin (1988), p. 4. 
22 Although not everyone agrees with Heidegger on this particular point. Rosen for instance states – 
Rosen (1969), p. xiv. – that, although the danger of nihilism is a permanent human possibility, the actual 
pervasive presence of nihilism today is due to a series of specific philosophical decisions in the past.” 
23 Mortensen (1994), pp.138-139. 
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man embodies the nihil, that modern man is the ‘nothing’ – yet, at 
precisely this point we would be wrong. (…) Aims are not lacking; they 
are, for modern man, everywhere and always bound up with the most 
important being – the self, my self, this one and no other, me. But is it not 
in this that, for Heidegger, a historically intensified forgetfulness of 
Being might lie? In other words, is modern man not the historical 
embodiment of near-absolute forgetfulness in which what Heidegger 
calls ‘everydayness’ becomes the only horizon of self- and world-
understanding? And, in this sense, is modern man not the central 
character of destructive nihilism?24 
 
It is ambiguous, to say the least, as to whether Heidegger holds “modern man” 
morally accountable for unleashing – and, on occasion, actively implementing – 
the destructive powers of nihilism. His account of the History of Being seems to 
imply that the processes of history are destined to happen the way they do and the 
way they will do. On the other hand, it would be difficult to ignore the morally 
highly saturated rhetoric Heidegger tends to use whenever he analyzes and, in 
effect, criticizes modern science and particularly modern technology for enabling 
the spread of nihilism and the spiritual impoverishment of human existence. Yet, 
it is also Heidegger who pays heed to the developments of other intellectual and 
spiritual traditions, namely, Chinese and Japanese thought, and sometimes 
incorporates them – usually without giving them much credit – into his later 
philosophy. The fact that – and the manner in which – he keeps open the 
possibility of a renewal of western thinking, a “second beginning” by which 
nihilism would be surpassed is clearly significant. Furthermore, the key to the 
overcoming of nihilism in Heidegger might already be there in the movement of 
nihilism itself. As Cunningham perceptively observed, nihilism in its true sense 
cannot be such a one-sided negative phenomenon as it is regularly portrayed in a 
rather overly simplified fashion. 
 
This conundrum merely points to the obvious fact that nihilism may lack 
God, but it also lacks this lack of God. Accompanying any radical 
absence is an absence of absence, and so to attribute a negativity to 
nihilism is one-sided. This type of accusation articulates its protestation 
                                                     
24 Costea and Amiridis (2011), pp. 21-22. 
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only ‘within the sides’ of a metaphysical imputation, since it must 
presume the absence of nihilism so as to be able to accuse it. Such 
accusation takes the form of deeming nihilism nihilistic, and this, it is 
argued, need not be the case (…) If we are to speak seriously of nihilism 
we must, it seems, understand nihilism precisely to be an absence of 
nihilism: nihilism is not nihilistic. (...) Nihilism will provide values, gods, 
and most of all, it seems, intelligibility. Indeed, as we shall see, nihilism 
generates an excessive intelligibility.25  
 
3. Nothingness, Emptiness and the Self in Japanese Philosophy and 
Psychotherapy 
 
If one accepts the above claim that nihilism is not nihilistic after all, that is to 
say, beyond its naturally destructive characteristics it has a positive aspect as well 
which permits new values and new meanings to emerge, one still wonders where 
these new values and meanings may rise from? If nothing exists any longer, if all 
that has been, is irretrievably lost, and the beings as we used to know them are no 
more, then the only fountainhead from which the new values could possibly spring 
forth is, indeed, nothingness itself. But what is nothingness? Is it a thing among 
others? If it is, how does it differ from any other being? Or is it perhaps a radically 
different reality which cannot be characterized by the traditional apparatus of 
ontology? 
The advancement of nihilism has been whirling onward ruinously until it has 
reached its most radical conclusion, which is this: it can no longer destruct without 
having to build and create something new. The way beyond nihilism leads through 
it, as both Nietzsche and Nishitani agreed, so one cannot simply shy away or shun 
the consequences of its relentless advancement. The most immediate consequence 
of this progress is that it is impossible to turn back to the same values and the 
same narratives which were still valid before nihilism commenced its vicious ride. 
However, it is still possible to grab hold of that which is alive and life-giving in 
the old and make use of it for the new to come. As Nishitani argues: 
 
Both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche anticipated the nihilism that was to come, 
and dared to descend to the depths of history and humanity to struggle 
                                                     
25 Cunningham (2002), p. 170. 
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desperately against it. They can even lead us Japanese to the nihilism 
lurking in the ground of our historical actuality. But in order for us to 
take up the struggle, we need our own means. The way to overcome it 
must be of our own creation. Only then will the spiritual culture of the 
Orient which has been handed down through the ages be revitalized in a 
new transformation.26 
 
Nishitani was convinced that the way out of nihilism could only be reached by 
dipping into its heart and coming face to face with nothingness itself. One is 
instinctively reluctant to turn away from being and to bend instead towards 
nothingness, for nonbeing and nothingness are generally considered to be 
analogous with death and extinction which every healthy living instinct wants to 
avoid. Nevertheless, as Heidegger emphatically referred to nothingness as 
something that can be experienced in the existential mode of anxiety (Angst) 
which brings one’s most authentic possibility for being to one’s awareness, the 
encounter of nothingness is not only inevitable but it is also desirable; desirable 
in the sense that it facilitates the displacement of something worse, i.e. the all too 
powerful self-destructive strand of nihilism. The direct experience of existential 
anxiety, along with Dasein’s running-forward-to-death and the chilling encounter 
of nothingness amidst the moment of Angst are justifiably dreaded scenarios that 
one would never look forward to. Yet, precisely this experience is that exceptional 
one which, by displaying the groundlessness of one’s existence prepares one for 
the acceptance of a vision that demands no grounds for humans to be able to exist 
and even to thrive and flourish happily in life.  
Despite the fact that Buddhism has been frequently accused, even by 
Nietzsche himself, of being through and through nihilistic and life-denying, 
Nishitani insists that “there is in Mahayana a standpoint that cannot be reached 
even by nihilism”. He quickly adds though that, “For the present this standpoint 
remains buried in the tradition of the past, far from historical actuality.” 27 Yet, 
this standpoint, which is the standpoint of nothingness or emptiness, is still 
potentially accessible for the seeking mind: one only needs to unearth the origins 
of the concepts of nothingness and emptiness and then witness how they endow 
with new values and meanings the moribund words and notions of our language 
and our narratives that had been long besieged by the negative forces of nihilism. 
                                                     
26 Nishitani (1990), p. 181. 
27 Op. cit., p. 180-181. 
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During the time when Nishitani’s predecessor, the originator of the Kyoto 
School, Nishida Kitarō was a young intellectual seeking out a way to wed the 
ancient insights of Zen Buddhism28 with the nomenclatures of modern western-
style philosophy, taking good use of the antique texts of Buddhism was not an 
approach that was in the vogue in Japan. As the government dispatched many of 
its brightest young students and professionals to Europe and the United States in 
order “to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills for modernization”, the prior 
body of knowledge that was founded on Indian, Chinese and ancient Japanese 
religious texts and on dated scholarly discussions came to be heavily criticized 
and eventually abandoned by the most.29 While the Japanese were looking for 
their identity, the religious past and the modernizing scientific present, especially 
in medical and religious circles, competed and clashed with each other.30 
 
At the outset, the explicitly expressed guiding principle of modernization 
in Japan was to borrow western technology and science but maintain 
Asian values. As the process unfolded, however, it became clear to many 
leading Japanese intellectuals that modernization brought with it ideas of 
self, society, knowledge, education, and ethics that ran counter to many 
traditional Buddhist, Confucian, and Shinto values. (…) In response to 
the new ideas from the West, a great many philosophers in the Japanese 
academy simply abandoned the premodern traditions as sources for their 
work, devoting themselves entirely to expositions and critiques of major 
western figures.31 
 
Sensing the damaging effects of this clash between the old and the new yet 
deliberately refusing to take sides, Nishida, and, about the same time, Morita 
Masatake, a famed psychiatrist at the prestigious Jikei University opted for 
elevating Buddhism back into the mainstream of philosophical and scientific 
discourses. In order to do this, they took advantage of the rich cultural heritage of 
                                                     
28 On Nishida’s Zen Buddhist practice of zazen in search of enlightenment see for example Uehara 
(2019), p. 578. 
29 Heisig et. al. (2011a), p.15: “Along with medicine, engineering, agriculture, postal systems, and 
education, knowledge of western thought was prized as a means to understand the foundations of modern 
society and the ideas behind western science and technology. Naturally, this would involve intimate 
familiarity with western philosophy. After a brief period of interest in British utilitarianism and 
American pragmatism, Japanese philosophers began to look to Germany for guidance.” 
30 Harding (2015), pp. 4-12. 
31 Heisig et. al. (2011a), p.15-16. 
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two well-respected archaic East Asian philosophical concepts: nothingness and 
emptiness. Nishida by planting the notion of absolute nothingness into the center 
of his conceptual framework and elaborating its crucial significance with regard 
to epistemology and ethics, whereas Morita by creating a unique form of 
psychotherapeutic practice which he based on the emptying of the self and on 
accepting reality as it is, the pragmatic reappropriation of these two concepts for 
modern Japan had began to take shape.  
As Deguchi explains, nothingness and emptiness are “among the most 
important philosophical terms in East Asian thoughts. Emptiness, as a 
philosophical term, has an Indian origin; it is śūnyatā in Sanskrit, and was 
formulated in Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly in the Paramīta sūtras and the 
Mādhyamaka school. On the other hand, nothingness came from Chinese Daoism, 
especially the doctrine of reverence for nothingness”32  Nishida differentiates 
between relative and absolute nothingness. Whereas relative nothingness is 
relative to being, in other words, it is the denial and negation of a particular form 
of being, absolute nothingness is not relative to anything (thus it is absolute). To 
put it differently, absolute nothingness (zettai mu) is not determined or delineated 
by anything else. It is a place (basho) which encompasses anything else and from 
which particular beings form and emerge. As Krummel elucidates, it is the 
“horizonless horizon that contextualizes and makes possible every determination 
of being as well as their negation”.33 Nishida’s position is akin to the Mahāyāna 
notion of the middle path or the emptiness of emptiness which stands between the 
negative (and relative) nothingness of nihilism and a substantialized version of 
nothingness which is liable to turn nothingness into yet another form of supreme 
being (similar to God or Being).34  
As Heisig observes, “One of the core ideas associated with the Kyoto School 
philosophers is that of a self-awareness in which the self awakens to its true nature 
as no-self.” 35  Regarding Nishida, the negation of the self and the goal of 
becoming the thing itself is a crucial part of his philosophical program from the 
outset. Becoming one with reality in a primordial, non-dual awareness is one of 
the principal goals of Nishida already in Inquiry into the Good, his first major 
                                                     
32 Deguchi (2014), p. 300: “When the Mahāyāna idea of emptiness was introduced into China, it was 
sometimes translated and explained as nothingness. Since then, these terms have been largely taken as 
synonyms in Buddhist philosophical discourse.” 
33 Krummel (2014), p. 272. 
34 Krummel (2014), p. 281. 
35 Heisig (2016), p. 187. 
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philosophical work. In order to this, in order to become united with reality in a 
non-dual awareness it is necessary to learn to empty the self and see things as they 
truly are without our subjective distortions and our reflexive interpretations.36 
When the subject and the object are completely joined in a single awareness, that 
is when the ego-self gets forgotten, and the totality of the experience may come 
to the fore. For the early Nishida the concept of “pure experience” was the starting 
point that was supposed to enable the self to rise above the subject-object division. 
Knowing things as they are is the goal of both philosophy and life in general, yet 
this kind of knowledge can only be acquired intuitively, according to Nishida. 
Pure experience is supposed to break through the ego-centered view of the self 
and reveal reality in an originary way. According to this view, the true or authentic 
self can only be encountered in pure experience when the self is lost in some kind 
of activity. At that moment the self loses its sense of itself and becomes completely 
“sincere”. This kind of sincerity appears spontaneously as soon as the awareness 
of the ego-self disappears. 
Losing the self in a non-reflexive activity serves as the key to understanding 
Morita Masatake’s approach to psychotherapy as well. As a psychiatrist his chief 
aim was to find a method which would successfully treat neurotic patients 
suffering from anxiety-related diseases and depression. Similarly to Nishida, 
Morita was also not propagating Buddhism out in the open but decided rather to 
let his theory (and practice) be influenced by Zen Buddhist tenets and values in a 
more subtle manner. The tacit application of the arugamama principle which 
entails accepting reality as it is, without illusions and without self-deception, 
coupled with the self-emptying process that occurs while the patient is lead to 
directly face his or her problems and thus to build up a novel relation to the world 
from the ground up are essential features of Morita therapy.37 According to this 
approach, reality can be experienced in a fundamentally different way than what 
we are used to in our everyday involvement with things and with other people. 
When one candidly and directly engages with the ever-changing stream of 
existence, a much deeper sort of involvement with reality can result whereby one 
comes to encounter the fine and delicately tangible events in the natural order of 
things. This experience is tantamount to losing one’s egoistic self and waking up 
to a new self that is safely grounded in the natural environment and is naturally 
selfless and compassionate. This new selfless self, by negating itself and through 
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37 Morita, Shōma (1998), pp. 3-34. 
 113
disentangling itself from its own neurotic preoccupation with itself does not fall 
prey to the self-destructive tendencies of nihilism, albeit it does not cease to 
acknowledge the emptiness of its existence either.38 Being completely immersed 
in the flux of reality the awareness of the subject merges into the tranquil and 
engaged observation of what appears in the field of consciousness. This might 
remind us of Nishida’s notion of “sincerity” and the disappearance of the self 
amidst the pure experience of reality. 
Turning back once again to Nishitani, one can readily observe how his 
analysis had been influenced by Nishida, and at the same, how he diverged from 
his predecessor in significant ways. Krummel points out that “Nishitani, 
borrowing the schema of Nishida, distinguishes emptiness as absolute 
nothingness (J. zettai mu) from nihility as relative nothingness (J. sōtai mu).”39 
However, in Nishitani’s explanation “absolute negation” (zettai hitei) as the 
negation of negation becomes the “great affirmation” (ōkina kōtei), and it is on 
the Buddhist standpoint of emptiness as absolute “nothingness” that nihilism can 
be penetrated and thus overcome. In Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani 
distinguishes three different standpoints or modes of existence which correspond 
to the three fields of consciousness, nihility, and emptiness. Davis sums it up the 
following way:  
 
On the field of consciousness (by which he means subjective, dualistic 
consciousness), we purport to know other persons and things; but in fact 
what we know are merely our own subjective representations of them. 
On the field of nihility (…) one realizes that there is an “absolute breach” 
between one’s subjective consciousness and the things or persons it 
purports to represent. However, on the field of emptiness, one realizes 
that this “absolute breach” that distances one person or thing from 
another at the same time “points directly to a most intimate encounter 
with everything that exists.” This “intimate encounter” is possible 
because underneath the abyss of nihility that separates subjective 
consciousness from everything else lies the field of emptiness that unites 
things in their differences.40 
 
                                                     
38 Chervenkova, Velizara (2017), pp. 45-60. 
39 Krummel (2019). p. 660. 
40 Davis (2017), p. 243. 
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The field of emptiness in Nishitani’s analysis has a unifying power that breaks 
down the individual differences of the subjects and provides a groundless ground 
upon which the experience of values and meanings is possible yet again. As we 
may remember, nihilism has announced its arrival by bringing into awareness the 
meaninglessness of life and the valuelessness of all values. At a later point, 
however, nihilism came to its most radical when the emergence of new values and 
new meanings was bound to happen once again, owing to the activation of the 
positive forces that lie beneath the negative veneer of the movement of nihilism. 
“When things appear to be ultimately meaningless, without substance, we are 
forced by the negation of what we had taken for granted to take a step back to see 
the reality of our existence under a new light. This marks a fundamental 
conversion of life that comes to question our ego-centric and anthropo-centric 
assumptions”.41 
A conversion of an earlier self-centered vantage point to a selfless and 
altruistic one is also a hallmark feature of Naikan therapy which is another 
Japanese psychotherapeutic approach founded upon a venerable Buddhist 
tradition. The founder of Naikan therapy, Yoshimoto Ishin was a Shin Buddhist 
priest who created Naikan (“introspection”) therapy out of the ancient ascetic 
practice of mishirabe the aim of which was the attainment of enlightenment 
(satori). Naikan theory emphasizes the interconnectedness of beings, and, in 
particular, the individual’s sinful forgetfulness of his or her indebtedness to others. 
During the course of the highly structured procedure of the therapy the clients are 
to meditate on and come to terms with their self-serving narratives of the past, 
while realizing how biased their preferred ways of remembrances vis-á-vis their 
roles in past events have been. As soon as one learns to see one’s life and the 
significance of other people’s assistance in one’s life in a less self-absorbed and 
self-protective manner, one will become more compassionate and feel 
reconnected to society and nature as a whole.42 Emptying the self, realizing an 
objective view of reality, and finding meaning in the appreciation of and 
gratefulness for one’s immediate environment (family, friends, the Nature) are the 
ultimate goals of Naikan therapy. 
Letting go is the key to Naikan therapy. One lets go of one’s old, false image 
of the self and of the world. However, instead of being reborn or transformed into 
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a new self, it is not the self but rather the world that changes form. It simply occurs 
as a result of the self’s realization concerning its deep interconnectedness with the 
world: the self stops seeing the world as something external to itself. The 
transformed self is transformed because it does not prioritize itself over other 
selves any longer. One learns in Naikan that the world has blurry boundaries, and 
by caring for the world the self sustains itself just as much as the world sustains 
itself by caring for the self. If I cause you pain the pain I cause you causes me 
pain, too; for although you are not me and I am not you, you and I are not entirely 
separate, either. The sincere and profound gratitude one feels during and after 
Naikan for one’s family and friends and for one’s life in general brings one to the 
understanding as to our essential belonging with one another, with our ever 




Having compared in a concise manner how Nishida, Morita, Nishitani and 
Yoshimoto have addressed the problems of meaninglessness, valuelessness and 
egocentrism that are all recognized to be the results of a pervasive nihilism that is 
present in our contemporary culture we came to the position where it will be 
possible to draw on the commonalities in their respective views. First of all, all 
four of these thinkers seem to agree that the only approach which is capable of 
transcending nihilism leads through the realization of the emptiness of the self. 
This view, in turn, demands to see reality as it is, beyond the false subject-object 
dichotomy. As Nishitani would stress, only by going through nihilism can one 
overcome it. Nishida and Nishitani both suggested a criterion with reference to 
attaining the objective of transcending the self-defeating self-centered vision of 
modernity that is virtually the same criterion that the aforementioned Japanese 
psychotherapists set as a goal. This criterion consists in allowing the self and other 
beings, via a transformative personal conversion, to become manifest in their 
“suchness” (shinnyo) so that the self could achieve an egoless tranquility from 
which it would become able to see its original connectedness to other beings. The 
ideal of the enlightened or selfless self looking at it from this revitalized Buddhist 
perspective is a self which is infinitely more embedded in the world than was ever 
before. The arugamama principle which demands the acceptance of things as they 
                                                     
43 Ozawa de-Silva (2006).  
 116
are instead of fleeing into imaginary scenarios or focusing monomaniacally on the 
ego’s petty concerns, is believed to be crucial for the individual’s well-being (and 
also for the healthy functioning of society as a whole).  
Standing on this rejuvenated standpoint of emptiness qua nothingness one 
does not purport to have buried once and for all the problem of nihilism or the 
quandary of the groundlessness that opens up underfoot whenever one sincerely 
examines one’s rapidly dissolving existential bases. Perhaps the self-destructive 
and self-reorganizing traits of nihilism are vital components to its movement that 
is eternally vying with(in) itself. The human self that both causes the suffering 
and is subject to the suffering it causes may be better off if it were conceived as 
an entity that lacks a substantial core, devoid of an unchanging and indestructible 
center. Perhaps the self could be posited instead as a locus of emptiness wherein 
new values and new meanings are created spontaneously and automatically as 
soon as the self stops concentrating on itself and, as a prudent alternative, opens 
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[Essay] 
If Goldfish Give Us Meaning in Life, What’s Next? 




In her widely influential and popular book Meaning in Life and Why It Matters, Susan Wolf formulates 
a hybrid theory of our ability to have meaning in life. She originally argues, meaning in life arises 
from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way. I show that Wolf ends 
up crucially shifting her view from this original version to a revised version that she presents in her 
response to Nomy Arpaly and Johnathan Haidt’s commentaries. Following this, I argue Wolf’s 
account of meaning in life has very serious, possibly irrevocable, flaws because it structurally allows 




Susan Wolf’s hybrid theory of “meaning in life” as outlined in Meaning in 
Life and Why It Matters aims to combine elements from objective theories of 
meaning in life and subjective or attitude-dependent theories of meaning in life.1 
Objective theories see meaning in life as being grounded in the actions one 
performs or the activities one participates in that promote “the greater good.” 
Subjective or attitude-dependent theories, on the other hand, see meaning in life 
as being grounded in the attitudes of satisfaction or fulfillment that one derives 
from activities they engage in or, more generally, their life at large. So understood, 
Wolf’s hybrid theory combines elements from both objective and subjective 
theories to suggest that meaning in life is grounded in one’s engagement with 
activities that are (i) subjectively satisfying and (ii) are objectively valuable in a 
positive way. On that note, this paper has two aims that will be divided 
correspondingly into two sections. In section one, I will focus on sketching a 
crucial shift in Wolf’s hybrid theory that I believe she commits herself to in the 
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appendix of the book. Following this, in section two I will raise some objections 
to this revised version of the hybrid theory and conclude with some brief 
comments on the implications for Wolf’s view.  
 
1. A Change in View  
 
In this section, I will attempt to draw an outline of the account of “meaning in 
life” that Susan Wolf gives in her lectures. I am going to show that Wolf ends up 
shifting her view from this original version to a revised version that she presents 
in her response to Nomy Arpaly and Johnathan Haidt’s commentaries. First, 
however, a few preliminary remarks are in order. I want to set up the scene by 
calling attention to how Wolf begins by framing her view against the background 
of two long-standing philosophical models of rationality. According to the first 
model, people act rationally only insofar as their actions are grounded in their own 
self-interest. Conversely, the second model holds that people act rationally only 
insofar as they do what is best from a strictly moral perspective. By most standards, 
I think, these two models are quite popular, but Wolf contends that they alone are 
not enough to adequately describe human motivation and practical reason. In fact, 
she says they leave out many of the motives and reasons that are most important 
and central to our lives. Consider for example common cases such as when we 
visit a family member in the hospital or stay up all night working hard on a 
philosophy paper. Here, Wolf thinks, it would be mistaken to say that our actions 
are grounded in self-interest or moral reasons, because we are neither maximizing 
our own welfare by doing them, nor are we duty-bound to perform them. 2 
Moreover, it seems odd to say that in such cases our behavior is unjustified in 
terms of our motives and practical reason. Thus, Wolf suggests that in these cases 
and others like them we act on reasons of love (i.e., acting for the sake of the loved 
person, object, or ideal, or simply because the actor loves what it is they are acting 
for), which correspondingly serve as an ingredient for meaning in one’s life.  
Still, Wolf makes it a point to show that not all cases where our actions are 
grounded in reasons of love does meaningfulness come to play a role, there are 
conditions that limit what contributes to meaning in one’s life. According to her, 
“meaning arises from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a 
                                                     
2 This isn’t to suggest that moral reasons to perform a given action only amounts to whether or not 
there is a duty to do so.  
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positive way.”3 This characterization of Wolf’s view, however, is very not very 
detailed and overlooks some important aspects. With that being said, I want to try 
to formulate her view as follows: 
 
Original version. A life with meaning in it is one that (i) subjects 
find fulfilling, (ii) contributes to or connects passionately with some 
person, object, or ideal, x, such that x has objective value (OV) 
outside of the subject, and (iii) that x is the thing that gives rise to the 
subject’s fulfillment. 
 
Now, there is a lot to unpack here, so let’s begin. For one thing we have these 
vague notions of “fulfillment” and “objective value outside of the subject” present 
in our formulation of the Original version that need to be made clear. For Wolf, a 
subject’s fulfillment just is “the feelings one has when one loves, or when one is 
engaging in activities by which one is gripped or excited.”4 As for the second 
concern, the notion of a person, object, or ideal having objective value outside the 
subject is merely used by Wolf to avoid a radically subjective account of value. 
Otherwise, Wolf’s proposal is, as it stands, pretty straightforward and we need not 
spend too much time on it. I do wish to acknowledge that something seems right 
about the account justifying those common cases—like visiting a family member 
in the hospital or staying up all night to write a philosophy paper—in terms of 
practical reason. 
Although it has this appealing consequence, the Original version isn’t very 
strong as it stands. Arpaly raises the worry that the Original version provides an 
objectionable result when given an easily imaginable case of a mentally disabled 
child that is positively engaged with caring for his pet goldfish and who finds the 
very activity to be fulfilling. As Wolf expresses throughout her lectures, she takes 
caring for a pet goldfish to be a paradigm instance of when an activity does not 
meet the conditions necessary to give rise to fulfillment.5 At least she thinks this 
is true for normal adults. However, according to Arpaly, “in caring for the fish, 
the child, unlike the adult, may well be working at the edge of his abilities, giving 
himself challenges and reasons to feel pride… a beloved goldfish or two can give 
                                                     
3 See note 1, p. 8.  
4 See note 1, p. 14.  
5 As Wolf’s own discussion renders clear, this is because she does not take caring for a pet goldfish as 
being an activity in which the subject contributes to or connects passionately with some person, object, 
or ideal, that has positive objective value. 
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the [mentally disabled] child a measure of fulfillment that would require much 
bigger projects in a normal adult…”6 Given this, if one embraces the Original 
version along with Wolf’s assumptions about the objective value in caring for a 
pet goldfish, then it must follow that the imagined mentally disabled child is not 
doing something which contributes to meaning in life. However, it seems clear 
from Wolf’s discussion following this objection that she feels this is an issue her 
account ought to accommodate.7 Following a worry of this sort, both Arpaly and 
Haidt suggest that the Original version is too restrictive in this way. For them, an 
account of meaning in life should focus on the subject’s fulfillment as meeting 
psychological needs and the exercise of human capacities, rather than place so 
much weight on the objective value of the person, object, or ideal that the subject 
engages with when determining meaning in one’s life. 
Of course, I am certainly not the first to think Wolf shifts her view when she 
responds to these objections in the appendix of the book. Frances Kamm also 
notices this and says, “[Wolf] hypothesizes that [(i)] it is the exercise of whatever 
capacities one has to the highest extent and [(ii)] the opportunity this gives for 
interacting with others that may create objective value in that to which one is 
attracted.”8 At a minimum, (ii) seems right, however, I want to suggest that (i) is 
an incorrect interpretation of what Wolf says. In fact, she can even be found saying, 
“Haidt’s and Arpaly’s discussions of human psychology are insightful and 
instructive, with interesting implications, I believe for the [Original version]. Still, 
I believe there are reasons to resist using their insights to defend a fulfillment view 
of meaning that is independent to any reference of objective value.”9 This is to 
say, that she wants to hold on to (iii), or something like it, from the Original 
version despite what might seem like pressure for her to reconsider. In an attempt 
to offset all these worries, she gives, at least implicitly, a revised version that I 
will try to formulate as follows: 
 
                                                     
6 See note 1, p. 89. 
7 “Although Haidt and Arpaly offered their examples (of the horse-loving student and goldish-loving 
disabled child) as challenges to the idea that meaningfulness need be understood as essentially connected 
to objective value, I see their examples as offering hints about where the objective value might be found 
and how it can emerge. By understanding their examples in this way we can not only acknowledge the 
plausibility of their assessments, but explain what makes them so effective.” Wolf, op. cit., p. 130. 
8 Frances Kamm, Almost Over, (unpublished manuscript). From Ch. 6 of her forthcoming book on death, 
dying, and public policy.   
9 See note 1, p. 120. 
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Revised version. A life with meaning in it is one that (i) subjects 
find fulfilling (ii) contributes to, or connects passionately with, some 
person, object, or ideal, x, such that x has objective value (OV) 
outside of the subject. (iii) Furthermore, there is a continuum of OV 
along which the OV of engaging with x can lie (e.g., building 
relationships, communion that comes from shared activity, 
cultivation and exercise of skills and virtues, etc.) and (iv) the whole 
or overall sum of those engagements the subject has, rather than x 
itself, is what gives rise to the fulfillment. 
 
So, what has changed? Well, let me emphasize an important difference between 
the Original version and the Revised version. Because Wolf adopts a new notion 
of there being “a continuum of value” along which the value of engaging with a 
person, object, or ideal can lie, the Revised version can account for those problems 
raised by Arpaly and Haidt. Without pretending that I have fully captured what is 
meant by this, I wish to say more to ensure there is clarity here. One simple way 
put to it, is that, by “continuum of value” Wolf means the network of valuable 
activities around the person, object, or ideal that the subject engages with—call 
them “associated values,” if you will—and as I hinted above these include things 
like refinement of skills or friendships made through the subject’s engagement. 
So then, on the Revised version, if the mentally disabled child who finds 
fulfillment in caring for a goldfish is engaged with other children who come to 
see the fish and rapport is achieved with his parents who help him care for it, then 
even if those engagements are associated with what Wolf would have described 
as an activity that has no objective value (the caring for a goldfish) on the Original 
version, they are still valuable and give the child meaning in life.  
In any case, it might be suggested that this shift is actually more problematic 
then helpful for Wolf’s account of “meaning in life,” and in the next section, I will 
discuss why I think this is so. 
 
2. Problems with the Revised version and My Worries 
 
As mentioned above and hinted at by the title of this section, I wish to discuss 
my worries that arise as a result of the shift to the Revised version and problems 
with Susan Wolf’s account of “meaning in life” as a whole. In what follows, I’ll 
largely be concerned with the question of what is allowed to count as giving 
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meaning to one’s life as a consequence of this revision.  
First, an important proviso: when looking at a theoretical level, the kind of 
objective value that some person, object, or ideal can have tends to be sorted into 
three general categories, that is, positive, negative, and neutral. As should have 
already been made clear by our discussion in section one, Wolf’s account of 
“meaning in life” has always held that, other things considered, if the person, 
object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged has an objective value that is 
positive, then this gives the subject meaning in life.10 This changed with the shift 
to the Revised version, because now the account allows for the person, object, or 
ideal with which the subject is engaged to have an objective value that is neutral 
(e.g., caring for a pet goldfish) or be what Wolf would more recently refer to as 
“good-for-nothing.”11 I am inclined to think, however, that even in these good-
for-nothing cases such as caring for a pet goldfish, meaning in life is still 
determined, other things considered, by the positive objective value of those 
things within the network of valuable activities associated with the goldish (e.g., 
the friendships made with the other children who come visit to see the goldfish). 
If that analysis is right, namely, that on the Revised version engagement with 
good-for-nothings can give the subject meaning in life, albeit in a somewhat 
indirect way, and that process rests on the main contributors of meaning in life to 
be within the network of activities having positive objective value that are merely 
associated with the good-for-nothings, then I think this account begins to crumble. 
My point is that, in that case, the shift from the Original version to the Revised 
version just represents a shift from the subject previously having to be 
passionately connected with a person, object, or ideal that had in itself positive 
objective value in order to have meaning in life, to now, the subject only having 
to be passionately connected with associated values which have positive objective 
value. That is, so long as the whole or overall sum of the engagements the subject 
has (i.e. the objective value of the person, object, or ideal itself with which the 
subject is engaged plus the associated values) is positive, then the subject has 
                                                     
10 By “other things considered” I mean that given those subjective components (i.e., the subject being 
connected passionately with some person, object, or ideal they choose to engage with and find it 
fulfilling), we can speak of the objective component as being met in such a way. Further, I want to note 
that what I am saying here is, on the Original version, meaning in life is determined (other things 
considered) by the subject’s engagement with some person, object, or ideal, that has positive objective 
value outside of the subject. 
11 Susan Wolf, “Good-for-Nothings” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association, Vol. 85 (2010): pp. 47-64. 
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meaning in life.12 
While this might not seem problematic when we’re only dealing with a 
hypothetical mentally disabled child who finds fulfillment in caring for his 
goldfish, when we further consider the consequences of what has been said above, 
the account seems, at least to me, beyond repair. The idea, roughly, is that if the 
account permits the network of activities with positive objective value to be the 
sole contributor in the event of the subject’s engagement with good-for-nothings, 
then it seems required to permit the network of activities with positive objective 
value to be the sole contributor in the event of the subject’s engagement with what 
I will call bad-for-someones.13 More specifically, this will structurally allow for 
Nazis to be doing something that contributes to meaning in their lives when they 
help out with the Nazi bake sale to raise money for their annual vandalism night, 
because they’ll be passionately connected to friendships and have shared 
communal activities (of which, generally on this view have positive objective 
value) along the way.14 Again, that is so long as the whole or overall sum of their 
engagements produce a positive objective value. Ultimately, this raises an 
interesting question: can an individual who is objectively bad have meaning in 
life? As I have expressed, it immediately seems that there is something 
disqualifying about objectively bad individuals having meaning in life, especially 
in an extreme counterexample like the one I just presented where the individuals 
are Nazis.15 However, I anticipate that insofar as one embraces Wolf’s Revised 
version, there are two possible ways they might respond to this concern. 
                                                     
12 It bears emphasizing that the model for representing evaluations of meaning in life on the Revised 
version assigns “parthood” relations to the person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged 
and to each of things that make up the associated values. From this, it seems natural to elucidate the 
model using a framework of additivism or atomism to derive the sum of those values. At any rate, Wolf’s 
shift in view now presents a picture where meaning in life is determined (other things considered) by a 
positive (in terms of value) sum of those things holding a parthood relation. (Sill it’s difficult to assert 
what exactly the parthood relation is in relation to, for our purposes let’s just call it x, and what exactly 
is a “part,” or can be a “part” of, x. Nevertheless, this need not concern us in advancing the discussion). 
For more see Campbell Brown, “Two Kinds of Holism About Values” in The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 57 (2007): pp. 456-463. 
13 By “bad-for-someones” I mean to refer to those cases where the person, object, or ideal with which 
the subject is engaged has an objective value that is negative (e.g., what most of the middle ages 
consisted of in Europe). 
14 Please do not take me to be saying the Nazi’s communal activities has positive objective value. All I 
meant here was that the general events of building friendships and shared communal activities have 
positive objective value. Also, I will later reference this imagined scenario as the Nazi bake sale example. 
15 Perhaps it’s worth addressing the objection that some readers make at this point. That is, any person, 
object, or ideal related to Nazism has an objective value so negative that realistically, no amount of 
objectively positive associated values could ever make the whole or overall sum of the subject’s 
engagements produce a positive objective value (see Landau, 2011; Campbell & Nyholm, 2015). Even 
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First, defenders of the Revised version might try to retreat by claiming it’s 
fallacious to assume the governing function of the account is based on an atomistic 
model of value holism—i.e., representing (for our purposes) evaluations of 
meaning in life by the sum of independent values without factoring in 
considerations for “interaction effects.” 16  That is when combined, those 
associated positive objective values offered in the above scenario with the Nazis 
actually contribute, all things considered, to the overall disvalue or badness of the 
case. In fact, I quite agree with those defenders that it may be, crudely put, “bad 
philosophy” to hastily make assumptions about what model the governing 
function of any account is based on. But, as far as I can see, their complaint has 
little force and will not provide them with the resources to avoid Wolf’s account 
from crumbling. After all, if one decides to pursue this anticipated retreat it 
remains necessary for them to reconfigure the Revised version with an alternative 
model that represents evaluations of whole values in terms of the composition of 
their part values. But my sense is that, even if this is accomplished, various 
unaddressed concerns still interfere with the Revised version being a 
philosophically satisfying account of meaning in life.  
For one thing, suppose we stipulate that the Revised version’s governing 
function is based on a sort of value holism supported by G.E. Moore or Jonathan 
Dancy where the contextual value of parts plays a critical role in representing 
evaluations of whole values. In this way, the Revised version would be able to 
offer a satisfying response to the Nazi counterexample, namely, that those 
associated positive objective values actually contribute, all things considered, to 
the overall disvalue or badness of the case. Call this the Revised version*. But, as 
                                                     
if that is so, I feel there are other less-extreme cases, one of which I will soon offer, where we could 
reasonably conceive of the person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged having a negative 
objective value that, when conjoined with objectively positive associated values, could allow for the 
whole or overall sum of the subject’s engagements to produce a positive objective value. 
16 To illustrate this point, consider the following example offered by Campbell Brown: “As the opinions 
of competent judges will attest, gravy complements chips, yet spoils ice-cream. That is, chips with gravy 
is better than chips alone, but ice-cream with gravy is worse than ice-cream alone. On an ‘atomistic’ 
view of value, these judgements are puzzling. The sole difference between chips with gravy and chips 
alone is the gravy. So any difference in value between these two must be the value of the gravy. But just 
the same is true of ice-cream with gravy and ice-cream alone: the only difference is the gravy, and so 
any difference in value must be the value of the gravy. The difference in value between the first pair is, 
therefore, the same as that between the second pair. In particular, chips with gravy is better than chips 
alone if and only if ice-cream with gravy is better than ice-cream alone.” Brown, op. cit., p. 1. In short, 
the response from loyal advocates of Wolf’s Revised version can be seen as claiming that the Nazi bake 
sale objection I raised doesn’t take into consideration that there might be an “interaction effect” between 
values as there is with ice-cream and gravy. 
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I hinted at before, the Nazi bake sale case is an extreme counterexample and of 
course there are other less-extreme cases. For example, suppose there’s a farmer 
who spends his entire adult life slaughtering cattle. (For our purposes and because 
it’s a matter of huge debate, let’s say that slaughtering cattle is a type of harm and 
hence a bad-for-someone case).17 Suppose that the farmer does this in order to 
provide food for his family and that he also donates the additional meat to those 
in need during the holidays making him a valued and respected member of his 
community. 18  Intuitively, this might appear to be a bad-for-someone with a 
significant amount of associated objectively positive goods that should contribute 
to meaning in the individual’s life, however, I think we ought to reject this 
inference or at least be very suspicious of it. Right off the bat, it appears unclear 
how the Revised version* would, all things considered, represent an evaluation of 
meaning in life for the cattle farmer—do the associated positive objective values 
here also contribute to the overall badness of the case? Based on what Wolf has 
said in the past about moral saints19, it may be that in this particular scenario she 
does not see the contribution from the negative elements in the cattle farmer’s 
engagement as being a matter of concern for meaning in life.20 Notice, however, 
that this would mark a significant departure from what she originally wished to 
claim in Meaning in Life and Why It Matters, namely, that “an individual cannot 
get meaning from worthless projects, much less from projects of wholly negative 
                                                     
17 I suppose on the traditional use of the word a cow isn’t a “someone.” In that event, one could refer to 
these this case as a bad-for-some-being case. See Harman, 2011; 2015, for debate on whether on not 
killing animals for farming practices constitutes a harm.  
18  This example came from Danny Underwood in comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
Additionally, John Partridge brought to my attention a possible real-life instance of the cattle farmer 
example. Dario Cecchini, a world-renowned Italian butcher from the Chianti region of Italy, was 
previously on a path to become a Veterinarian before he left university to take over the family business 
from his dying father. In doing so, he became the eighth generation of Cecchini butchers. Now, I’m not 
sure Cecchini donates leftover meat to those in need during the holidays the above example describes, 
but he is certainly a well-respected member of his community and, for that matter, the more global 
cooking community. His mission is to protect and advocate for the local butcher against the rise of 
powerful supermarkets and moreover, serve as a teacher and educator. These could considerably be 
associated positive objective values.   
19 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints” in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79 (1982): pp. 419-439. 
20 Frances Kamm pointed out to me that the cattle farmer case might be particularly interesting here 
since it seems to be a case of compensation. That is, by donating his spare product to the needy and 
serving as a valued and respected member of his community, the cattle farmer is attempting to 
compensate for his engagement in an immoral activity. Perhaps that’s why it intuitively seems as if this 
is a bad-for-someone with a significant amount of associated objectively positive goods that should (or 
at least could) contribute to meaning in life. At any rate, another question that might be worth asking is 
how something like compensation, sacrifice, or other contexts weigh on the all things considered value 
of an immoral action, activity, or what have you.   
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value.”21 At the very least, it seems evident that the cattle farmer scenario raises 
concerns that require further consideration. 
The second way I anticipate defenders of the Revised version (and also 
Revised version*) might respond to the issues that arise from the Nazi bake sale 
case (and the cattle farmer scenario just outlined) is by positing anti-meaning as 
part of the model’s conceptual framework. That is, one could suggest that 
meaningfulness is not monopolar and in fact has a negative pole that represents 
adding something of distinctly negative value to one’s life. In this way, Nazi bake 
sale people would be engaged in an activity that substantially weighs against 
whatever contributions to meaning in life they might have had from the positive 
associated values. Although this accounts for the Nazi bake sale case, I find this 
response to face the same issue as the first response. More specifically, it still 
remains unclear how the account would represent an all things considered 
evaluation of meaning in life for the cattle farmer—is he engaged in an activity 
that, like the Nazi bake sale people, substantially weighs against the contributions 
to meaning in life that stem from the positive associated values? As before, the 
cattle farmer case intuitively appears to be a bad-for-someone with a significant 
amount of associated objectively positive goods that should (or at least could) 
contribute to meaning in life. But, as before too, if the contribution from the 
associated values can offset the anti-meaning that stems from the negative 
elements in the in the cattle farmer’s engagement, then there clearly has been a 
departure from what Wolf says about “projects of wholly negative value.”  
Assuming that there is a solution to the foregoing concerns I have raised, the 
Revised version* stands to completely fly in the face of what Wolf seems to say, 
at least implicitly, about what I will refer to as Gauguin cases.22 These are 
scenarios where an individual contributes to, or connects passionately with, some 
person, object, or ideal, that has positive objective value outside of the subject, 
but meanwhile, also is engaged with a network of associated activities that have 
negative objective value. Wolf makes it clear when discussing the scorned artist 
and lonely inventor on the Original version that it’s not a necessary condition for 
there to be a network of associated values in order for the subject to attain meaning 
in life. Against this background, when analyzing Gauguin cases on the Original 
                                                     
21 See note 1, p. 60 
22 So called because of Bernard Williams’ discussion of Gauguin in his essay on moral luck. As the 
story goes, Gauguin abandoned his family in Denmark and isolated himself to pursue art in Paris, hence, 
he aptly represents an individual in the kind of scenario I want to draw on here. 
 130 
version Wolf would have considered an individual—one such as Paul Gauguin—
to have meaning in life. However, given the above discussion of the shift in her 
view to the Revised version and the anticipated responses to the Nazi bake sale 
counterexample that brings to attention the Revised version*, analyzing Gauguin 
cases in the same way as before becomes extremely problematic. To reinforce this 
picture, reflect on how a value holism that takes into account the contextual value 
of parts in the evaluations of whole values—a G.E. Moore and/or Jonathan Dancy 
value holism—would parse these Gauguin cases. According to this way of 
theorizing, the model would likely represent an evaluation of a “Gauguin scenario” 
as a negative whole value, since considerably, it’s just the reverse of the 
aforementioned Nazi bake sale example. By this, I mean to point out that, in the 
latter, the person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged has a negative 
objective value and the associated values are positive, while in the former, the 
person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged has a positive objective 
value and the associated values are negative. So understood, they are switched. 
But, unlike the Nazi bake sale example, Wolf previously seemed committed to 
the idea that an individual like Gauguin would be making a contribution to 
meaning in their life.  
Summing up, if some of what I have argued turns out to not to hit the mark, it 
nevertheless seems evident that Wolf or her supporters need to address the 
concerns I’ve presented in order for the revised hybrid theory to be a 
philosophically satisfying account of meaning in life. On the other hand, if what 
I have argued hitherto does hit the mark, then Wolf’s account has very serious, 
possibly irrevocable, flaws. To say more about why I consider these to be 
“possibly irrevocable flaws,” recall from our earlier discussion that the shift from 
the Original version to the Revised version required a reconfiguration of the 
hybrid theory such that it included a model for representing evaluations of whole 
values in terms of the composition of their part values. Through that process, the 
worries against atomism in the form of the Nazi bake sale case led us to invoke 
value holism in the Revised version*, but, as I see it, this won’t suffice for a theory 
of meaning in life.  
The first point to note is that having meaning in life is generally seen as 
something that (all else being equal) makes one better-off and renders their life 
more desirable to have. To put it another way, meaning in life is generally seen as 
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a prudential good.23 Given that, ideally a theory of meaning in life will be able to 
inform our decision making, that is, insofar as we wish to make ourselves better-
off. In order to do this, a theory needs to be able to provide consistent evaluations 
in the form of meaning in life judgments. Drawing a connection to the examples 
presented earlier, that means a theory needs to be able to provide a single meaning 
in life judgement for each of the individuals in the above cases, more specifically, 
the goldfish owner, the Nazi bake sale people, the cattle farmer, and Paul Gaugin. 
As it turns out, both the Revised version and Revised version* won’t meet this 
criteria. On both of those versions, the objective value of an individual’s 
engagement with some person, object, or ideal, x, considered as a whole depends 
on the values of its parts, namely, the objective value of x and the associated 
values, which allows for multiple meaning in life judgements to be available for 
cases like the cattle farmer and Paul Gaugin. That is to say, in both of those 
examples, a story where the sum of the parts forms a whole with positive objective 
value can just as easily be told as a story where the sum of the parts forms a whole 
with negative objective value.24 At any rate, the bottom line is this: a theory of 
meaning in life that provides contradictory evaluations based on the same case 
information is not a philosophically satisfying theory and can’t inform our 
decision making as it relates to achieving meaning in life or making our lives 
prudentially more valuable.  
As for what an alternative account might look like in that case, I am still 
unsure. Rather, this paper has more so aimed to illuminate a negative result of not 
only Wolf’s Revised version/Revised version* but also her account of “meaning 
in life” as a whole.25  
                                                     
23 See Campbell, 2013; Campbell & Nyholm, 2015; Metz, 2013. Using different terms, Metz suggests 
that meaningfulness is what Tim Scanlon would call a personal good—i.e., “[a] condition that makes 
and individual person’s existence better or worse and so…in a broad sense ‘good for’ one (cf. p. 62).”  
24 With respect to Paul Gaugin on the Revised version*, one could plausibly say that while there is some 
negative OV from the associated values, there is much more positive OV from the art that he is engaged 
in and, moreover, no noteworthy interaction effects between the art and the negative associated values. 
As a result, this makes the sum of those values positive. Therefore, Gauguin has meaning in life. But, 
one could also just as plausibly say the reverse, namely, that while there is so much positive OV from 
the art he is engaged with, there is also a smaller but still sufficient amount of negative OV from the 
associated values to result in interaction effects that make the sum of those values negative. Therefore, 
Gaugin doesn’t have meaning in life. Suffice to say, both judgements about Gaugin can be given on the 
Revised version* despite being based on the same case information.  
25 Previous versions of this paper were presented at The College of William & Mary, the Rutgers 
Undergraduate Philosophy Reading Group, and Waseda University. I would like to thank the audiences 
of each for their input, especially John Partridge, Thaddeus Metz, Philip Swenson, and Frank Wu. I am 
most grateful to Frances Kamm, Danny Underwood, Frank Wu, and an anonymous reviewer for their 
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